Nasser Alzeidi

32 papers A 3B 1C 1Journal 15Unranked 11
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2023 J jnl
Int. Arab J. Inf. Technol.
Shahd Alqam, Nasser Alzeidi, Abderezak Touzene, Khaled Day
2022 J jnl
J. Commun.
Khaled Day, Faiza Al-Salti, Nasser Alzeidi, Abderezak Touzene
2021 J jnl
J. Cyber Secur. Mobil.
Zainab Rashid Alkindi, Mohamed Sarrab, Nasser Alzeidi
2020 J jnl
J. Real Time Image Process.
Abir Al-Sideiri, Nasser Alzeidi, Mayyada Al Hammoshi, Munesh Singh Chauhan, Ghaliya Muslem ALFarsi
2020 B conf
IWCMC
Yahya Al Sawafi, Abderezak Touzene, Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi
2020 J jnl
Int. J. Pervasive Comput. Commun.
Yahya Al Sawafi, Abderezak Touzene, Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi
2019 J jnl
Comput. Networks
Faiza Al-Salti, Nasser Alzeidi, Khaled Day, Abderezak Touzene
2019 J jnl
Int. J. Cloud Appl. Comput.
Hamid A. Jadad, Abderezak Touzene, Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi, Bassel R. Arafeh
2019 conf
ICUFN
Fatema Al Bahanta, Nasser Alzeidi, Khaled Day, Abderezak Touzene, Hussein Al-Maqbali
2018 conf
ICFNDS
Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi, Abderezak Touzene
2018 C conf
ISNCC
Faiza Al-Salti, Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi, Abderezak Touzene
2018 conf
FNC/MobiSPC
Ahlem Boudellioua, Nasser Alzeidi
2018 conf
ICOIN
Yahya Al Sawafi, Abderezak Touzene, Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi
2017 J jnl
Wirel. Networks
Faiza Al-Salti, Nasser Alzeidi, Bassel R. Arafeh
2017 J jnl
J. Commun.
Khaled Day, Hussein Al-Maqbali, Nasser Alzeidi, Abderezak Touzene
2016 conf
MobiWIS
Hamid A. Jadad, Abderezak Touzene, Nasser Alzeidi, Khaled Day, Bassel R. Arafeh
2014 conf
CyberC
Faiza Al-Salti, Nasser Alzeidi, Bassel R. Arafeh
2014 J jnl
Int. J. Wirel. Mob. Comput.
Hussein Al-Maqbali, Khaled Day, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Abderezak Touzene, Nasser Alzeidi
2013 J jnl
Int. J. Commun. Syst.
Sharifa Al Khanjari, Bassel R. Arafeh, Khaled Day, Nasser Alzeidi
2012 conf
ICUFN
Nasser Alzeidi, Khaled Day, Abderezak Touzene, Bassel R. Arafeh
2011 J jnl
CoRR
Khaled Day, Abderezak Touzene, Bassel R. Arafeh, Nasser Alzeidi
2011 conf
DICTAP (1)
Khaled Day, Bassel R. Arafeh, Abderezak Touzene, Nasser Alzeidi
2009 conf
ICUMT
Ruqaiya Al-Badi, Maha Al-Riyami, Nasser Alzeidi
2008 J jnl
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.
Nasser Alzeidi, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Ahmad Khonsari
2008 J jnl
Int. J. Parallel Emergent Distributed Syst.
Nasser Alzeidi, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Ahmad Khonsari
2007 J jnl
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.
Nasser Alzeidi, Ahmad Khonsari, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Lewis M. Mackenzie
2007 conf
ICC
Nasser Alzeidi, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Lewis M. Mackenzie, Ahmad Khonsari
2007
Nasser Alzeidi
2006 A conf
IPDPS
Nasser Alzeidi, Ahmad Khonsari, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Lewis M. Mackenzie
2006 conf
PARELEC
Farshad Safaei, Ahmad Khonsari, Mahmood Fathy, Nasser Alzeidi, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua
2006 A conf
IPDPS
Farshad Safaei, Mostafa Rezazad, Ahmad Khonsari, Mahmood Fathy, Mohamed Ould-Khaoua, Nasser Alzeidi
2001 A conf
ISSRE
Lee J. White, Husain Almezen, Nasser Alzeidi
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*