S. Matthew Weinberg

197 papers A* 65A 14B 7Journal 102Unranked 7

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	A	`conf`	Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users. ITCS Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
2026	A	`conf`	Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms. ITCS Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2026	A*	`conf`	The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders. SODA Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2025	A	`conf`	A Bicriterion Concentration Inequality and Prophet Inequalities for k-Fold Matroid Unions. ITCS Noga Alon, Nick Gravin, Tristan Pollner, Aviad Rubinstein, Hongao Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2025	A*	`conf`	A QPTAS For Up-To-ε Revenue Maximization With Multiple Constant-Demand Bidders Over Independent Items. EC Dimitar Chakarov, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue
2025	J	`jnl`	Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users. CoRR Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
2025	A*	`conf`	Breaking Omertà: On Threshold Cryptography, Smart Collusion, and Whistleblowing. CCS Mahimna Kelkar, Aadityan Ganesh, Aditi Partap, Joseph Bonneau, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	J	`jnl`	Breaking Omertà: On Threshold Cryptography, Smart Collusion, and Whistleblowing. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Mahimna Kelkar, Aadityan Ganesh, Aditi Partap, Joseph Bonneau, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	J	`jnl`	Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms. CoRR Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	J	`jnl`	Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity. CoRR Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng, Yingkai Li, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	A*	`conf`	Competition Complexity in Multi-item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity. EC Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng, Yingkai Li, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	B	`conf`	Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards. AFT Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	J	`jnl`	Selfish mining under general stochastic rewards. CoRR Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025	J	`jnl`	The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders. CoRR Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2025	A*	`conf`	q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations. ICALP Kiril Bangachev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	J	`jnl`	A Bicriterion Concentration Inequality and Prophet Inequalities for CoRR Noga Alon, Nick Gravin, Tristan Pollner, Aviad Rubinstein, Hongao Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2024	A*	`conf`	Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier. FOCS Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2024	J	`jnl`	Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier. CoRR Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2024	A*	`conf`	Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols. EC Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu
2024	J	`jnl`	Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols. CoRR Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu
2024	A*	`conf`	Contracting with a Learning Agent. NeurIPS Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Joshua R. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	J	`jnl`	Contracting with a Learning Agent. CoRR Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Joshua R. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	A*	`conf`	On the Cut-Query Complexity of Approximating Max-Cut. ICALP Orestis Plevrakis, Seyoon Ragavan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	B	`conf`	Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum. AFT Kaya Alpturer, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	J	`jnl`	Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum. CoRR Kaya Alpturer, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	J	`jnl`	Optimal item pricing in online combinatorial auctions. Math. Program. José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Andrés Fielbaum, Tristan Pollner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	B	`conf`	Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection Are Statistically Detectable. AFT Linda Cai, Jingyi Liu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
2024	J	`jnl`	Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection are Statistically Detectable. CoRR Linda Cai, Jingyi Liu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
2024	A*	`conf`	Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. EC Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	J	`jnl`	Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. CoRR Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	A*	`conf`	Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-Based Mechanisms for All Approximation Guarantees. STOC Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	J	`jnl`	Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees. CoRR Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	A*	`conf`	Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items. EC Mahsa Derakhshan, Emily Ryu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue
2024	J	`jnl`	Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items. CoRR Mahsa Derakhshan, Emily Ryu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue
2024	A	`conf`	Simple and Optimal Online Contention Resolution Schemes for k-Uniform Matroids. ITCS Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	B	`conf`	To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility. SAGT Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024	A*	`conf`	Undetectable Selfish Mining. EC Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	B	`ed.`	5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT 2023, Princeton, NJ, USA, October 23-25, 2023 AFT Joseph Bonneau, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	A	`conf`	An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities. ITCS Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	J	`jnl`	Optimal Stopping with Multi-Dimensional Comparative Loss Aversion. CoRR Linda Cai, Joshua Gardner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	—	`conf`	Optimal Stopping with Multi-dimensional Comparative Loss Aversion. WINE Linda Cai, Joshua Gardner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	—	`conf`	Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers. WINE Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, Shirley Zhang
2023	J	`jnl`	Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers. CoRR Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, Shirley Zhang
2023	J	`jnl`	Simple and Optimal Online Contention Resolution Schemes for k-Uniform Matroids. CoRR Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	J	`jnl`	Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match. CoRR Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	J	`jnl`	Undetectable Selfish Mining. CoRR Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg
2023	J	`jnl`	q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations. CoRR Kiril Bangachev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	J	`jnl`	An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities. CoRR Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	A*	`conf`	Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes. EC Emily Dale, Jessica Fielding, Hari Ramakrishnan, Sacheth Sathyanarayanan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	J	`jnl`	Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. Manag. Sci. Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	A	`conf`	Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions. ITCS Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	J	`jnl`	Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions. CoRR Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	A*	`conf`	On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. NeurIPS Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	J	`jnl`	On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. CoRR Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	J	`jnl`	On the cut-query complexity of approximating max-cut. CoRR Orestis Plevrakis, Seyoon Ragavan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	B	`conf`	Optimal Item Pricing in Online Combinatorial Auctions. IPCO José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Andrés Fielbaum, Tristan Pollner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	A*	`conf`	Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable. EC S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou
2022	A*	`conf`	Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. EC Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu
2022	J	`jnl`	Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. CoRR Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu
2022	J	`jnl`	Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions. SIAM J. Comput. Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	A*	`conf`	The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game. EC Akash Gaonkar, Divya Raghunathan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022	—	`conf`	Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match. WINE Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. SIAM J. Comput. Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A*	`conf`	A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design. AAAI Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A	`conf`	Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting. ITCS Kimberly Ding, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting. CoRR Kimberly Ding, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A*	`conf`	Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game. ICLR Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A*	`conf`	Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. EC Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A*	`conf`	Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness. STOC Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
2021	—	`conf`	Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem. WINE Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem. CoRR Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	—	`conf`	On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design. WINE Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A*	`conf`	Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability. EC Mark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability. CoRR Mark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	A*	`conf`	Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. EC Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. CoRR Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	J	`jnl`	The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization. J. ACM Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design. CoRR Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. J. ACM Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A	`conf`	Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. ITCS Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
2020	A*	`conf`	Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees. ICALP Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Auction learning as a two-player game. CoRR Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. CoRR Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments. CoRR Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A*	`conf`	Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments. EC Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A*	`conf`	Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions. ICML Michael Chang, Sidhant Kaushik, S. Matthew Weinberg, Tom Griffiths, Sergey Levine
2020	J	`jnl`	Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions. CoRR Michael Chang, Sidhant Kaushik, S. Matthew Weinberg, Thomas L. Griffiths, Sergey Levine
2020	J	`jnl`	Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness. CoRR Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
2020	A	`conf`	Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard. ITCS Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A	`conf`	New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization. ITCS Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer. CoRR Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A*	`conf`	On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer. EC Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A*	`conf`	Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. EC Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. CoRR Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Local. CoRR S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou
2020	A	`conf`	Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples. ITCS Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Non-Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A*	`conf`	Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions. STOC Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	A*	`conf`	Subsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks. AAAI Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020	J	`jnl`	When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase. CoRR Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. CoRR Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
2019	J	`jnl`	Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. CoRR Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. FOCS Pravesh Kothari, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees. CoRR Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A	`conf`	Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. ITCS Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. EC Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard. CoRR Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms. COLT Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MInimization. CoRR Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items. STOC Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples. CoRR Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	—	`conf`	Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. WINE Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. CoRR Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information. Games Econ. Behav. Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. WWW Matheus Xavier Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg, Danny Yuxing Huang, Nick Feamster, Tithi Chattopadhyay
2019	J	`jnl`	Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. CoRR Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	A*	`conf`	Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. EC Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. CoRR Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A*	`conf`	Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts. USENIX Security Symposium Harry A. Kalodner, Steven Goldfeder, Xiaoqi Chen, S. Matthew Weinberg, Edward W. Felten
2018	J	`jnl`	Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. CoRR Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A	`conf`	Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph. ITCS Aviad Rubinstein, Tselil Schramm, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. CoRR Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A*	`conf`	On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions. SODA Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items. CoRR Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A*	`conf`	Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. EC Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. CoRR Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A*	`conf`	The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization. FOCS Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	J	`jnl`	The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization. CoRR Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A*	`conf`	The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. SODA Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	A*	`conf`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	J	`jnl`	Computing exact minimum cuts without knowing the graph. CoRR Aviad Rubinstein, Tselil Schramm, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	A	`conf`	Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. ITCS Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	A*	`conf`	Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler. INFOCOM Zhe Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg, Liang Zheng, Carlee Joe-Wong, Mung Chiang
2017	J	`jnl`	Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms. CoRR Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	J	`jnl`	On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	J	`jnl`	Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. CoRR Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	A*	`conf`	The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	A*	`conf`	The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case. EC Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	J	`jnl`	The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. CoRR Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	J	`jnl`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	A*	`conf`	A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. STOC Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	J	`jnl`	A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	J	`jnl`	Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. CoRR Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	A*	`conf`	Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. SODA Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	A*	`conf`	On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward. CCS Miles Carlsten, Harry A. Kalodner, S. Matthew Weinberg, Arvind Narayanan
2016	J	`jnl`	Parallel Algorithms for Select and Partition with Noisy Comparisons. CoRR Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	A*	`conf`	Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons. STOC Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	—	`ch.`	Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	J	`jnl`	Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. CoRR Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	J	`jnl`	Signal to noise in matching markets. CoRR S. Matthew Weinberg, James Zou
2016	J	`jnl`	The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	A*	`conf`	Bayesian Truthful SODA Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	B	`conf`	Game Theory based Peer Grading Mechanisms for MOOCs. L@S William Wu, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nicolaas Kaashoek, Christos Tzamos, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	J	`jnl`	Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	J	`jnl`	Pricing lotteries. J. Econ. Theory Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	A*	`conf`	Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. EC Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	A*	`conf`	Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies. EC Nikhil R. Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	J	`jnl`	Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. CoRR Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015	A*	`conf`	Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. EC Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	A*	`conf`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. FOCS Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	J	`jnl`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. CoRR Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	J	`jnl`	A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. SIGecom Exch. Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	—	`—`	Algorithms for strategic agents. S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	J	`jnl`	Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms. CoRR Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	A*	`conf`	Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information. SODA Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	—	`conf`	Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. APPROX-RANDOM Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	J	`jnl`	Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. CoRR Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013	A*	`conf`	Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions. SODA Pablo Daniel Azar, Constantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013	J	`jnl`	Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information. CoRR Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013	J	`jnl`	Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations CoRR Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013	A*	`conf`	Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations. SODA Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013	A*	`conf`	Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design. FOCS Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013	J	`jnl`	Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design CoRR Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012	A*	`conf`	An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms. STOC Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012	J	`jnl`	Matroid Prophet Inequalities CoRR Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012	A*	`conf`	Matroid prophet inequalities. STOC Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012	J	`jnl`	Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization CoRR Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012	A*	`conf`	Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization. FOCS Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012	A*	`conf`	Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design. EC Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2011	J	`jnl`	An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms CoRR Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2011	J	`jnl`	An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2011	J	`jnl`	On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design CoRR Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2011	J	`jnl`	On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2011	J	`jnl`	On optimal multidimensional mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2010	A*	`conf`	Pricing Randomized Allocations. SODA Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2009	J	`jnl`	Pricing Randomized Allocations CoRR Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert D. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg