Sophie Klumper

11 papers A* 3B 1Journal 6Unranked 1
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 A* conf
Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets.
SODA
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions.
CoRR
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Smoothness Meets Autobidding: Tight Price of Anarchy Bounds for Simultaneous First-Price Auctions.
CoRR
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2024 A* conf
Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting Games.
EC
Adrian Haret, Sophie Klumper, Jan Maly, Guido Schäfer
2024 A* conf
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model.
EC
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2024 J jnl
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model.
CoRR
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2023 — conf
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents.
WINE
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2023 J jnl
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents.
CoRR
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2022 B conf
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.
SAGT
Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer
2022 J jnl
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.
CoRR
Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer