Randy H. Moss

25 papers B 1Journal 18Unranked 5
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2017 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Instrum. Meas.
Kanakam Teja Maddala, Randy H. Moss, William V. Stoecker, Jason R. Hagerty, Justin G. Cole, Nabin K. Mishra, Ronald Joe Stanley
2017 conf
VISIGRAPP (4: VISAPP)
Nabin K. Mishra, Ravneet Kaur, Reda Kasmi, Serkan Kefel, Pelin Guvenc, Justin G. Cole, Jason R. Hagerty, Hemanth Y. Aradhyula, Robert W. LeAnder, Ronald Joe Stanley, Randy H. Moss, William V. Stoecker
2017 J jnl
Inf.
Haidar A. Almubarak, Ronald Joe Stanley, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss
2016 J jnl
IEEE J. Biomed. Health Informatics
Peng Guo, Koyel Banerjee, Ronald Joe Stanley, L. Rodney Long, Sameer K. Antani, George R. Thoma, Rosemary Zuna, Shelliane R. Frazier, Randy H. Moss, William V. Stoecker
2013 conf
VISAPP (1)
David E. Madsen, Katie S. Payne, Jason R. Hagerty, Nathan Szanto, Mark Wronkiewiecz, Randy H. Moss, William V. Stoecker
2013 conf
VISAPP (1)
Viswanaath Subramanian, Randy H. Moss, Ryan K. Rader, Sneha K. Mahajan, William V. Stoecker
2013 conf
VISAPP (1)
Kaushik V. S. N. Ghantasala, Raeed H. Chowdhury, Uday Guntupalli, Jason R. Hagerty, Randy H. Moss, Ryan K. Rader, William V. Stoecker
2011 J jnl
Comput. Medical Imaging Graph.
M. Emre Celebi, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss
2011 J jnl
Comput. Medical Imaging Graph.
Ankur Dalal, Randy H. Moss, Ronald Joe Stanley, William V. Stoecker, Kapil Gupta, David A. Calcara, Jin Xu, Bijaya Shrestha, Rhett Drugge, Joseph M. Malters, Lindall A. Perry
2011 J jnl
Comput. Medical Imaging Graph.
Hanzheng Wang, Randy H. Moss, Xiaohe Chen, Ronald Joe Stanley, William V. Stoecker, M. Emre Celebi, Joseph M. Malters, James M. Grichnik, Ashfaq A. Marghoob, Harold S. Rabinovitz, Scott W. Menzies, Thomas M. Szalapski
2010 J jnl
CoRR
M. Emre Celebi, Hitoshi Iyatomi, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss, Harold S. Rabinovitz, Giuseppe Argenziano, H. Peter Soyer
2009 J jnl
Comput. Medical Imaging Graph.
Azmath Khan, Kapil Gupta, Ronald Joe Stanley, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss, Giuseppe Argenziano, H. Peter Soyer, Harold S. Rabinovitz, Armand B. Cognetta Jr.
2008 J jnl
Comput. Medical Imaging Graph.
M. Emre Celebi, Hitoshi Iyatomi, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss, Harold S. Rabinovitz, Giuseppe Argenziano, H. Peter Soyer
2007 J jnl
Comput. Medical Imaging Graph.
M. Emre Celebi, Hassan A. Kingravi, Bakhtiyar Uddin, Hitoshi Iyatomi, Y. Alp Aslandogan, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss
2007 B conf
Image Processing
M. Emre Celebi, Hassan A. Kingravi, Hitoshi Iyatomi, Jeongkyu Lee, Y. Alp Aslandogan, William Van Stoecker, Randy H. Moss, Joseph M. Malters, Ashfaq A. Marghoob
2004 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Educ.
Ronald Joe Stanley, Steve E. Watkins, Anand Gopal, Randy H. Moss
2001 conf
MIAR
Zhao Zhang, Randy H. Moss, William V. Stoecker
2000 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Medical Imaging
Zhao Zhang, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss
1994 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Biomed. Eng.
Fikret Erçal, Anurag Chawla, William V. Stoecker, Hsi-Chieh Lee, Randy H. Moss
1993 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Medical Imaging
Fikret Erçal, Madhav Moganti, William V. Stoecker, Randy H. Moss
1990 J jnl
Pattern Recognit.
Jeremiah E. Golston, Randy H. Moss, William V. Stoecker
1985 J jnl
IEEE Micro
Eric H. Stelzer, Randy H. Moss
1985 J jnl
IEEE Micro
Richard E. Wainwright, Randy H. Moss
1983 J jnl
Pattern Recognit.
Randy H. Moss, C. Michael Robinson, W. J. Poppelbaum
1981
Randy H. Moss
redb/extractors/apk_extractors/apk_resources.py
← Index redb/extractors/apk_extractors/apk_resources.py python
import hashlib
import inspect
import os
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any

from redb.extractors.enum import Tag
from redb.extractors.apk_extractor import APKExtractor
from redb.models.dataclasses import APKResource


# ─── Suspicious file types ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# File types that are suspicious when found inside res/ or assets/.
# Excludes javascript/html (extremely common in legitimate hybrid apps)
# and common media/font types that are normal APK content.
SUSPICIOUS_TYPES = {
    # Executables — no legitimate reason in assets/res
    "elf", "pebin", "macho", "dex", "apk",
    # Java containers — DexClassLoader target
    "jar",
    # Archives — rare in legitimate assets (~135:1 malware-to-benign ratio)
    "zip", "gzip", "7z", "xz", "tar", "bzip2", "rar", "7zip", "lzma",
    # Scripts with system execution capability
    "shell", "python", "powershell", "batch",
}

# ─── Entropy thresholds ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# For unrecognized/unknown types: encrypted payloads typically land > 7.0
ENTROPY_HIGH_UNKNOWN = 7.0
# For recognized-but-non-image types: stricter threshold
ENTROPY_EXTREME = 7.85

# ─── Android-specific binary format magic bytes ─────────────────────────
# These formats are common in legitimate APKs but unknown to Magika,
# causing misclassification (e.g., AXML → "gzip", profm → "unknown").
AXML_MAGIC = b'\x03\x00\x08\x00'       # Android Binary XML (compiled res/*.xml)
ARSC_MAGIC = b'\x02\x00\x0c\x00'       # Android compiled resource table
ART_PROF_MAGIC = b'pro\x00'            # ART baseline profile
ART_PROFM_MAGIC = b'prm\x00'           # ART baseline profile metadata

# ─── Allowlisted paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Fixed, hardcoded paths in the Android build system that are always benign.
# ART profiles at these exact paths are shipped by Jetpack ProfileInstaller.
ALLOWLISTED_PATHS = {
    "assets/dexopt/baseline.prof",
    "assets/dexopt/baseline.profm",
}

# ─── Image handling ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Magika-confirmed image types: high entropy is expected (lossy codecs
# like VP8/JPEG arithmetic-code toward entropy ~7.95-8.0 by design).
IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES = {"png", "webp", "jpeg", "gif", "bmp", "tiff", "ico"}
IMAGE_EXTENSIONS = {".png", ".webp", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".bmp", ".tiff", ".ico"}

# ─── Types Magika assigns when it can't identify the content ────────────
UNRECOGNIZED_MAGIKA_TYPES = {"unknown", "empty"}

# ─── Resource scan limits ───────────────────────────────────────────────
MAX_RESOURCE_FILES = 5000


class APKResourceExtractor(APKExtractor):

    def __init__(
        self, filepath, log, exporters=None, index_prefix=None,
        known_benign=False, known_malicious=False,
        apk=None,
    ):
        super().__init__(
            filepath, log, exporters, index_prefix,
            known_benign, known_malicious, apk,
        )
        self.resources = []
        self.suspicious_files = []
        self.log.debug(inspect.currentframe().f_code.co_name)

    def tag(self):
        return Tag.APK_RESOURCES.value

    # ─── Core classification logic ──────────────────────────────────────

    def _identify_android_format(self, header: bytes) -> str | None:
        """
        Identify Android-specific binary formats that Magika doesn't know.
        Returns a corrected type label, or None to fall through to Magika.
        """
        if len(header) < 4:
            return None

        magic4 = header[:4]

        # Android Binary XML — all res/*.xml in a compiled APK.
        # Magika often misclassifies this as "gzip".
        if magic4 == AXML_MAGIC:
            return "android_binary_xml"

        # Android compiled resource table (resources.arsc chunks)
        if magic4 == ARSC_MAGIC:
            return "android_resource_table"

        # ART baseline profiles — high entropy (zlib inside) but benign.
        # The format is inert (method reference bitmaps/metadata, not
        # executable code) and some build configs place them at varying paths.
        if magic4 == ART_PROF_MAGIC:
            return "android_art_profile"
        if magic4 == ART_PROFM_MAGIC:
            return "android_art_profile_metadata"

        return None

    def _is_suspicious_resource(
        self, path: str, magika_type: str, entropy: float,
        android_type: str | None,
    ) -> bool:
        """
        Determine if a resource file is suspicious.

        Detection layers:
        1. Allowlisted paths → always benign
        2. Android-specific format override → reclassify Magika mislabels
        3. Image extension vs Magika type mismatch → encrypted blob detection
        4. Magika-confirmed images → benign regardless of entropy
        5. Suspicious type match → flag known-dangerous types
        6. High-entropy unknown blobs → likely encrypted payloads
        """

        # ── Layer 1: Allowlisted paths (hardcoded Android build artifacts) ──
        if path in ALLOWLISTED_PATHS:
            return False

        # ── Layer 2: Android-specific format detection ──────────────────────
        # Override Magika's label for formats it doesn't recognize.
        # All Android-specific formats (AXML, ARSC, ART profiles) are
        # legitimate build artifacts — never suspicious.
        if android_type is not None:
            return False

        # ── Layer 3: Image extension / Magika type mismatch ─────────────────
        # If the file extension claims "image" but Magika's content analysis
        # disagrees, this is a strong signal for an encrypted payload with
        # a fake image extension (e.g., ErrorFather's "rbyypivsnw.png").
        ext = os.path.splitext(path)[1].lower()
        if ext in IMAGE_EXTENSIONS and magika_type not in IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES:
            # Exception: Magika might label a valid image as "unknown" if
            # the file is very small (< ~16 bytes). Don't flag tiny files.
            if entropy > 5.0:
                return True

        # ── Layer 4: Magika-confirmed images → benign ───────────────────────
        # Lossy codecs (VP8, JPEG) produce entropy up to ~8.0 by design.
        # If Magika confirms image structure, high entropy is expected.
        if magika_type in IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES:
            return False

        # ── Layer 5: Known suspicious file types ────────────────────────────
        if magika_type in SUSPICIOUS_TYPES:
            return True

        # ── Layer 6: High-entropy unrecognized blobs ────────────────────────
        # Files Magika can't identify with high entropy are likely encrypted
        # payloads. Most Android malware packers store encrypted DEX/SO
        # payloads as opaque blobs with random names and no valid magic.
        if magika_type in UNRECOGNIZED_MAGIKA_TYPES and entropy > ENTROPY_HIGH_UNKNOWN:
            return True

        # ── Layer 7: Extreme entropy on any non-image recognized type ───────
        # Catches edge cases where Magika assigns a benign label (e.g.,
        # "xml", "txt") but the entropy is impossibly high for that format.
        if magika_type not in IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES and entropy > ENTROPY_EXTREME:
            return True

        return False

    # ─── Extraction pipeline ────────────────────────────────────────────

    def extract(self):
        if not self._is_valid_apk():
            self.log.error(f"Invalid APK for {self.hash.sha256}")
            return None

        try:
            from magika import Magika
            magika = Magika()
        except Exception as e:
            self.log.error(f"Failed to initialize Magika for {self.hash.sha256}: {e}")
            magika = None

        self.resources = []
        self.suspicious_files = []
        scanned = 0

        zf = self._get_zip_file()
        if not zf:
            return None

        with zf:
            for info in zf.infolist():
                if info.is_dir():
                    continue
                if not (info.filename.startswith("res/") or
                        info.filename.startswith("assets/")):
                    continue

                if scanned >= MAX_RESOURCE_FILES:
                    self.log.warning(
                        f"Resource scan limit reached ({MAX_RESOURCE_FILES}), "
                        f"stopping resource enumeration"
                    )
                    break
                scanned += 1

                try:
                    data = zf.read(info.filename)
                except Exception as e:
                    self.log.warning(
                        f"Error reading resource {info.filename}: {e}"
                    )
                    continue

                try:
                    file_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
                    file_entropy = round(self.calculate_entropy(data), 3)

                    # Read first bytes for Android-specific format detection
                    header = data[:16] if len(data) >= 16 else data

                    if magika:
                        try:
                            filetype = magika.identify_bytes(data).output.label
                        except Exception:
                            filetype = "unknown"
                    else:
                        filetype = "unknown"

                    # Identify Android-specific formats once, reuse for
                    # both stored type and suspicion classification
                    android_type = self._identify_android_format(header)
                    stored_type = android_type if android_type else filetype

                    suspicious = self._is_suspicious_resource(
                        path=info.filename,
                        magika_type=filetype,
                        entropy=file_entropy,
                        android_type=android_type,
                    )

                    resource = APKResource(
                        path=info.filename,
                        size=info.file_size,
                        sha256=file_sha256,
                        filetype_magika=stored_type,
                        entropy=file_entropy,
                    )

                    if suspicious:
                        resource.is_suspicious = True
                        self.suspicious_files.append(resource)

                    self.resources.append(resource)
                except Exception as e:
                    self.log.warning(
                        f"Error processing resource {info.filename}: {e}"
                    )
                    continue

        if not self.resources:
            return None

        return {
            "total_resource_count": len(self.resources),
            "total_resource_size": sum(r.size for r in self.resources),
            "suspicious_file_count": len(self.suspicious_files),
            "resources": self.resources,
            "suspicious_files": self.suspicious_files,
        }

    # ─── Export ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    def prepare_export_data(self, exporter_type: str) -> Any:
        if exporter_type == "ClickHouseExporter":
            if not self.resources:
                return None

            current_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
            data = []
            for res in self.resources:
                data.append([
                    self.sha256,
                    res.path,
                    res.size,
                    res.sha256,
                    res.filetype_magika,
                    res.entropy,
                    int(res.is_suspicious),
                    current_time,
                ])

            column_names = [
                'sha256', 'resource_path', 'resource_size',
                'resource_sha256', 'resource_magika', 'resource_entropy',
                'is_suspicious', 'analysis_date',
            ]

            column_type_names = [
                'FixedString(64)', 'String', 'UInt64',
                'FixedString(64)', 'LowCardinality(String)', 'Float32',
                'UInt8', "DateTime64(3, 'UTC')",
            ]

            return (data, column_names, column_type_names)

    def get_clickhouse_table(self) -> str:
        return "redb_apk_resources"