Y. Narahari - RankMe

168 papers A* 13A 23B 10C 2Misc 3Journal 80Unranked 34

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2025	J	`jnl`	Deep Learning Based Auction Design for Selling Agricultural Produce through Farmer Collectives to Maximize Nash Social Welfare. CoRR Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Bazil Ahmed, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
2025	A	`conf`	Regret Guarantees for a UCB-based Algorithm for Volatile Combinatorial Bandits. AAMAS Abhishek Kumar, Andra Siva Sai Teja, Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2024	J	`jnl`	Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications. CoRR V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Y. Narahari
2024	—	`conf`	To Test or Not: Incentivizing Individuals in a Population to Achieve Socially Optimal Testing in Epidemics. CASE Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, Y. Narahari
2023	—	`conf`	A Decision Support Tool for District Level Planning of Agricultural Crops for Maximizing Profits of Farmers. CASE Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Abhishek Chaudhary, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
2023	—	`conf`	An Innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CASE Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
2023	J	`jnl`	An innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CoRR Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
2023	—	`conf`	Designing Fair, Cost-Optimal Auctions Based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs Through Farmer Collectives. CASE Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari
2023	J	`jnl`	Designing Fair, Cost-optimal Auctions based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs through Farmer Collectives. CoRR Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari
2023	B	`ed.`	Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Educational Data Mining, EDM 2023, Bengaluru, India, July 11-14, 2023 EDM Mingyu Feng, Tanja Käser, Partha P. Talukdar, Rakesh Agrawal, Y. Narahari, Mykola Pechenizkiy
2022	—	`conf`	A Data-Driven, Farmer-Oriented Agricultural Crop Recommendation Engine (ACRE). BDA Rohit Patel, Inavamsi Enaganti, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari
2022	J	`jnl`	Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. CoRR Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
2022	J	`jnl`	Dominant strategy truthful, deterministic multi-armed bandit mechanisms with logarithmic regret for sponsored search auctions. Appl. Intell. Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2022	J	`jnl`	Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. CoRR Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari
2022	—	`conf`	Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. WINE Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
2022	J	`jnl`	Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. CoRR Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
2022	J	`jnl`	Recent Advances in Modeling and Control of Epidemics using a Mean Field Approach. CoRR Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, Y. Narahari
2021	J	`jnl`	Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. J. Mach. Learn. Res. Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari
2021	J	`jnl`	Ballooning multi-armed bandits. Artif. Intell. Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2021	J	`jnl`	Improving Teacher-Student Interactions in Online Educational Forums using a Markov Chain based Stackelberg Game Model. CoRR Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
2020	J	`jnl`	A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. CoRR Shivika Narang, Y. Narahari
2020	A*	`conf`	Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. AAAI Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari
2020	A	`conf`	Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. AAMAS Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2020	J	`jnl`	Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. CoRR Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2020	J	`jnl`	On Achieving Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings. CoRR Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Y. Narahari
2019	J	`jnl`	Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problem. CoRR Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari
2019	J	`jnl`	An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2019	—	`conf`	Design of Trusted B2B Market Platforms using Permissioned Blockchains and Game Theory. IEEE ICBC Shivika Narang, Megha Byali, Pankaj Dayama, Vinayaka Pandit, Y. Narahari
2019	J	`jnl`	Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-Based Preference Aggregation. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari
2019	J	`jnl`	Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers. Theor. Comput. Sci. Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2018	J	`jnl`	A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing. Artif. Intell. Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
2018	J	`jnl`	Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2018	A	`conf`	Design of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions for Online Discussion Forums. AAMAS Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Amleshwar Kumar, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari
2017	A	`conf`	A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. AAMAS Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. CoRR Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2017	A	`conf`	Analysis of Thompson Sampling for Stochastic Sleeping Bandits. UAI Aritra Chatterjee, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Rohit Vaish, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	Formation of Stable Strategic Networks with Desired Topologies. CoRR Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	Frugal bribery in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. CoRR Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. CoRR Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-based Preference Aggregation. CoRR Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	Multi-Label Classification from Multiple Noisy Sources Using Topic Models. Inf. Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2017	J	`jnl`	On Optimal Mechanisms in the Two-Item Single-Buyer Unit-Demand Setting. CoRR D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
