Vasilis Gkatzelis

105 papers A* 33A 5B 1Misc 1Journal 59Unranked 5

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	J	`jnl`	The Distortion of Prior-Independent b-Matching Mechanisms. CoRR Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Sebastian Homrighausen
2025	J	`jnl`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. Oper. Res. Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2025	A*	`conf`	Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. SODA Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025	J	`jnl`	Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. Oper. Res. Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025	A*	`conf`	EF2X Exists for Four Agents. AAAI Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2025	A*	`conf`	Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line. IJCAI Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Emma Rewinski, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2025	J	`jnl`	Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line. CoRR Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Emma Rewinski, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2025	A*	`conf`	Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers. WWW Vasilis Gkatzelis, Randolph Preston McAfee, Renato Paes Leme
2025	J	`jnl`	Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Randolph Preston McAfee, Renato Paes Leme
2025	J	`jnl`	Procurement Auctions with Predictions: Improved Frugality for Facility Location. CoRR Eric Balkanski, Nicholas DeFilippis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2025	A*	`conf`	Simultaneously Satisfying MXS and EFL. EC Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2024	J	`jnl`	Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2024	J	`jnl`	EF2X Exists For Four Agents. CoRR Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2024	A*	`conf`	Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. IJCAI Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma
2024	J	`jnl`	Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. Math. Oper. Res. Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan
2024	A*	`conf`	Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p, q)-Veto Core. EC Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2024	J	`jnl`	Learning-Augmented Robust Algorithmic Recourse. CoRR Kshitij Kayastha, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Shahin Jabbari
2024	A*	`conf`	Online Mechanism Design with Predictions. EC Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu
2024	A*	`conf`	Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions. NeurIPS Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Golnoosh Shahkarami
2024	J	`jnl`	Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions. CoRR Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Golnoosh Shahkarami
2024	J	`jnl`	Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games. Oper. Res. George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2024	J	`jnl`	SIGecom Job Market Candidate Profiles 2024. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2024	J	`jnl`	Simultaneously Satisfying MXS and EFL. CoRR Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2023	A*	`conf`	Best of Both Distortion Worlds. EC Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah
2023	J	`jnl`	Best of Both Distortion Worlds. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah
2023	A	`conf`	EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare. ECAI Marius Garbea, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2023	J	`jnl`	EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare. CoRR Marius Garbea, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2023	J	`jnl`	Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma
2023	J	`jnl`	Mechanism Design with Predictions: An Annotated Reading List. SIGecom Exch. Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2023	J	`jnl`	Online Mechanism Design with Predictions. CoRR Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu
2023	—	`conf`	Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents. SaTML Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Juba Ziani
2023	J	`jnl`	Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. CoRR Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2023	A*	`conf`	Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions. IJCAI Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah
2023	A	`conf`	Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. ITCS Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2022	A*	`conf`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	J	`jnl`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	A	`conf`	Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. AAMAS Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	J	`jnl`	Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. CoRR Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	A*	`conf`	Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. SODA Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2022	A*	`conf`	Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions. EC Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan
2022	J	`jnl`	Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan
2022	A*	`conf`	Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. EC Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan
2022	J	`jnl`	Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. CoRR Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan
2022	J	`jnl`	Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. Oper. Res. Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta
2022	A*	`conf`	Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions. SODA Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Artur Gorokh, Billy Jin
2022	J	`jnl`	Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents. CoRR Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Juba Ziani
2022	A	`conf`	Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond. ITCS Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	J	`jnl`	Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions. CoRR Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah
2022	J	`jnl`	SIGecom Job Market Candidate Profiles 2023. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2022	J	`jnl`	Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. CoRR Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2021	A*	`conf`	Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. AAAI Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	J	`jnl`	Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. CoRR Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2021	A*	`conf`	Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. AAAI Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan
2021	A*	`conf`	PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. IJCAI Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	J	`jnl`	PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. CoRR Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	B	`conf`	Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. SAGT Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	J	`jnl`	Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	A*	`conf`	Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors. EC Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2021	J	`jnl`	Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2021	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2022. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2020	A*	`conf`	A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching. SODA Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2020	J	`jnl`	Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. CoRR Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2020	J	`jnl`	Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan
2020	J	`jnl`	Online Nash Social Welfare via Promised Utilities. CoRR Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Billy Jin, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2020	A*	`conf`	Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture. FOCS Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
2020	J	`jnl`	Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
2020	A*	`conf`	Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games. EC George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2020	J	`jnl`	Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games. CoRR George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2020	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2019	J	`jnl`	A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching. CoRR Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2019	A*	`conf`	Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints. IJCAI Ke Yang, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Julia Stoyanovich
2019	J	`jnl`	Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints. CoRR Ke Yang, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Julia Stoyanovich
2019	A*	`conf`	Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders. AAAI Eric J. Friedman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Scott Shenker
2019	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2020. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2018	J	`jnl`	Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items. SIAM J. Comput. Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2018	Misc	`conf`	Participation Incentives on a Wireless Random Access Erasure Collision Channel. ITA Vasilis Gkatzelis, Steven Weber
2018	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2017	A*	`conf`	Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. EC Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod
2017	—	`conf`	Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling. WINE Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Cosimo Vinci
2017	A*	`conf`	Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty. EC Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
2017	A*	`conf`	Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service. EC Vasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden
2017	A*	`conf`	Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. EC Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta
2017	—	`conf`	Participation incentives on a wireless random access erasure collision channel. NetEcon@EC Vasilis Gkatzelis, Steven Weber
2017	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2018. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2017	J	`jnl`	The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions. Math. Oper. Res. Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden
2016	J	`jnl`	Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. CoRR Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod
2016	J	`jnl`	Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. CoRR Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta
2016	J	`jnl`	Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games. Oper. Res. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden
2016	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2017. SIGecom Exch. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2015	A*	`conf`	Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items. STOC Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2015	J	`jnl`	Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items. SIGecom Exch. Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2015	J	`jnl`	Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. Games Econ. Behav. Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver
2015	J	`jnl`	Pricing private data. Electron. Mark. Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christina Aperjis, Bernardo A. Huberman
2015	J	`jnl`	SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016. SIGecom Exch. Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline
2014	—	`conf`	Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games. WINE Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden
2014	A*	`conf`	The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions. EC Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden
2013	—	`—`	Incentive-Centered Design of Money-Free Mechanisms. Vasilis Gkatzelis
2013	A*	`conf`	Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments. EC Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel
2013	A	`conf`	Positive results for mechanism design without money. AAMAS Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel
2012	J	`jnl`	Mechanism Design for Fair Division CoRR Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel
2012	J	`jnl`	The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games. Theory Comput. Syst. Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis
2012	J	`jnl`	Truthful Mechanisms for Proportionally Fair Allocations CoRR Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel
2011	A*	`conf`	Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms. STOC Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver
2010	J	`jnl`	Coordination Mechanisms for Weighted Sum of Completion Times in Machine Scheduling CoRR Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni
2009	—	`conf`	The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games. WINE Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis