Michal Feldman

284 papers A* 81A 13B 14Journal 153Unranked 22

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	A*	`conf`	Contract Design for Sequential Actions. SODA Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
2026	J	`jnl`	Equal-Pay Contracts. CoRR Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
2026	A	`conf`	One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts. ITCS Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
2026	J	`jnl`	Order-Competitive Ratio. SIAM J. Comput. Liyan Chen, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Nuozhou Sun, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2026	J	`jnl`	The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. Math. Oper. Res. Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
2026	A*	`conf`	When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers. SODA Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Aviad Rubinstein
2025	J	`jnl`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. Oper. Res. Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2025	J	`jnl`	Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts. CoRR Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2025	A*	`conf`	Budget-Feasible Contracts. EC Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
2025	J	`jnl`	Budget-Feasible Contracts. CoRR Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
2025	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Contract Design: Recent Progress and Emerging Frontiers. CoRR Michal Feldman
2025	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Contracts. SIAM J. Comput. Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2025	J	`jnl`	Fair Division via Resource Augmentation. CoRR Hannaneh Akrami, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yoav Gal Tzur
2025	A*	`conf`	Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts. SODA Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2025	J	`jnl`	One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
2025	A*	`conf`	Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependent Values. EC Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
2025	J	`jnl`	Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependent Values. CoRR Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
2025	J	`jnl`	Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. Math. Oper. Res. Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
2025	J	`jnl`	Pandora's box problem with time constraints. Artif. Intell. Georgios Amanatidis, Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Artem Tsikiridis
2025	A*	`conf`	Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation. AAAI Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2025	J	`jnl`	Succinct Ambiguous Contracts. CoRR Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Yarden Rashti
2025	A*	`conf`	The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts. EC Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka, Ermis Soumalias
2025	J	`jnl`	The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts. CoRR Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka, Ermis Soumalias
2025	J	`jnl`	Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching in General Graphs. Math. Oper. Res. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nikolai Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2025	J	`jnl`	Ultra-Efficient Contracts: Breaking the Substitutes Barrier in Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR Michal Feldman, Liat Yashin
2024	A*	`conf`	Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote). STOC Michal Feldman
2024	J	`jnl`	Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey. CoRR Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2024	J	`jnl`	Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey. Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci. Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2024	A*	`conf`	Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. EC Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2024	A*	`conf`	Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms. EC Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2024	J	`jnl`	Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2024	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. Math. Oper. Res. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
2024	A*	`conf`	Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes. SODA Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
2024	A*	`conf`	Fair Division via Quantile Shares. STOC Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
2024	A*	`conf`	Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p, q)-Veto Core. EC Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2024	J	`jnl`	Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2024	A*	`conf`	On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. AAAI Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
2024	A	`conf`	On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. ITCS Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
2024	A*	`conf`	Pandora's Problem with Deadlines. AAAI Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
2024	A*	`conf`	Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
2024	J	`jnl`	Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
2024	J	`jnl`	Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation. CoRR Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2024	J	`jnl`	Sequential Contracts. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
2024	A*	`conf`	The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. EC Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
2024	J	`jnl`	The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. CoRR Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
2024	J	`jnl`	The Query Complexity of Contracts. CoRR Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Aviad Rubinstein
2024	J	`jnl`	Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. Algorithmica Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
2023	A*	`conf`	"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings. SODA Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2023	B	`conf`	Ambiguous Contracts. SAGT Michal Feldman
2023	A*	`conf`	Ambiguous Contracts. EC Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
2023	J	`jnl`	Ambiguous Contracts. CoRR Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
2023	J	`jnl`	Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. CoRR Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
2023	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes. CoRR Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
2023	A*	`conf`	Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. FOCS Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
2023	J	`jnl`	Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
2023	J	`jnl`	Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner
2023	J	`jnl`	Fair Division via Quantile Shares. CoRR Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
2023	A*	`conf`	Interdependent Public Projects. SODA Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2023	A*	`conf`	Multi-agent Contracts. STOC Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2023	J	`jnl`	On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. CoRR Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
2023	J	`jnl`	On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
2023	J	`jnl`	Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. CoRR Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
2023	A*	`conf`	Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. EC Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
2023	J	`jnl`	Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. CoRR Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
2023	J	`jnl`	Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding. Games Econ. Behav. Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
2023	A*	`conf`	Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. ICALP Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
2022	J	`jnl`	A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner
2022	A*	`conf`	Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents. AAAI Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
2022	A*	`conf`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	J	`jnl`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	A*	`conf`	General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching. EC Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2022	J	`jnl`	Interdependent Public Projects. CoRR Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2022	B	`conf`	Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. SAGT Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Almog Wald
2022	J	`jnl`	Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. CoRR Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2022	J	`jnl`	Max-Min Greedy Matching. Theory Comput. Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
2022	J	`jnl`	Multi-Agent Contracts. CoRR Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2022	J	`jnl`	On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2022	J	`jnl`	Prophet Matching with General Arrivals. Math. Oper. Res. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2022	J	`jnl`	Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. CoRR Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
2022	A*	`conf`	Two-Price Equilibrium. AAAI Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
2022	—	`ed.`	Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings WINE Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2021	J	`jnl`	(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond). CoRR Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
2021	J	`jnl`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021	—	`conf`	An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. SOSA Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
2021	A*	`conf`	Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? EC Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
2021	J	`jnl`	Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? CoRR Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
2021	A*	`conf`	Combinatorial Contracts. FOCS Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2021	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
2021	J	`jnl`	Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations. CoRR Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour
2021	A*	`conf`	On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	A*	`conf`	On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. IJCAI Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
2021	A*	`conf`	PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. AAAI Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
2021	B	`conf`	Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. SAGT Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
2021	J	`jnl`	Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
2021	A*	`conf`	Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. AAAI Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
2021	J	`jnl`	Two-Price Equilibrium. CoRR Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
2020	A*	`conf`	A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. EC Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2020	J	`jnl`	A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets. SIGecom Exch. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2020	J	`jnl`	Approximate Modularity Revisited. SIAM J. Comput. Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2020	A*	`conf`	Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases. AAAI Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
2020	A*	`conf`	Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. EC Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2020	J	`jnl`	Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. CoRR Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2020	J	`jnl`	On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2020	J	`jnl`	On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
2020	—	`conf`	On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. WINE Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
2020	J	`jnl`	On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
2020	A*	`conf`	Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models. EC Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2020	J	`jnl`	Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2020	J	`jnl`	Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
2020	J	`jnl`	Pricing Multi-Unit Markets. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
2020	J	`jnl`	Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs. SIAM J. Comput. Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
2020	J	`jnl`	Secretary Matching with General Arrivals. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
2020	J	`jnl`	Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. CoRR Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
2020	J	`jnl`	Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2020	J	`jnl`	The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. CoRR Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
2019	J	`jnl`	A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2019	A*	`conf`	Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk). ICALP Michal Feldman
2019	A*	`conf`	Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
2019	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
2019	J	`jnl`	Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
2019	A	`conf`	Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff. AAMAS Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
2019	—	`conf`	Max-Min Greedy Matching. APPROX-RANDOM Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
2019	—	`conf`	Max-min greedy matching. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
2019	J	`jnl`	Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. Theory Comput. Syst. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
2019	A*	`conf`	Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019	J	`jnl`	Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
2018	A*	`conf`	99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. EC Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
2018	J	`jnl`	99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. CoRR Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
2018	J	`jnl`	An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
2018	J	`jnl`	Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018	A*	`conf`	Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
2018	J	`jnl`	Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
2018	J	`jnl`	Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Michael Schwarz
2018	J	`jnl`	Max-Min Greedy Matching. CoRR Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
2018	—	`conf`	Pricing Multi-unit Markets. WINE Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
2018	J	`jnl`	Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub
2018	A*	`conf`	Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. EC Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama
2018	J	`jnl`	Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama
2018	A	`conf`	Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. ESA Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub
2017	A*	`conf`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	A*	`conf`	Approximate modularity revisited. STOC Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2017	B	`conf`	Liquid Price of Anarchy. SAGT Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman
2017	A*	`conf`	Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices. EC Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman
2017	J	`jnl`	Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices. CoRR Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman
2017	B	`conf`	Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. SAGT Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
2017	J	`jnl`	Pricing Identical Items. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
2017	A	`conf`	Pricing Social Goods. ESA Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman
2017	J	`jnl`	Pricing Social Goods. CoRR Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman
2017	—	`conf`	Pricing social goods. NetEcon@EC Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman
