Ophir Friedler

21 papers A* 6A 2Journal 11Unranked 1
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2025 J jnl
DCN^2: Interplay of Implicit Collision Weights and Explicit Cross Layers for Large-Scale Recommendation.
CoRR
Blaz Skrlj, Yonatan Karni, Grega Gaspersic, Blaz Mramor, Yulia Stolin, Martin Jakomin, Jasna Urbancic, Yuval Dishi, Natalia Silberstein, Ophir Friedler, Assaf Klein
2025 A conf
Practical Multi-Task Learning for Rare Conversions in Ad Tech.
RecSys
Yuval Dishi, Ophir Friedler, Yonatan Karni, Natalia Silberstein, Yulia Stolin
2025 J jnl
Practical Multi-Task Learning for Rare Conversions in Ad Tech.
CoRR
Yuval Dishi, Ophir Friedler, Yonatan Karni, Natalia Silberstein, Yulia Stolin
2025 A* conf
Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box.
WWW
Ophir Friedler, Hu Fu, Anna R. Karlin, Ariana Tang
2025 J jnl
Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box.
CoRR
Ophir Friedler, Hu Fu, Anna R. Karlin, Ariana Tang
2021 J jnl
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.
Oper. Res.
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020 A* conf
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets.
EC
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2020 J jnl
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets.
SIGecom Exch.
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2020 — —
Simple Mechanisms for Complex Environments
Ophir Friedler
2019 J jnl
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets.
CoRR
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2018 A* conf
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition.
EC
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
2018 J jnl
99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition.
CoRR
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
2017 A* conf
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.
EC
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017 A* conf
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.
EC
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016 J jnl
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.
CoRR
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016 J jnl
Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements.
CoRR
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
2016 A* conf
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements.
EC
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
2016 J jnl
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.
CoRR
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015 — conf
A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games.
ICALP (2)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2015 J jnl
Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games.
SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev.
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2014 A conf
Effective post-silicon failure localization using dynamic program slicing.
DATE
Ophir Friedler, Wisam Kadry, Arkadiy Morgenshtein, Amir Nahir, Vitali Sokhin