| 2022 | A Common Generalization of Budget Games and Congestion Games. Fuga Kiyosue, Kenjiro Takazawa |
| 2022 | Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Colchester, UK, September 12-15, 2022, Proceedings Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros A. Voudouris |
| 2022 | An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games. Jack Dippel, Adrian Vetta |
| 2022 | Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2˟ 2˟ 2 Games. Sahar Jahani, Bernhard von Stengel |
| 2022 | Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents. Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer |
| 2022 | Collective Schedules: Axioms and Algorithms. Martin Durand, Fanny Pascual |
| 2022 | Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs. Matan Gilboa, Noam Nisan |
| 2022 | Coopetition Against an Amazon. Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz |
| 2022 | Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities. Shaul Rosner, Tami Tamir |
| 2022 | Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz |
| 2022 | Decentralized Update Selection with Semi-strategic Experts. Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío |
| 2022 | Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems. Aggelos Kiayias |
| 2022 | Explicitly Simple Near-Tie Auctions. Reshef Meir, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi |
| 2022 | Fair Ride Allocation on a Line. Yuki Amano, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino, Hirotaka Ono |
| 2022 | Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment. Edith Elkind, Sonja Kraiczy, Nicholas Teh |
| 2022 | Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games. Georgios Piliouras, Lillian J. Ratliff, Ryann Sim, Stratis Skoulakis |
| 2022 | Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities. Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre |
| 2022 | Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-modal Preferences. Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Daniel Lokshtanov, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh |
| 2022 | Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism. Ruben Brokkelkamp, Sjir Hoeijmakers, Guido Schäfer |
| 2022 | How Bad is the Merger Paradox? Liad Blumrosen, Yehonatan Mizrahi |
| 2022 | Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas. Kazuhisa Makino, Shuichi Miyazaki, Yu Yokoi |
| 2022 | Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting. Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong |
| 2022 | Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts. Alon Cohen, Argyrios Deligkas, Moran Koren |
| 2022 | Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Almog Wald |
| 2022 | On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets. Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Artem Tsikiridis |
| 2022 | On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games. Qian Wang |
| 2022 | On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games. Yichen Yang, Kai Jia, Martin C. Rinard |
| 2022 | Online Max-min Fair Allocation. Yasushi Kawase, Hanna Sumita |
| 2022 | PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games. Paul W. Goldberg, Matthew J. Katzman |
| 2022 | Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games. Martin Hoefer, Lisa Wilhelmi |
| 2022 | Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy. Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg |
| 2022 | Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals Can Be Harder Than Strict Preferences. Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Tomohiro Koana |
| 2022 | Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams. Leora Schmerler, Noam Hazon, Sarit Kraus |