2017	A*	`conf`	Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs. FOCS Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
2017	A*	`conf`	Stable Secretaries. EC Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
2017	J	`jnl`	Stable Secretaries. CoRR Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
2017	A*	`conf`	The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017	B	`conf`	The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. SAGT Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
2016	J	`jnl`	A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	J	`jnl`	Approximate Modularity Revisited. CoRR Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2016	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput. Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2016	—	`conf`	Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions. WINE Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
2016	J	`jnl`	Correlated- and Coarse- equilibria of Single-item auctions. CoRR Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
2016	J	`jnl`	Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
2016	A*	`conf`	Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. EC Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
2016	J	`jnl`	Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. CoRR Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
2016	A*	`conf`	Lottery Pricing Equilibria. EC Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi
2016	—	`conf`	Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap. APPROX-RANDOM Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2016	A*	`conf`	On Voting and Facility Location. EC Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb
2016	—	`conf`	Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers. NIPS Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar
2016	J	`jnl`	Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities. CoRR Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
2016	J	`jnl`	Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements. CoRR Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
2016	A*	`conf`	Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements. EC Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
2016	J	`jnl`	The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016	A*	`conf`	The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. EC Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
2016	A*	`conf`	The price of anarchy in large games. STOC Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2016	A*	`conf`	Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model. AAAI Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova
2015	—	`conf`	A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games. ICALP (2) Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2015	A*	`conf`	A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. AAAI Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2015	J	`jnl`	Capacitated Network Design Games. Theory Comput. Syst. Michal Feldman, Tom Ron
2015	A*	`conf`	Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. SODA Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2015	J	`jnl`	Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects. Inf. Process. Lett. Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2015	J	`jnl`	Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games. SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev. Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
2015	A*	`conf`	Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? AAAI Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
2015	A*	`conf`	How Robust Is the Wisdom of the Crowds? IJCAI Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz
2015	A*	`conf`	Implementing the Wisdom of Waze. IJCAI Shoshana Vasserman, Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim
2015	J	`jnl`	Liquid Price of Anarchy. CoRR Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman
2015	J	`jnl`	On Voting and Facility Location. CoRR Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb
2015	J	`jnl`	On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing. CoRR Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2015	A*	`ed.`	Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '15, Portland, OR, USA, June 15-19, 2015 EC Tim Roughgarden, Michal Feldman, Michael Schwarz
2015	J	`jnl`	The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. CoRR Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
2015	J	`jnl`	The Price of Anarchy in Large Games. CoRR Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2015	J	`jnl`	Truthful Secretaries with Budgets. CoRR Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
2015	—	`conf`	Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. WINE Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
2014	J	`jnl`	A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. CoRR Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2014	J	`jnl`	A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2014	J	`jnl`	Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. CoRR Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2014	B	`conf`	Clearing Markets via Bundles. SAGT Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier
2014	J	`jnl`	Clearing Markets via Bundles. CoRR Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier
2014	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. CoRR Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2014	J	`jnl`	Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? CoRR Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
2014	J	`jnl`	Introduction. Games Econ. Behav. Michal Feldman, Kevin Leyton-Brown
2014	J	`jnl`	Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. CoRR Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
2014	—	`conf`	Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. APPROX-RANDOM Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	J	`jnl`	Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. CoRR Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014	A	`conf`	Sequential decision making with vector outcomes. ITCS Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2014	J	`jnl`	Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz
2014	J	`jnl`	Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. CoRR Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
2013	J	`jnl`	Adversarial Leakage in Games. SIAM J. Discret. Math. Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2013	J	`jnl`	Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Discret. Appl. Math. Leah Epstein, Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir, Lukasz Witkowski, Marcin Witkowski
2013	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium CoRR Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2013	A*	`conf`	Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium. STOC Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2013	A	`conf`	Efficient parking allocation as online bipartite matching with posted prices. AAMAS Reshef Meir, Yiling Chen, Michal Feldman
2013	J	`jnl`	Introduction to the Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
2013	—	`conf`	Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. WINE Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2013	J	`jnl`	Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. CoRR Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2013	J	`jnl`	Mechanism design with a restricted action space. Games Econ. Behav. Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman
2013	J	`jnl`	Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale CoRR Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme
2013	A*	`conf`	Pricing public goods for private sale. EC Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme
2013	A*	`conf`	Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. STOC Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2013	A*	`conf`	Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective. EC Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf
2013	—	`conf`	The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem. WINE Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz
2012	J	`jnl`	Bayesian ignorance. Theor. Comput. Sci. Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2012	B	`conf`	Capacitated Network Design Games. SAGT Michal Feldman, Tom Ron
2012	J	`jnl`	Combinatorial agency. J. Econ. Theory Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, Eyal Winter
2012	J	`jnl`	Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies. Theor. Comput. Sci. Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman
2012	J	`jnl`	Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. Oper. Res. Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2012	—	`conf`	Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects. WINE Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2012	J	`jnl`	Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. SIAM J. Comput. Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2012	A	`conf`	Mastering multi-player games. AAMAS Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz, Michal Feldman
2012	A*	`conf`	Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles. EC Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama
2012	B	`conf`	Mechanisms and Impossibilities for Truthful, Envy-Free Allocations. SAGT Michal Feldman, John K. Lai
2012	A*	`conf`	On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions. AAAI Steven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia
2012	J	`jnl`	On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections. Artif. Intell. Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason A. Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher M. Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
2012	A*	`conf`	Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. EC Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski
2012	J	`jnl`	Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization CoRR Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz
2012	A*	`conf`	Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. EC Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz
2012	J	`jnl`	Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient CoRR Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
2012	J	`jnl`	Solving Cooperative Reliability Games CoRR Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2012	A	`conf`	Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability. AAMAS Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
2011	B	`conf`	Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability. SAGT Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman, Mishael Rosenthal
2011	A	`conf`	Economical Graph Discovery. ICS Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2011	J	`jnl`	Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location and the Mini-Sum-of-Squares Objective CoRR Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf
2011	—	`conf`	Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. WINE Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
2011	A	`conf`	Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. UAI Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2011	J	`jnl`	Stability Scores: Stability and Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions CoRR Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
2011	—	`conf`	Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing. WINE Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2010	J	`jnl`	A note on competitive diffusion through social networks. Inf. Process. Lett. Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	A	`conf`	Adversarial Leakage in Games. ICS Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	A*	`conf`	Bayesian ignorance. PODC Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	A*	`conf`	Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract. EC Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2010	J	`jnl`	Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
2010	J	`jnl`	On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness CoRR Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2010	A	`conf`	Playing Games without Observing Payoffs. ICS Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	J	`jnl`	Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks. Math. Oper. Res. Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	J	`jnl`	Structured coalitions in resource selection games. ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	J	`jnl`	Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games CoRR Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2010	J	`jnl`	Walking in circles. Discret. Math. Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
2009	J	`jnl`	A prescriptive approach for playing games. SIGecom Exch. Michal Feldman
2009	J	`jnl`	Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2009	—	`conf`	Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies. WINE Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman
2009	J	`jnl`	Efficient graph topologies in network routing games. Games Econ. Behav. Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
2009	J	`jnl`	Envy-Free Makespan Approximation CoRR Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2009	B	`conf`	Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency. SAGT Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
2009	A*	`conf`	On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections. SODA Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason A. Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher M. Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
2009	—	`conf`	Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities. WINE Michal Feldman, Ran J. Tessler, Yoav Wilf
2009	B	`conf`	Partition Equilibrium. SAGT Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
2009	J	`jnl`	Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks CoRR Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
2009	J	`jnl`	Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. Games Econ. Behav. Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
2009	J	`jnl`	Strong price of anarchy. Games Econ. Behav. Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
2009	J	`jnl`	The Proportional-Share Allocation Market for Computational Resources. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang
2008	B	`conf`	Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. SAGT Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2008	—	`conf`	Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. WINE Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
2007	J	`jnl`	Hidden-Action in Network Routing. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker
2007	A*	`conf`	Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. EC Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
2007	A*	`conf`	Strong price of anarchy. SODA Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
2006	A*	`conf`	Combinatorial agency. EC Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
2006	J	`jnl`	Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. Michal Feldman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, John Chuang, Ion Stoica
2006	A*	`conf`	Implementation with a bounded action space. EC Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman
2006	—	`conf`	Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. WINE Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
2005	J	`jnl`	A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters CoRR Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang
2005	A*	`conf`	A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters. EC Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang
2005	A*	`conf`	Hidden-action in multi-hop routing. EC Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker
2005	J	`jnl`	Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems. SIGecom Exch. Michal Feldman, John Chuang
2005	B	`conf`	The Evolution of Cooperation under Cheap Pseudonyms. CEC Michal Feldman, John Chuang
2004	A*	`conf`	Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. EC Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, John Chuang
2003	—	`conf`	Workshop Report for 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS '03) 21-22 February 2003 - Claremont Hotel, Berkeley, CA, USA. IPTPS Michal Feldman, Shelley Zhuang