Victoria McArthur

32 papers A* 1C 1Misc 4Journal 8Unranked 17
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2025 conf
VR Workshops
Assem Kroma, Anthony Scavarelli, Zahra Borhani, Kristen Grinyer, Victoria McArthur, Francisco R. Ortega, Robert J. Teather
2025 conf
CHI Extended Abstracts
Julia M. Robinson, Victoria McArthur
2025 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph.
Lijie Yao, Federica Bucchieri, Victoria McArthur, Anastasia Bezerianos, Petra Isenberg
2024 J jnl
CoRR
Lijie Yao, Federica Bucchieri, Victoria McArthur, Anastasia Bezerianos, Petra Isenberg
2024 J jnl
Interactions
Victoria McArthur
2023 J jnl
Frontiers Virtual Real.
Sojung Bahng, Victoria McArthur, Ryan M. Kelly
2022 C conf
FDG
Kristen Grinyer, Sara Czerwonka, Adrian Alvarez, Victoria McArthur, Audrey Girouard, Robert J. Teather
2022 conf
HCI (37)
Sara Czerwonka, Victoria McArthur
2021 conf
HCI (24)
Malek El Kouzi, Victoria McArthur
2020 conf
HCI (42)
Seyed Ali Mirazimzadeh, Victoria McArthur
2020 Misc ed.
CHI PLAY
Pejman Mirza-Babaei, Victoria McArthur, Vero Vanden Abeele, Max Birk
2020 ed.
CHI PLAY (Companion)
Pejman Mirza-Babaei, Victoria McArthur, Vero Vanden Abeele, Max Birk
2020 conf
HCI (46)
Siqi Luo, Robert J. Teather, Victoria McArthur
2019 J jnl
Interactions
Victoria McArthur
2019 J jnl
Behav. Inf. Technol.
Victoria McArthur
2018 J jnl
Entertain. Comput.
Margaree Peacocke, Robert J. Teather, Jacques Carette, I. Scott MacKenzie, Victoria McArthur
2017 A* conf
CHI
Victoria McArthur
2015 conf
GEM
Kei'Ichiro Yamamoto, Victoria McArthur
2015 conf
GEM
Victoria McArthur, Robert John Teather
2015 Misc conf
CHI PLAY
Victoria McArthur, Robert John Teather, Jennifer Jenson
2015 conf
GEM
Pejman Mirza-Babaei, Naeem Moosajee, Robert J. Teather, Jacques Carette, Victoria McArthur
2014 Misc conf
IE
Victoria McArthur, Jennifer Jenson
2012 conf
CHI Extended Abstracts
Victoria McArthur, Tamara Peyton, Jennifer Jenson, Nicholas Taylor, Suzanne de Castell
2012 conf
CHI Extended Abstracts
Nicholas Taylor, Victoria McArthur, Jennifer Jenson
2011 conf
SIGGRAPH Game Papers
Kelly Bergstrom, Victoria McArthur, Jennifer Jenson, Tamara Peyton
2011 conf
Sandbox@SIGGRAPH
Kelly Bergstrom, Victoria McArthur, Jennifer Jenson, Tamara Peyton
2010 conf
Future Play
Victoria McArthur
2009 Misc conf
EICS
Victoria McArthur, Steven J. Castellucci, I. Scott MacKenzie
2009 J jnl
J. Inf. Commun. Ethics Soc.
Tyler M. Pace, Aaron R. Houssian, Victoria McArthur
2008 conf
Future Play
Victoria McArthur, Tyler M. Pace, Aaron R. Houssian
2008 conf
CHI Extended Abstracts
Victoria McArthur
2008 conf
Future Play
Victoria McArthur
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*