Nan Chen

28 papers B 1C 6Journal 14Unranked 7
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2022 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.
Tiancheng Ouyang, Peihang Xu, Jie Lu, Xiaoyi Hu, Benlong Liu, Nan Chen
2022 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Ind. Informatics
Peihang Xu, Xiaoyi Hu, Benlong Liu, Tiancheng Ouyang, Nan Chen
2022 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.
Peihang Xu, Benlong Liu, Xiaoyi Hu, Tiancheng Ouyang, Nan Chen
2019 J jnl
Sensors
Xianjian Jin, Guodong Yin, Nan Chen
2019 conf
ITSC
Kuoran Zhang, Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen, Mingcong Cao, Guodong Yin
2019 conf
CCTA
Mingcong Cao, Jinxiang Wang, Rongrong Wang, Junmin Wang, Nan Chen
2019 J jnl
IEEE Access
Kuoran Zhang, Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen, Mingcong Cao, Guodong Yin
2018 C conf
ACC
Kuoran Zhang, Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen, Guodong Yin
2018 conf
ITSC
Mingcong Cao, Rongrong Wang, Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen
2018 B conf
Intelligent Vehicles Symposium
Mengmeng Dai, Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen, Guodong Yin
2018 C conf
ACC
Mingcong Cao, Rongrong Wang, Nan Chen
2018 J jnl
J. Frankl. Inst.
Hui Jing, Rongrong Wang, Junmin Wang, Nan Chen
2016 conf
ICVES
Ning Zhang, Pengcheng Li, Guodong Yin, Nan Chen, Yang Li
2016 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.
Chuan Hu, Rongrong Wang, Fengjun Yan, Nan Chen
2016 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.
Chuan Hu, Rongrong Wang, Fengjun Yan, Nan Chen
2016 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.
Rongrong Wang, Hui Jing, Chuan Hu, Fengjun Yan, Nan Chen
2016 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Rongrong Wang, Hui Jing, Jinxiang Wang, Mohammed Chadli, Nan Chen
2016 C conf
ACC
Hui Jing, Rongrong Wang, Chuan Hu, Jinxiang Wang, Fengjun Yan, Nan Chen
2015 C conf
ACC
Jinxiang Wang, Rongrong Wang, Hui Jing, Mohammed Chadli, Nan Chen
2015 J jnl
J. Frankl. Inst.
Rongrong Wang, Hui Jing, Fengjun Yan, Hamid Reza Karimi, Nan Chen
2015 C conf
ACC
Chuan Hu, Rongrong Wang, Fengjun Yan, Mohammed Chadli, Nan Chen
2015 conf
CDC
Hui Jing, Chuan Hu, Fengjun Yan, Mohammed Chadli, Rongrong Wang, Nan Chen
2015 conf
CDC
Tian Mi, Cong Li, Chuan Hu, Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen, Rongrong Wang
2015 J jnl
J. Frankl. Inst.
Rongrong Wang, Hui Zhang, Junmin Wang, Fengjun Yan, Nan Chen
2015 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.
Chuan Hu, Rongrong Wang, Fengjun Yan, Nan Chen
2015 C conf
ACC
Rongrong Wang, Chuan Hu, Fengjun Yan, Mohammed Chadli, Nan Chen
2008 conf
CSSE (1)
Jinxiang Wang, Nan Chen, Guodong Yin
2007 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.
Guodong Yin, Nan Chen, Pu Li
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*