Rahul Shome

51 papers A* 9A 5C 3Journal 26Unranked 8
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
CoRR
Subhransu S. Bhattacharjee, Dylan Campbell, Rahul Shome
2025 A* conf
CVPR
Subhransu S. Bhattacharjee, Dylan Campbell, Rahul Shome
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Changlin Song, Yunzhong Hou, Michael Randall Barnes, Rahul Shome, Dylan Campbell
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Subhransu S. Bhattacharjee, Hao Lu, Dylan Campbell, Rahul Shome
2025 A* conf
AAAI
Songtuan Lin, Alban Grastien, Rahul Shome, Pascal Bercher
2024 A conf
IROS
Rahul Shome
2024 A* conf
ICRA
Yoonchang Sung, Rahul Shome, Peter Stone
2024 A conf
IROS
Hao Lu, Hanna Kurniawati, Rahul Shome
2024 J jnl
CoRR
Tianyang Pan, Rahul Shome, Lydia E. Kavraki
2024 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Robotics
Tianyang Pan, Rahul Shome, Lydia E. Kavraki
2024 J jnl
CoRR
Subhransu S. Bhattacharjee, Dylan Campbell, Rahul Shome
2023 J jnl
CoRR
Yoonchang Sung, Rahul Shome, Peter Stone
2023 A* conf
ICRA
Shlok Sobti, Rahul Shome, Lydia E. Kavraki
2023 A* conf
ICRA
Carlos Quintero-Peña, Zachary Kingston, Tianyang Pan, Rahul Shome, Anastasios Kyrillidis, Lydia E. Kavraki
2023 A conf
IROS
Rahul Shome, Zachary Kingston, Lydia E. Kavraki
2023 J jnl
CoRR
Rahul Shome, Zachary Kingston, Lydia E. Kavraki
2022 A* conf
ICRA
Tianyang Pan, Andrew M. Wells, Rahul Shome, Lydia E. Kavraki
2021 A conf
IROS
Tianyang Pan, Andrew M. Wells, Rahul Shome, Lydia E. Kavraki
2021 A conf
IROS
Shlok Sobti, Rahul Shome, Swarat Chaudhuri, Lydia E. Kavraki
2021 A* conf
ICRA
Rahul Shome, Lydia E. Kavraki
2021 J jnl
IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng.
Rahul Shome, Kiril Solovey, Jingjin Yu, Kostas E. Bekris, Dan Halperin
2021 C conf
WAFR
Rahul Shome, Daniel Nakhimovich, Kostas E. Bekris
2021 C conf
WAFR
Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2020 J jnl
CoRR
Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2020 J jnl
IEEE Robotics Autom. Lett.
Chaitanya Mitash, Rahul Shome, Bowen Wen, Abdeslam Boularias, Kostas E. Bekris
2020 J jnl
CoRR
Chaitanya Mitash, Rahul Shome, Bowen Wen, Abdeslam Boularias, Kostas E. Bekris
2020 A* conf
AAAI
Malihe Alikhani, Baber Khalid, Rahul Shome, Chaitanya Mitash, Kostas E. Bekris, Matthew Stone
2020 J jnl
Auton. Robots
Rahul Shome, Kiril Solovey, Andrew Dobson, Dan Halperin, Kostas E. Bekris
2019 conf
MRS
Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2019 J jnl
CoRR
Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2019 J jnl
Adv. Robotics
Andrew Kimmel, Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2019 J jnl
CoRR
Kostas E. Bekris, Rahul Shome
2019 J jnl
CoRR
Malihe Alikhani, Baber Khalid, Rahul Shome, Chaitanya Mitash, Kostas E. Bekris, Matthew Stone
2019 A* conf
ICRA
Rahul Shome, Wei N. Tang, Changkyu Song, Chaitanya Mitash, Hristiyan Kourtev, Jingjin Yu, Abdeslam Boularias, Kostas E. Bekris
2019 J jnl
CoRR
Rahul Shome, Wei N. Tang, Changkyu Song, Chaitanya Mitash, Hristiyan Kourtev, Jingjin Yu, Abdeslam Boularias, Kostas E. Bekris
2019 J jnl
CoRR
Rahul Shome, Kiril Solovey, Andrew Dobson, Dan Halperin, Kostas E. Bekris
2018 conf
Humanoids
Andrew Kimmel, Rahul Shome, Zakary Littlefield, Kostas E. Bekris
2018 J jnl
CoRR
Andrew Kimmel, Rahul Shome, Zakary Littlefield, Kostas E. Bekris
2018 C conf
WAFR
Rahul Shome, Kiril Solovey, Jingjin Yu, Kostas E. Bekris, Dan Halperin
2018 J jnl
CoRR
Rahul Shome, Kiril Solovey, Jingjin Yu, Kostas E. Bekris, Dan Halperin
2017 conf
Humanoids
Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2017 J jnl
CoRR
Andrew Dobson, Kiril Solovey, Rahul Shome, Dan Halperin, Kostas E. Bekris
2017 conf
MRS
Andrew Dobson, Kiril Solovey, Rahul Shome, Dan Halperin, Kostas E. Bekris
2016 J jnl
IEEE Robotics Autom. Lett.
Colin Rennie, Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris, Alberto F. De Souza
2016 conf
CASE
Zakary Littlefield, Shaojun Zhu, Hristiyan Kourtev, Zacharias Psarakis, Rahul Shome, Andrew Kimmel, Andrew Dobson, Alberto Ferreira de Souza, Kostas E. Bekris
2015 J jnl
CoRR
Colin Rennie, Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris, Alberto F. De Souza
2015 J jnl
IEEE Robotics Autom. Mag.
Kostas E. Bekris, Rahul Shome, Athanasios Krontiris, Andrew Dobson
2014 conf
ISER
Min Zhao, Rahul Shome, Isaac Yochelson, Kostas E. Bekris, Eileen Kowler
2014 conf
SIMPAR
Zakary Littlefield, Athanasios Krontiris, Andrew Kimmel, Andrew Dobson, Rahul Shome, Kostas E. Bekris
2014 conf
Humanoids
Athanasios Krontiris, Rahul Shome, Andrew Dobson, Andrew Kimmel, Kostas E. Bekris
2014 J jnl
CoRR
Athanasios Krontiris, Rahul Shome, Andrew Dobson, Andrew Kimmel, Isaac Yochelson, Kostas E. Bekris
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*