2017	A	`conf`	Parameterized Dichotomy of Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. AAMAS Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2017	A	`conf`	Thompson Sampling Based Mechanisms for Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. AAMAS Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2017	A	`conf`	Two-Phase Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Seed Nodes and Referral Incentives. ICWSM Sneha Mondal, Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
2016	A	`conf`	A Deterministic MAB Mechanism for Crowdsourcing with Logarithmic Regret and Immediate Payments. AAMAS Shweta Jain, Ganesh Ghalme, Satyanath Bhat, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2016	—	`conf`	A Fluctuation Smoothing Approach for Unsupervised Automatic Short Answer Grading. NLP-TEA@COLING Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	A Robust UCB Scheme for Active Learning in Regression from Strategic Crowds. CoRR Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2016	B	`conf`	A Robust UCB scheme for active learning in regression from strategic crowds. IJCNN Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	A Truthful Mechanism with Biparameter Learning for Online Crowdsourcing. CoRR Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	An Iterative Transfer Learning Based Ensemble Technique for Automatic Short Answer Grading. CoRR Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari
2016	A*	`conf`	Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. IJCAI Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. CoRR Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2016	A	`conf`	Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach. ECAI Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2016	A	`conf`	Crowdsourced Referral Auctions. ECAI Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2016	A*	`conf`	Frugal Bribery in Voting. AAAI Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2016	—	`conf`	Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. WINE D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. CoRR D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. CoRR Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2016	J	`jnl`	Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification from the Crowd. CoRR Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2016	B	`conf`	Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification. ICTAI Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
2016	A	`conf`	Transfer Learning for Automatic Short Answer Grading. ECAI Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks. CoRR Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari
2015	—	`conf`	A Perspective on Computer Assisted Assessment Techniques for Short Free-Text Answers. CAA Shourya Roy, Y. Narahari, Om D. Deshmukh
2015	A*	`conf`	A Stackelberg Game Approach for Incentivizing Participation in Online Educational Forums with Heterogeneous Student Population. AAAI Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
2015	A	`conf`	A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks. AAMAS Arpita Biswas, Shweta Jain, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement. CoRR Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2015	—	`ed.`	Companion Volume to the Proceedings of the 2nd IKDD Conference on Data Sciences, CODS 2015 Companion Volume, Bangalore, India, March 20, 2015 CODS Companion Volume Manish Gupta, Y. Narahari, V. S. Subrahmanian, Indrajit Bhattacharya
2015	A	`conf`	Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. AAMAS Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations. CoRR Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance
2015	—	`conf`	E-mandi implementation based on gale-shapely algorithm for perishable goods supply chain. CASE S. Prasanna Devi, Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, S. Vinu Kiran, S. Manivannan
2015	A*	`conf`	Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election Using Sampling. IJCAI Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election using Sampling. CoRR Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	Frugal Bribery in Voting. CoRR Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015	A	`conf`	Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting. AAMAS Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	Manipulation is Harder with Incomplete Votes. CoRR Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015	J	`jnl`	On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. CoRR Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015	—	`ed.`	Proceedings of the Second ACM IKDD Conference on Data Sciences, Bangalore, CoDS 2015, India, March 18-21, 2015 CODS Manish Gupta, Y. Narahari, V. S. Subrahmanian, Indrajit Bhattacharya
2015	J	`jnl`	Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers. CoRR Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
2015	A	`conf`	Truthful Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Applications. AAMAS Pankaj Dayama, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari
2014	A*	`conf`	A Multiarmed Bandit Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Demand Response in Smart Grids. AAAI Shweta Jain, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Y. Narahari
2014	A	`conf`	A mechanism to optimally balance cost and quality of labeling tasks outsourced to strategic agents. AAMAS Satyanath Bhat, Swaprava Nath, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance
2014	A	`conf`	A quality assuring multi-armed bandit crowdsourcing mechanism with incentive compatible learning. AAMAS Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
2014	J	`jnl`	An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance. CoRR Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
2014	A	`conf`	Asymptotic collusion-proofness of voting rules: the case of large number of candidates. AAMAS Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
2014	J	`jnl`	Complexity of Kernelization in the Possible Winner Problem. CoRR Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2014	J	`jnl`	Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Concepts for top-$k$ Problems. CoRR Swapnil Dhamal, Akanksha Meghlan, Y. Narahari
2014	J	`jnl`	Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. CoRR Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2014	—	`conf`	Mechanism design for sustainable virtual power plant formation. CASE Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari
2014	Misc	`conf`	Message from social networking workshop chairs. COMSNETS Madhav V. Marathe, Y. Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam
2013	J	`jnl`	Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules when the Number of Candidates is Large CoRR Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
2013	A	`conf`	Eliciting high quality feedback from crowdsourced tree networks using continuous scoring rules. AAMAS Ratul Ray, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari
2013	—	`conf`	Incentive compatible mechanisms for power cut allocation in smart grids. CASE Chetan Yadati, Dilpreet Kaur, Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan, Avik Sarkar, Y. Narahari
2013	J	`jnl`	Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. Vikas K. Garg, Y. Narahari, M. Narasimha Murty
2013	J	`jnl`	Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Oper. Res. Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2013	B	`conf`	Scalable Preference Aggregation in Social Networks. HCOMP Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
2012	—	`conf`	A strategy-proof and budget balanced mechanism for carbon footprint reduction by global companies. CASE L. Udaya Lakshmi, Y. Narahari, Deepak Bagchi, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya, Shantanu Biswas, Nukala Viswanadham
2012	J	`jnl`	Carbon footprint optimization: game theoretic problems and solutions. SIGecom Exch. Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham, S. V. Subrahmanya
2012	—	`conf`	Influence limitation in multi-campaign social networks: A Shapley value based approach. CASE Premm Raj H, Y. Narahari
2012	J	`jnl`	Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing CoRR Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou
2012	—	`conf`	Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions. CASE Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham
2012	J	`jnl`	Optimal Mix of Incentive Strategies for Product Marketing on Social Networks CoRR Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, Y. Narahari
2012	A	`conf`	Optimal incentive timing strategies for product marketing on social networks. AAMAS Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, Y. Narahari
2012	J	`jnl`	Sufficient Conditions for Formation of a Network Topology by Self-interested Agents CoRR Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
2012	A*	`conf`	Threats and Trade-Offs in Resource Critical Crowdsourcing Tasks Over Networks. AAAI Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou
2011	J	`jnl`	Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks and Application to Viral Marketing CoRR Mayur Mohite, Y. Narahari
2011	A	`conf`	Incentive compatible influence maximization in social networks and application to viral marketing. AAMAS Mayur Mohite, Y. Narahari
2011	J	`jnl`	Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2011	J	`jnl`	Topologies of strategically formed social networks based on a generic value function - Allocation rule model. Soc. Networks Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari
2010	—	`conf`	Game Theoretic Approaches to Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. PAKDD (1) Y. Narahari
2010	J	`jnl`	Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions CoRR Akash Das Sarma, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2010	A	`conf`	Threshold behavior of incentives in social networks. CIKM Nagaraj Kota, Y. Narahari
2009	J	`jnl`	An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari
2009	J	`jnl`	An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders CoRR Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2009	B	`conf`	Approximately Efficient Iterative Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. CEC Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari
2009	J	`jnl`	Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad hoc Networks with Rational Nodes CoRR Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari
2009	—	`book`	Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions. Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam, V. Hastagiri Prakash
2009	B	`conf`	Nash Bargaining Based Ad Networks for Sponsored Search Auctions. CEC Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Karthik Subbian, Y. Narahari
2009	J	`jnl`	Nonconvex piecewise linear knapsack problems. Eur. J. Oper. Res. S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari
2009	J	`jnl`	On Framework and Hybrid Auction Approach to the Spectrum Licensing Procedure CoRR Devansh Dikshit, Y. Narahari
2009	—	`conf`	On the Incentive Compatible Core of a Procurement Network Game with Incomplete Information. MALLOW Chandrashekar T. Subramanyam, Y. Narahari
2009	B	`conf`	Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. CEC Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2009	—	`conf`	Redistribution Mechanisms for the Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. MALLOW Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
2009	J	`jnl`	Reverse combinatorial auction-based protocols for resource selection in grids. Int. J. Grid Util. Comput. G. V. R. Radhanikanth, Y. Narahari
2009	B	`conf`	Stability and Efficiency of Social Networks with Strategic, Resource Constrained Nodes. CEC Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari
2008	J	`jnl`	Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari
2008	—	`conf`	Determining the top-k nodes in social networks using the Shapley value. AAMAS (3) Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari
2008	J	`jnl`	Mechanism Design for Single Leader Stackelberg Problems and Application to Procurement Auction Design. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari
2007	—	`conf`	A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation. CEC/EEE Y. Narahari, Nikesh Kumar Srivastava
2007	—	`conf`	A Combinatorial Procurement Auction for QoS-Aware Web Services Composition. CASE Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, Sudeep Mallick, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya
2007	—	`conf`	An Intelligent Procurement Marketplace forWeb Services Composition. Web Intelligence Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, Sudeep Mallick, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya
2007	J	`jnl`	Auction-Based Mechanisms for Electronic Procurement. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. Tallichetty S. Chandrashekar, Y. Narahari, Charles H. Rosa, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, Jeffrey D. Tew, Pankaj Dayama
2007	—	`conf`	Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach. COMSWARE Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari
2007	—	`conf`	Design of an Optimal Auction for Sponsored Search Auction. CEC/EEE Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Siva Sankar Reddy
2007	C	`conf`	Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Group Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. APSEC Karthik Subbian, Ramakrishnan Kannan, Raghav Kumar Gautam, Y. Narahari
2007	J	`jnl`	Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming. Eur. J. Oper. Res. S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari, Charles H. Rosa, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, Jeffrey D. Tew
2007	—	`conf`	Optimal Auctions for Multi-Unit Procurement with Volume Discount Bids. CEC/EEE Raghav Kumar Gautam, N. Hemachandra, Y. Narahari, V. Hastagiri Prakash
2007	—	`conf`	The Core and Shapley Value Analysis for Cooperative Formation of Procurement Networks. CEC/EEE Tallichetty S. Chandrashekar, Y. Narahari
2007	C	`conf`	Truth Eliciting Mechanisms for Trouble Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. SEKE Karthik Subbian, Y. Narahari
2006	—	`conf`	A Strategyproof Auction Mechanism for Grid Scheduling with Selfish Entities. WEBIST (1) V. Hastagiri Prakash, Y. Narahari
2006	J	`jnl`	Achieving sharp deliveries in supply chains through variance pool allocation. Eur. J. Oper. Res. Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham
2006	J	`jnl`	Learning dynamic prices in electronic retail markets with customer segmentation. Ann. Oper. Res. C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari, K. Ravikumar
2005	—	`conf`	A Lagrangian heuristic for bid evaluation in e-procurement auctions. CASE S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari
2005	J	`jnl`	Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari
2004	—	`conf`	A Decomposition Based Approach for Design of Supply Aggregation and Demand Aggregation Exchanges. FORTE Workshops Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, Anish Das Sarma
2004	J	`jnl`	Object oriented modeling and decision support for supply chains. Eur. J. Oper. Res. Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari
2003	B	`conf`	Reinforcement Learning Applications in Dynamic Pricing of Retail Markets. CEC C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari, K. Ravikumar
2003	B	`conf`	Trade Determination in Multi-Attribute Exchanges. CEC S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari
2003	—	`conf`	e-Procurement Using Goal Programming. EC-Web S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari
2002	—	`conf`	A New Approach to the Design of Electronic Exchanges. EC-Web S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari
2002	Misc	`conf`	IMPROVE: An Innovative Market for e-Procurement. IC-AI S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari
2002	Misc	`conf`	Improving Web Server Performance by Network Aware Data Buffering and Caching. HiPC Sourav Sen, Y. Narahari
2002	A*	`conf`	Queueing Network Modeling and Lead Time Compression of Electronic Procurement. ICRA C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari
2000	J	`jnl`	A Mathematical Programming Approach to Optimal Markovian Switching of Poisson Arrival Streams to Queueing Systems. Queueing Syst. Theory Appl. N. Hemachandra, Y. Narahari
2000	A*	`conf`	Design of Synchronized Supply Chains: A Six Sigma Tolerancing Approach. ICRA Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, R. Bhattacharya
1998	J	`jnl`	Asymptotic loss of priority scheduling policies in closed re-entrant lines: A computational study. Eur. J. Oper. Res. Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan
1998	A*	`conf`	Design for Tolerance of Electro-Mechanical Assemblies. ICRA Rachuri Sudarsan, Y. Narahari, Kevin W. Lyons, Ram D. Sriram, M. R. Duffey
1997	J	`jnl`	Transient analysis of multiclass manufacturing systems with priority scheduling. Comput. Oper. Res. Y. Narahari, N. Hemachandra, M. S. Gaur
1996	J	`jnl`	Performance analysis of scheduling policies in re-entrant manufacturing systems. Comput. Oper. Res. Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan
1995	A*	`conf`	Modeling Re-Entrant Mufacturing Systems with Inspections. ICRA Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan
1994	A*	`conf`	Real-World Extensions to a Production Scheduling Algorithm Based on Lagrangian Relaxation. ICRA Y. Narahari, Sundar Ram Vedula
1993	—	`conf`	Analysis of Dynamic Load Balancing Strategies Using a Combination of Stochastic Petri Nets and Queueing Networks. Application and Theory of Petri Nets C. R. M. Sundaram, Y. Narahari
1990	J	`jnl`	Deadlock prevention and deadlock avoidance in flexible manufacturing systems using Petri net models. IEEE Trans. Robotics Autom. Nukala Viswanadham, Y. Narahari, Timothy L. Johnson
1987	A*	`conf`	Coloured Petri net models for automated manufacturing systems. ICRA N. Viswanadham, Y. Narahari
1985	—	`conf`	On the invariants of coloured Petri nets. Applications and Theory in Petri Nets Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham