Taiki Todo - RankMe

59 papers A* 13A 21B 7Misc 1Journal 9Unranked 8

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2025	A	`conf`	Average Rules for Facility Location Games with Voluntary Participation. ECAI Shota Miyamoto, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2025	—	`conf`	Incentive Design in Hedonic Games with Permission Structures. ICAART (1) Yuta Akahoshi, Yao Zhang, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2025	B	`conf`	Parameterized Voter Relevance in Facility Location Games with Tree-Shaped Invitation Graphs. WALCOM Ryoto Ando, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2025	—	`conf`	Strategy-Proofness and Non-Obvious Manipulability of Top-Trading-Cycles with Strategic Invitations. ICAART (1) Shinnosuke Hamasaki, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2024	A	`conf`	Analyzing Incentives and Fairness in Ordered Weighted Average for Facility Location Games. ECAI Kento Yoshida, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2024	J	`jnl`	Analyzing Incentives and Fairness in Ordered Weighted Average for Facility Location Games. CoRR Kento Yoshida, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2024	J	`jnl`	Parameterized Voter Relevance in Facility Location Games with Tree-Shaped Invitation Graphs. CoRR Ryoto Ando, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2022	B	`conf`	False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Wheel Graphs. PRIMA Koji Osoegawa, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2022	J	`jnl`	Manipulation-resistant false-name-proof facility location mechanisms for complex graphs. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2022	A	`conf`	Strategy-Proof House Allocation with Existing Tenants over Social Networks. AAMAS Bo You, Ludwig Dierks, Taiki Todo, Minming Li, Makoto Yokoo
2022	A*	`conf`	Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks. IJCAI Sung-Ho Cho, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2021	A*	`conf`	Fair Pairwise Exchange among Groups. IJCAI Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Toby Walsh
2021	—	`conf`	Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information. ADT Taiki Todo, Ryoji Wada, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo
2021	A	`conf`	Mechanism Design for Housing Markets over Social Networks. AAMAS Takehiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2021	A*	`conf`	New Algorithms for Japanese Residency Matching. IJCAI Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2020	A	`conf`	False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. ECAI Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo
2020	A*	`conf`	Mechanism Design with Uncertainty. IJCAI Taiki Todo
2020	A	`conf`	Split Manipulations in Cost Sharing of Minimum Cost Spanning Tree. ECAI Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2020	A*	`conf`	Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network. AAAI Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2019	Misc	`conf`	Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. COCOON Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2019	J	`jnl`	Efficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network. CoRR Seiji Takanashi, Takehiro Kawasaki, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2019	J	`jnl`	False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. CoRR Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo
2019	A	`conf`	Manipulations-resistant Facility Location Mechanisms for ZV-line Graphs. AAMAS Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2019	B	`conf`	SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location. PRIMA Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2019	J	`jnl`	Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network. CoRR Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018	J	`jnl`	A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018	A*	`conf`	Facility Location Games With Fractional Preferences. AAAI Chi Kit Ken Fong, Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018	A	`conf`	Facility Location with Variable and Dynamic Populations. AAMAS Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018	J	`jnl`	Manipulation-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs. CoRR Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018	A*	`conf`	Service Exchange Problem. IJCAI Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo
2018	J	`jnl`	Strategy-proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-nothing Utility. Fundam. Informaticae Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2017	B	`conf`	Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences. PRIMA Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2016	A*	`conf`	False-Name-Proof Locations of Two Facilities: Economic and Algorithmic Approaches. AAAI Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2016	B	`conf`	Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets. PRIMA Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2016	A	`conf`	Manipulations in Two-Agent Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences. AAMAS Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2015	A*	`conf`	A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences. AAAI Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2015	—	`conf`	Characteristics of Sustainable OSS Projects: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. CHASE@ICSE Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Saya Onoue, Ken-ichi Matsumoto
2015	A*	`conf`	Exchange of Indivisible Objects with Asymmetry. IJCAI Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2015	A	`conf`	Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting. AAMAS Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2015	A	`conf`	Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination. AAMAS Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Hidenao Iwane, Hirokazu Anai, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo
2015	A	`conf`	Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach. AAMAS Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2015	B	`conf`	Strategy-Proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-Nothing Utility. PRIMA Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2014	A	`conf`	Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. AAMAS Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2014	A	`conf`	False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-minded Decomposition. ECAI Dengji Zhao, Siqi Luo, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2014	A	`conf`	Optimal false-name-proof single-item redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2014	B	`conf`	Predicting Own Action: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Induced by Proper Scoring Rules. HCOMP Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2014	A*	`conf`	Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments. AAAI Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, Makoto Yokoo
2014	A*	`conf`	Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. AAAI Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2013	A	`conf`	False-name-proof matching. AAMAS Taiki Todo, Vincent Conitzer
2013	A	`conf`	VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: general framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Miao Yao, Makoto Yokoo
2012	A	`conf`	False-name-proofness in online mechanisms. AAMAS Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2011	A	`conf`	False-name-proof mechanism design without money. AAMAS Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2011	A*	`conf`	Generalizing Envy-Freeness toward Group of Agents. IJCAI Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2010	—	`conf`	Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions. IAT Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2010	A	`conf`	Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms. AAMAS Taiki Todo
2010	—	`conf`	False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line. WINE Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2010	A	`conf`	Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo
2009	—	`conf`	Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness. WINE Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2009	—	`conf`	Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS (1) Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai