EC A*

83 papers

YearTitle / Authors
2016"Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-proof Environment.
Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer
2016A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding.
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Mohamed Mostagir
2016A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games.
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz
2016A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment Selection.
Shipra Agrawal, Vashist Avadhanula, Vineet Goyal, Assaf Zeevi
2016A/B Testing of Auctions.
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov
2016Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming.
Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, Sivaraman Balakrishnan
2016Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets.
Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer
2016Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations Model.
Antoine Désir, Vineet Goyal, Danny Segev
2016Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction.
Ioannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras
2016Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games.
Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Zhiwei Steven Wu
2016Blockchain Mining Games.
Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Tselekounis
2016Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor Market.
Ravi Jagadeesan
2016Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract].
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston
2016Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach.
Ozan Candogan, Markos Epitropou, Rakesh V. Vohra
2016Computational Extensive-Form Games.
Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman
2016Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains.
Piotr Dworczak
2016Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search.
Robert D. Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner, E. Glen Weyl
2016Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christos Tzamos
2016Dynamic Conflict on a Network.
Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal, David E. N. Minarsch
2016Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment.
Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub
2016Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform.
M. Keith Chen
2016Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games.
Vittorio Bilò, Cosimo Vinci
2016Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups.
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
2016Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract.
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
2016Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace.
MohammadHossein Bateni, Yiwei Chen, Dragos Florin Ciocan, Vahab S. Mirrokni
2016Feature-based Dynamic Pricing.
Maxime C. Cohen, Ilan Lobel, Renato Paes Leme
2016General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations.
Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu
2016Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games.
Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun-Ko, Chaitanya Swamy
2016How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be?
Ioannis Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2016Impact of Community Structure on Cascades.
Mehrdad Moharrami, Vijay G. Subramanian, Mingyan Liu, Marc Lelarge
2016Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games.
Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm
2016Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction.
Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes
2016Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy: Abstract of the Kalai Prize Talk.
Tim Roughgarden
2016Ironing in the Dark.
Tim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers
2016Large Market Games with Near Optimal Efficiency.
Richard Cole, Yixin Tao
2016Lottery Pricing Equilibria.
Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi
2016Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover.
Yajun Wang, Sam Chiu-wai Wong
2016Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation.
Shuchi Chawla, J. Benjamin Miller
2016Mechanism Design with Selective Verification.
Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos, Manolis Zampetakis
2016Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms.
Joosung Lee
2016Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves.
Tim Roughgarden, Joshua R. Wang
2016On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets.
Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi
2016On Voting and Facility Location.
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb
2016On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers.
Yiwei Chen, Vivek F. Farias
2016Online Budgeted Allocation with General Budgets.
Nathaniel Kell, Debmalya Panigrahi
2016Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items.
Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang
2016Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations.
Ian A. Kash, Rafael M. Frongillo
2016Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information.
Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang
2016Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods.
Marek Pycia, Kyle Woodward
2016Persuasion with Limited Communication.
Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe, Ruixin Qiang
2016Petty Envy When Assigning Objects.
Thayer Morrill
2016Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias.
Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Manish Raghavan
2016Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange.
John P. Dickerson, David F. Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm, James Trimble
2016Pricing with Limited Knowledge of Demand.
Maxime C. Cohen, Georgia Perakis, Robert S. Pindyck
2016Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '16, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24-28, 2016
Vincent Conitzer, Dirk Bergemann, Yiling Chen
2016Procrastination with Variable Present Bias.
Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis
2016Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions.
Jacob D. Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie, Matus Telgarsky
2016Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay.
Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko, Steven Tadelis
2016Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment Choices.
Nathan Kallus, Madeleine Udell
2016Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees.
Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah
2016Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements.
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
2016Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information.
Kyle Woodward
2016Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks.
Frank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem Amin, Michael P. Wellman
2016Sybil Detection Using Latent Network Structure.
Grant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook, Fang-Yi Yu
2016The FedEx Problem.
Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias
2016The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types.
Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich, David G. Rand
2016The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing.
Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
2016The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm Design.
Haifeng Xu
2016The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms.
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
2016The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets.
Rachel Cummings, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
2016The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs.
Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer
2016The Seasonality Of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field Test.
Quinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen, Haijun Zhu
2016The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries.
Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li
2016The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models.
Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth
2016The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare.
Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang
2016Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads.
Ashish Goel, David Timothy Lee
2016Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions.
Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2016Understanding Emerging Threats to Online Advertising.
Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao, Georgios Zervas
2016Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms.
Jan Christoph Schlegel
2016What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design.
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad
2016When Should an Expert Make a Prediction?
Yossi Azar, Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour
2016Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning Algorithms.
Hamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh, Umar Syed
2016Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?
Ya'akov (Kobi) Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick