Pranav Garimidi

23 papers A* 3B 2Journal 14Unranked 4
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions.
CoRR
Pranav Garimidi, Michael Neuder, Tim Roughgarden
2025 J jnl
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.
Oper. Res.
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025 J jnl
Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How.
CoRR
Pranav Garimidi, Joachim Neu, Max Resnick
2025 J jnl
Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How.
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
Pranav Garimidi, Joachim Neu, Max Resnick
2025 J jnl
Non-Delegatable Commitments.
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
Georg Fuchsbauer, Pranav Garimidi, Guru-Vamsi Policharla, Max Resnick, Ertem Nusret Tas
2025 — conf
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols.
FC (2)
Pranav Garimidi, Lioba Heimbach, Tim Roughgarden
2025 J jnl
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols.
CoRR
Pranav Garimidi, Lioba Heimbach, Tim Roughgarden
2024 J jnl
Centralization in Block Building and Proposer-Builder Separation.
CoRR
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2024 — conf
Centralization in Block-Building and Proposer-Builder Separation.
FC (1)
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2024 B conf
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World.
AFT
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2024 J jnl
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World.
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2024 — conf
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers.
FC Workshops
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2023 J jnl
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers.
CoRR
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2023 B conf
When Bidders Are DAOs.
AFT
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2023 J jnl
When Bidders Are DAOs.
CoRR
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
2022 — conf
A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design.
DeFi@CCS
Jason Milionis, Dean Hirsch, Andy Arditi, Pranav Garimidi
2022 J jnl
A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design.
CoRR
Jason Milionis, Dean Hirsch, Andy Arditi, Pranav Garimidi
2022 A* conf
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.
SODA
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2021 A* conf
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.
AAAI
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 J jnl
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.
CoRR
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2021 A* conf
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.
IJCAI
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 J jnl
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.
CoRR
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2020 J jnl
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.
CoRR
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin