Ron Lavi - RankMe

78 papers A* 27A 4B 2Journal 36Unranked 5

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	B	`ed.`	Algorithmic Game Theory - 18th International Symposium, SAGT 2025, Bath, UK, September 2-5, 2025, Proceedings SAGT Ron Lavi, Jie Zhang
2025	J	`jnl`	From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? Games Econ. Behav. Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
2024	J	`jnl`	Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes. Math. Oper. Res. Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi
2024	J	`jnl`	Technical Note - Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. Oper. Res. Tal Alon, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash
2023	A*	`conf`	From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. AAAI Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
2023	J	`jnl`	Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2022	J	`jnl`	Principal-agent VCG contracts. J. Econ. Theory Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash
2022	J	`jnl`	Redesigning Bitcoin's Fee Market. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar
2021	J	`jnl`	From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. CoRR Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
2021	A*	`conf`	Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. EC Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2021	J	`jnl`	Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. CoRR Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2021	—	`conf`	Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post Vs. Ex-Interim IR. WINE Ido Feldman, Ron Lavi
2021	J	`jnl`	Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations. Int. J. Game Theory Amir Ban, Ron Lavi
2021	J	`jnl`	Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. CoRR Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2021	A*	`conf`	Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. IJCAI Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2021	J	`jnl`	Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. CoRR Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2021	J	`jnl`	Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2020	A*	`conf`	A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. NeurIPS Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Qi Qi, Wenwei Wang, Xiang Yan
2020	J	`jnl`	A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. CoRR Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Qi Qi, Wenwei Wang, Xiang Yan
2020	J	`jnl`	Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency. J. ACM Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
2020	J	`jnl`	Bayesian generalized network design. Theor. Comput. Sci. Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
2020	A*	`conf`	Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis. IJCAI Ron Lavi, Omer Shiran-Shvarzbard
2020	J	`jnl`	No-Regret Stateful Posted Pricing. CoRR Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi
2020	A*	`conf`	Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes. NeurIPS Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi
2020	A*	`conf`	VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis. AAAI Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2019	A	`conf`	Bayesian Generalized Network Design. ESA Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
2019	J	`jnl`	Bayesian Generalized Network Design. CoRR Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
2019	A*	`conf`	Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter. ICALP Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, William K. Moses Jr.
2019	J	`jnl`	Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter. CoRR Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, William K. Moses Jr.
2019	A*	`conf`	Principal-Agent VCG Contracts. EC Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash
2019	A*	`conf`	Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market. WWW Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar
2019	J	`jnl`	VCG Under Sybil (False-name) Attacks - a Bayesian Analysis. CoRR Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2018	J	`jnl`	Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency. CoRR Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
2018	A*	`conf`	Approximating generalized network design under (dis)economies of scale with applications to energy efficiency. STOC Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
2018	A*	`conf`	Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives. IJCAI Argyrios Deligkas, Erez Karpas, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky
2017	J	`jnl`	Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market. CoRR Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar
2016	—	`ch.`	Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms Ron Lavi
2016	J	`jnl`	Preface to Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. Theory Comput. Syst. Martin Hoefer, Ron Lavi
2015	J	`jnl`	Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. J. Econ. Theory Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
2014	B	`ed.`	Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, SAGT 2014, Haifa, Israel, September 30 - October 2, 2014. Proceedings SAGT Ron Lavi
2014	J	`jnl`	Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals. Int. J. Game Theory Ron Lavi, Ella Segev
2013	J	`jnl`	Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium CoRR Oren Ben-Zwi, Ron Lavi, Ilan Newman
2013	A*	`conf`	Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply. EC Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2013	A*	`conf`	Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grant Games. AAAI Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
2012	—	`conf`	Composition games for distributed systems: The EU grant games (abstract). INFOCOM Workshops Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
2012	A*	`conf`	Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. EC Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi
2012	A*	`conf`	Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. EC Olivier Compte, Ron Lavi, Ella Segev
2012	J	`jnl`	Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games Econ. Behav. Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
2012	J	`jnl`	Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
2012	A*	`conf`	Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. EC Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
2012	J	`jnl`	Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case. Games Econ. Behav. Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren
2011	—	`conf`	A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Pareto-Optimality in Quasi-Linear Settings with Public Budgets - Working Paper. WINE Ron Lavi, Marina May
2011	A	`conf`	Brief Announcement: Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grants Games. DISC Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
2011	J	`jnl`	Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games CoRR Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
2011	—	`conf`	Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case. AMMA Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren
2011	J	`jnl`	Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. J. ACM Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
2009	A*	`conf`	An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
2009	—	`ch.`	Mechanism Design. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Ron Lavi
2009	J	`jnl`	Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies. J. ACM Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
2009	J	`jnl`	Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. Games Econ. Behav. Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
2009	J	`jnl`	Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem. Soc. Choice Welf. Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
2009	J	`jnl`	VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exch. Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
2008	—	`ch.`	Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms Ron Lavi
2008	A*	`conf`	Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
2007	J	`jnl`	Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. Ron Lavi
2007	A*	`conf`	Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. EC Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
2006	A*	`conf`	Impersonation-Based Mechanisms. AAAI Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
2006	A*	`conf`	Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies. SODA Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
2005	A*	`conf`	Mechanism Design for Single-Value Domains. AAAI Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
2005	A*	`conf`	Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. SODA Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
2005	A*	`conf`	Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. FOCS Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
2004	—	`—`	Auction theory in computational settings (תורת המכרזים עבור מערכות ממוחשבות.). Ron Lavi
2004	J	`jnl`	Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. Theor. Comput. Sci. Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
2004	A	`conf`	Online Competitive Algorithms for Maximizing Weighted Throughput of Unit Jobs. STACS Yair Bartal, Francis Y. L. Chin, Marek Chrobak, Stanley P. Y. Fung, Wojciech Jawor, Ron Lavi, Jirí Sgall, Tomás Tichý
2003	A*	`conf`	Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. FOCS Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
2001	A	`conf`	The Home Model and Competitive Algorithms for Load Balancing in a Computing Cluster. ICDCS Ron Lavi, Amnon Barak
2000	A*	`conf`	Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. EC Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
1998	—	`conf`	Improving the PVM Daemon Network Performance by Direct Network Access. PVM/MPI Ron Lavi, Amnon Barak