M. M. van Paassen

30 papers B 13Journal 10Unranked 7
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2024 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Hum. Mach. Syst.
Robbin Veldhuis, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2022 J jnl
CoRR
Tigran Mkhoyan, Mark Wentink, Bernd De Graaf, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2020 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Hum. Mach. Syst.
Wei Fu, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2020 conf
ICHMS
Dirk Van Baelen, Joost Ellerbroek, M. M. van Paassen, David A. Abbink, Max Mulder
2019 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Hum. Mach. Syst.
Clark Borst, Roeland M. Visser, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2019 B conf
SMC
R. Nagaraj, R. E. Klomp, Clark Borst, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2019 B conf
SMC
D. S. A. ten Brink, Rolf Klomp, Clark Borst, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2019 B conf
SMC
Max Mulder, Lei Yang, Clark Borst, M. M. van Paassen
2017 J jnl
Cogn. Technol. Work.
Clark Borst, Vincent A. Bijsterbosch, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2015 J jnl
J. Aerosp. Inf. Syst.
Karen M. Feigh, M. M. van Paassen
2015 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.
Gustavo Adrian Mercado-Velasco, Clark Borst, Joost Ellerbroek, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2014 B conf
SMC
Jan Smisek, Winfred Mugge, Jeroen B. J. Smeets, M. M. van Paassen, Andre Schiele
2014 B conf
SMC
M. M. van Paassen, Matthew L. Bolton, Noelia Jimenez
2013 conf
World Haptics
Jan Smisek, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder, David A. Abbink
2011 J jnl
Presence Teleoperators Virtual Environ.
B. J. Correia Grácio, Mark Wentink, Ana Rita Valente Pais, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2010 B conf
SMC
Joost Ellerbroek, Mark Visser, Stijn B. J. Van Dam, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2010 B conf
SMC
M. M. van Paassen
2010 B conf
SMC
Herman J. Damveld, J. L. G. Bonten, Riender Happee, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2010 conf
ECCE
J. Comans, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2010 conf
ECCE
S. M. B. Abdul Rahman, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2010 B conf
SMC
M. M. van Paassen, Jurriaan G. d'Engelbronner, Max Mulder
2008 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Part B
Joost C. F. de Winter, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen, David A. Abbink, Peter A. Wieringa
2008 conf
Mobile HCI
Joost C. F. de Winter, Stefan de Groot, Jenny Dankelman, Peter A. Wieringa, M. M. van Paassen, Max Mulder
2008 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Part A
Stijn B. J. Van Dam, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2008 B conf
SMC
Stijn B. J. Van Dam, Carolien L. A. Steens, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2008 B conf
SMC
Wijnko Oomkens, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen, Matthijs H. J. Amelink
2007 B conf
SMC
Stijn B. J. Van Dam, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2007 B conf
SMC
Thanh Mung Lam, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen
2004 conf
SMC (3)
Thanh Mung Lam, Harmen Wigert Boschloo, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen, Frans C. T. van der Helm
2004 conf
SMC (3)
Mark Mulder, S. Kitazaki, S. Hijikata, Max Mulder, M. M. van Paassen, Erwin R. Boer
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*