Vishnu V. Narayan

31 papers A* 5A 1B 4C 2Journal 19
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 A* conf
Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division.
AAAI
Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Yuang Eric Shen
2026 J jnl
Tight Asymptotic Bounds for Fair Division With Externalities.
CoRR
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Vishnu V. Narayan, Simon Schierreich
2025 J jnl
Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division.
CoRR
Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Yuang Eric Shen
2025 J jnl
Online Fair Division With Subsidy: When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist, and at What Cost?
CoRR
Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2025 A* conf
Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation.
AAAI
Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2024 A* conf
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations.
EC
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2024 A* conf
Fair Division via Quantile Shares.
STOC
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
2024 J jnl
Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation.
CoRR
Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2023 J jnl
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations.
CoRR
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2023 A conf
Fair Chore Division under Binary Supermodular Costs.
AAMAS
Siddharth Barman, Vishnu V. Narayan, Paritosh Verma
2023 J jnl
Fair Chore Division under Binary Supermodular Costs.
CoRR
Siddharth Barman, Vishnu V. Narayan, Paritosh Verma
2023 J jnl
Fair Division via Quantile Shares.
CoRR
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
2023 J jnl
The speed and threshold of the biased perfect matching and Hamilton cycle games.
Discret. Appl. Math.
Noah Brüstle, Sarah Clusiau, Vishnu V. Narayan, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Bruce A. Reed, Ben Seamone
2022 J jnl
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems.
Algorithmica
Yaqiao Li, Vishnu V. Narayan, Denis Pankratov
2022 J jnl
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions.
Theory Comput. Syst.
Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
2022 J jnl
The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is).
Theory Comput. Syst.
Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
2021 J jnl
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions.
CoRR
Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
2021 C conf
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Hamilton Cycle Game.
LAGOS
Noah Brüstle, Sarah Clusiau, Vishnu V. Narayan, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Bruce A. Reed, Ben Seamone
2021 C conf
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Perfect Matching Game.
LAGOS
Noah Brüstle, Sarah Clusiau, Vishnu V. Narayan, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Bruce A. Reed, Ben Seamone
2021 J jnl
Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers.
CoRR
Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
2021 B conf
Two Birds with One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers.
SAGT
Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
2020 A* conf
One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy.
EC
Johannes Brustle, Jack Dippel, Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
2020 B conf
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems.
WAOA
Yaqiao Li, Vishnu V. Narayan, Denis Pankratov
2020 J jnl
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems.
CoRR
Yaqiao Li, Vishnu V. Narayan, Denis Pankratov
2020 J jnl
The matching augmentation problem: a $\frac{7}{4}$-approximation algorithm.
Math. Program.
Joe Cheriyan, Jack Dippel, Fabrizio Grandoni, Arindam Khan, Vishnu V. Narayan
2019 J jnl
One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy.
CoRR
Johannes Brustle, Jack Dippel, Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
2019 B conf
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions.
SAGT
Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
2019 B conf
The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions (But Almost Is).
SAGT
Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
2019 J jnl
The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is).
CoRR
Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
2018 J jnl
The Matching Augmentation Problem: A 7/4-Approximation Algorithm.
CoRR
Joe Cheriyan, Jack Dippel, Fabrizio Grandoni, Arindam Khan, Vishnu V. Narayan
2016 J jnl
A 17/12-approximation algorithm for 2-vertex-connected spanning subgraphs on graphs with minimum degree at least 3.
CoRR
Vishnu V. Narayan