Nathanaël Barrot

16 papers A* 6A 4Journal 3Unranked 2
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2022 — conf
Robust Weighted Partial Maximum Satisfiability Problem: Challenge to σ
PRICAI (1)
Tomoya Sugahara, Kaito Yamashita, Nathanaël Barrot, Miyuki Koshimura, Makoto Yokoo
2020 A conf
Peer Reviewing in Participatory Guarantee Systems: Modelisation and Algorithmic Aspects.
AAMAS
Nathanaël Barrot, Sylvaine Lemeilleur, Nicolas Paget, Abdallah Saffidine
2020 A* conf
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network.
AAAI
Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2020 J jnl
Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for ratio constraints.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst.
Kentaro Yahiro, Yuzhe Zhang, Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo
2019 A* conf
Stable and Envy-free Partitions in Hedonic Games.
IJCAI
Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo
2019 J jnl
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network.
CoRR
Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2019 A* conf
Unknown Agents in Friends Oriented Hedonic Games: Stability and Complexity.
AAAI
Nathanaël Barrot, Kazunori Ota, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2018 A conf
Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Ratio Constraints.
AAMAS
Kentaro Yahiro, Yuzhe Zhang, Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo
2018 A* conf
Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Union of Symmetric M-convex Constraints.
IJCAI
Yuzhe Zhang, Kentaro Yahiro, Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo
2017 A* conf
Core Stability in Hedonic Games among Friends and Enemies: Impact of Neutrals.
IJCAI
Kazunori Ohta, Nathanaël Barrot, Anisse Ismaili, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2017 A conf
Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections.
AAMAS
Nathanaël Barrot, Jérôme Lang, Makoto Yokoo
2016 A* conf
Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains.
IJCAI
Nathanaël Barrot, Jérôme Lang
2016 — —
Sur les aspects computationnels du vote par approbation. (Computational Aspects of Approval Voting).
Nathanaël Barrot
2015 A conf
Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability.
AAMAS
Georgios Amanatidis, Nathanaël Barrot, Jérôme Lang, Evangelos Markakis, Bernard Ries
2015 J jnl
Vote par approbation pour les élections à vainqueurs multiples. Une famille générale de règles, leur complexité algorithmique et leur manipulabilité.
Rev. d'Intelligence Artif.
Nathanaël Barrot, Jérôme Lang, Bernard Ries
2013 — conf
Possible Winners in Approval Voting.
ADT
Nathanaël Barrot, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Lang, Jérôme Monnot, Bernard Ries