Xianwen Kong

33 papers A* 2A 1B 1C 2Journal 18Unranked 8
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
Pattern Recognit.
Shaoxiang Guo, Donald Risbridger, David A. Robb, Xianwen Kong, M. J. Daniel Esser, Michael J. Chantler, Richard M. Carter, Mustafa Suphi Erden
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Kaicheng Zhang, Shida Xu, Yining Ding, Xianwen Kong, Sen Wang
2025 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Robotics
Kaicheng Zhang, Shida Xu, Yining Ding, Xianwen Kong, Sen Wang
2025 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Cogn. Dev. Syst.
Kun Qian, Zhenhong Li, Yihui Zhao, Jie Zhang, Xianwen Kong, Samit Chakrabarty, Zhiqiang Zhang, Sheng Quan Xie
2024 conf
M2VIP
Yuxuan Zhang, Lijuan Luo, Kun Qian, Xianwen Kong
2024 A* conf
ICRA
Kaicheng Zhang, Yining Ding, Shida Xu, Ziyang Hong, Xianwen Kong, Sen Wang
2024 conf
ICIT
Kun Qian, Yue Zhang, Zhenhong Li, Patrícia A. Vargas, Mustafa Suphi Erden, Xianwen Kong
2024 A conf
IROS
Kun Qian, Mustafa Suphi Erden, Xianwen Kong
2024 conf
CASE
David A. Robb, Donald Risbridger, Ben Mills, Ildar Rakhmatulin, Xianwen Kong, Mustafa Suphi Erden, M. J. Daniel Esser, Richard M. Carter, Mike J. Chantler
2024 J jnl
CoRR
David A. Robb, Donald Risbridger, Ben Mills, Ildar Rakhmatulin, Xianwen Kong, Mustafa Suphi Erden, M. J. Daniel Esser, Richard M. Carter, Mike J. Chantler
2022 C conf
IPAS
Ola Skeik, Mustafa Suphi Erden, Xianwen Kong
2021 J jnl
SN Comput. Sci.
Girish Balasubramanian, Senthil Arumugam Muthukumaraswamy, Xianwen Kong
2021 conf
ICSIPA
Nathan Western, Xianwen Kong, Mustafa Suphi Erden
2019 J jnl
Robotics
Maurizio Ruggiu, Xianwen Kong
2018 J jnl
Robotica
Jieyu Wang, Yan-an Yao, Xianwen Kong
2018 J jnl
Robotics
Maurizio Ruggiu, Xianwen Kong
2017 J jnl
CoRR
Damien Chablat, Xianwen Kong, Chengwei Zhang
2016 conf
Living Machines
Guochao Bai, Jieyu Wang, Xianwen Kong
2015 conf
ICAC
Xavier Herpe, Ross Walker, Xianwen Kong, Matthew W. Dunnigan
2015 conf
ICAC
Guangbo Hao, Ronan Hand, Xianwen Kong, Wenlong Chang, Xichun Luo
2014 B conf
RO-MAN
Alistair McConnell, Xianwen Kong, Patrícia A. Vargas
2014 J jnl
Robotica
Xiuyun He, Xianwen Kong, Damien Chablat, Stéphane Caro, Guangbo Hao
2012 C conf
INDIN
Yan Jin, Xianwen Kong, Colm Higgins, Mark Price
2011 J jnl
Robotica
Xianwen Kong, Clément Gosselin, Marco Carricato
2007 A* conf
ICRA
Clément M. Gosselin, Mehdi Tale Masouleh, Vincent Duchaine, Pierre-Luc Richard, Simon Foucault, Xianwen Kong
2007 book
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
2006 conf
ARK
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
2005 J jnl
J. Field Robotics
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
2004 J jnl
Int. J. Robotics Res.
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
2004 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Robotics Autom.
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
2002 J jnl
Int. J. Robotics Res.
Xianwen Kong, Clément Gosselin
2001 J jnl
J. Field Robotics
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
2001 J jnl
Int. J. Robotics Res.
Xianwen Kong, Clément M. Gosselin
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*