Kadda Beghdad Bey

36 papers B 2C 5Journal 16Unranked 13
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2025 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Islam Baira, Adil Imad Eddine Hosni, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Badis Djamaa
2025 J jnl
Online Soc. Networks Media
Hichem Merini, Adil Imad Eddine Hosni, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Vincenzo Lomonaco, Marco Podda, Islam Baira
2024 J jnl
Soc. Netw. Anal. Min.
Abdelhani Diboune, Hachem Slimani, Hassina Nacer, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2024 J jnl
J. Supercomput.
Redouane Benabdallah Benarmas, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2024 J jnl
Comput. J.
Aissam Aouar, Saïd Yahiaoui, Lamia Sadeg, Nadia Nouali-Taboudjemat, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2024 J jnl
Soc. Netw. Anal. Min.
Adil Imad Eddine Hosni, Islam Baira, Hichame Merini, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2024 J jnl
Big Data Res.
Aissam Aouar, Saïd Yahiaoui, Lamia Sadeg, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2023 C conf
ISNCC
Ali Belgacem, Abbas Bradai, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2023 C conf
FedCSIS
Zakaria Bairi, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Olfa Ben Ahmed, Abdenour Amamra, Abbas Bradai
2023 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.
Zakaria Bairi, Olfa Ben Ahmed, Abdenour Amamra, Abbas Bradai, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2022 conf
CSA
Kheyreddine Djouzi, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Abdenour Amamra
2022 J jnl
J. Comput. Sci.
Kheyreddine Djouzi, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Abdenour Amamra
2022 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Cloud Comput.
Ali Belgacem, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Hassina Nacer
2022 conf
CSA
Adil Imad Eddine Hosni, Khaled Aimen Hafiani, Abderrahim Chenoui, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2022 J jnl
Clust. Comput.
Ali Belgacem, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2021 conf
FiCloud
Ali Belgacem, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Saïd Mahmoudi
2020 J jnl
Clust. Comput.
Ali Belgacem, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Hassina Nacer, Sofiane Bouznad
2019 conf
FedCSIS (Communication Papers)
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Sofiane Bouznad, Farid Benhammadi, Hassina Nacer
2018 conf
FedCSIS (Communication Papers)
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Ali Belgacem, Hassina Nacer
2018 conf
CIST
Nabil Djebari, Hachem Slimani, Hassina Nacer, Djamil Aïssani, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2018 conf
PAIS
Ali Belgacem, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Hassina Nacer
2017 conf
ICEIS (1)
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Hassina Nacer, Mohamed El Yazid Boudaren, Farid Benhammadi
2017 conf
ICEIS (1)
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Farid Benhammadi, Mohamed El Yazid Boudaren, Salim Khamadja
2017 conf
UNet
Hassina Nacer, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Nabil Djebari
2017 conf
ICEIS (Revised Selected Papers)
Mohamed El Yazid Boudaren, Emmanuel Monfrini, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Ahmed Habbouchi, Wojciech Pieczynski
2017 conf
ICEIS (1)
Mohamed El Yazid Boudaren, Emmanuel Monfrini, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Ahmed Habbouchi, Wojciech Pieczynski
2015 B conf
FUZZ-IEEE
M'hamed Mataoui, Faouzi Sebbak, Farid Benhammadi, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2015 C conf
CLOSER
M'hamed Mataoui, Faouzi Sebbak, Kadda Beghdad Bey, Farid Benhammadi
2015 B conf
FUZZ-IEEE
Faouzi Sebbak, Farid Benhammadi, M'hamed Mataoui, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2014 J jnl
Image Vis. Comput.
Farid Benhammadi, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2013 J jnl
Int. J. Pattern Recognit. Artif. Intell.
Farid Benhammadi, Kadda Beghdad Bey
2011 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Farid Benhammadi, Zahia Guessoum, Aïcha Mokhtari
2010 J jnl
Future Gener. Comput. Syst.
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Farid Benhammadi, Aïcha Mokhtari, Zahia Guessoum
2009 C conf
ISPDC
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Farid Benhammadi, Aïcha Mokhtari, Zahia Guessoum
2008 conf
NOTERE
Kadda Beghdad Bey, Zahia Guessoum, Aïcha Mokhtari, Farid Benhammadi
2006 C conf
ISCC
Hamid Hentous, Farid Benhammadi, Mohamed Aissani, Kadda Beghdad Bey
redb/extractors/apk_extractors/apk_resources.py
← Index redb/extractors/apk_extractors/apk_resources.py python
import hashlib
import inspect
import os
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any

from redb.extractors.enum import Tag
from redb.extractors.apk_extractor import APKExtractor
from redb.models.dataclasses import APKResource


# ─── Suspicious file types ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# File types that are suspicious when found inside res/ or assets/.
# Excludes javascript/html (extremely common in legitimate hybrid apps)
# and common media/font types that are normal APK content.
SUSPICIOUS_TYPES = {
    # Executables — no legitimate reason in assets/res
    "elf", "pebin", "macho", "dex", "apk",
    # Java containers — DexClassLoader target
    "jar",
    # Archives — rare in legitimate assets (~135:1 malware-to-benign ratio)
    "zip", "gzip", "7z", "xz", "tar", "bzip2", "rar", "7zip", "lzma",
    # Scripts with system execution capability
    "shell", "python", "powershell", "batch",
}

# ─── Entropy thresholds ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# For unrecognized/unknown types: encrypted payloads typically land > 7.0
ENTROPY_HIGH_UNKNOWN = 7.0
# For recognized-but-non-image types: stricter threshold
ENTROPY_EXTREME = 7.85

# ─── Android-specific binary format magic bytes ─────────────────────────
# These formats are common in legitimate APKs but unknown to Magika,
# causing misclassification (e.g., AXML → "gzip", profm → "unknown").
AXML_MAGIC = b'\x03\x00\x08\x00'       # Android Binary XML (compiled res/*.xml)
ARSC_MAGIC = b'\x02\x00\x0c\x00'       # Android compiled resource table
ART_PROF_MAGIC = b'pro\x00'            # ART baseline profile
ART_PROFM_MAGIC = b'prm\x00'           # ART baseline profile metadata

# ─── Allowlisted paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Fixed, hardcoded paths in the Android build system that are always benign.
# ART profiles at these exact paths are shipped by Jetpack ProfileInstaller.
ALLOWLISTED_PATHS = {
    "assets/dexopt/baseline.prof",
    "assets/dexopt/baseline.profm",
}

# ─── Image handling ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Magika-confirmed image types: high entropy is expected (lossy codecs
# like VP8/JPEG arithmetic-code toward entropy ~7.95-8.0 by design).
IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES = {"png", "webp", "jpeg", "gif", "bmp", "tiff", "ico"}
IMAGE_EXTENSIONS = {".png", ".webp", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".bmp", ".tiff", ".ico"}

# ─── Types Magika assigns when it can't identify the content ────────────
UNRECOGNIZED_MAGIKA_TYPES = {"unknown", "empty"}

# ─── Resource scan limits ───────────────────────────────────────────────
MAX_RESOURCE_FILES = 5000


class APKResourceExtractor(APKExtractor):

    def __init__(
        self, filepath, log, exporters=None, index_prefix=None,
        known_benign=False, known_malicious=False,
        apk=None,
    ):
        super().__init__(
            filepath, log, exporters, index_prefix,
            known_benign, known_malicious, apk,
        )
        self.resources = []
        self.suspicious_files = []
        self.log.debug(inspect.currentframe().f_code.co_name)

    def tag(self):
        return Tag.APK_RESOURCES.value

    # ─── Core classification logic ──────────────────────────────────────

    def _identify_android_format(self, header: bytes) -> str | None:
        """
        Identify Android-specific binary formats that Magika doesn't know.
        Returns a corrected type label, or None to fall through to Magika.
        """
        if len(header) < 4:
            return None

        magic4 = header[:4]

        # Android Binary XML — all res/*.xml in a compiled APK.
        # Magika often misclassifies this as "gzip".
        if magic4 == AXML_MAGIC:
            return "android_binary_xml"

        # Android compiled resource table (resources.arsc chunks)
        if magic4 == ARSC_MAGIC:
            return "android_resource_table"

        # ART baseline profiles — high entropy (zlib inside) but benign.
        # The format is inert (method reference bitmaps/metadata, not
        # executable code) and some build configs place them at varying paths.
        if magic4 == ART_PROF_MAGIC:
            return "android_art_profile"
        if magic4 == ART_PROFM_MAGIC:
            return "android_art_profile_metadata"

        return None

    def _is_suspicious_resource(
        self, path: str, magika_type: str, entropy: float,
        android_type: str | None,
    ) -> bool:
        """
        Determine if a resource file is suspicious.

        Detection layers:
        1. Allowlisted paths → always benign
        2. Android-specific format override → reclassify Magika mislabels
        3. Image extension vs Magika type mismatch → encrypted blob detection
        4. Magika-confirmed images → benign regardless of entropy
        5. Suspicious type match → flag known-dangerous types
        6. High-entropy unknown blobs → likely encrypted payloads
        """

        # ── Layer 1: Allowlisted paths (hardcoded Android build artifacts) ──
        if path in ALLOWLISTED_PATHS:
            return False

        # ── Layer 2: Android-specific format detection ──────────────────────
        # Override Magika's label for formats it doesn't recognize.
        # All Android-specific formats (AXML, ARSC, ART profiles) are
        # legitimate build artifacts — never suspicious.
        if android_type is not None:
            return False

        # ── Layer 3: Image extension / Magika type mismatch ─────────────────
        # If the file extension claims "image" but Magika's content analysis
        # disagrees, this is a strong signal for an encrypted payload with
        # a fake image extension (e.g., ErrorFather's "rbyypivsnw.png").
        ext = os.path.splitext(path)[1].lower()
        if ext in IMAGE_EXTENSIONS and magika_type not in IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES:
            # Exception: Magika might label a valid image as "unknown" if
            # the file is very small (< ~16 bytes). Don't flag tiny files.
            if entropy > 5.0:
                return True

        # ── Layer 4: Magika-confirmed images → benign ───────────────────────
        # Lossy codecs (VP8, JPEG) produce entropy up to ~8.0 by design.
        # If Magika confirms image structure, high entropy is expected.
        if magika_type in IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES:
            return False

        # ── Layer 5: Known suspicious file types ────────────────────────────
        if magika_type in SUSPICIOUS_TYPES:
            return True

        # ── Layer 6: High-entropy unrecognized blobs ────────────────────────
        # Files Magika can't identify with high entropy are likely encrypted
        # payloads. Most Android malware packers store encrypted DEX/SO
        # payloads as opaque blobs with random names and no valid magic.
        if magika_type in UNRECOGNIZED_MAGIKA_TYPES and entropy > ENTROPY_HIGH_UNKNOWN:
            return True

        # ── Layer 7: Extreme entropy on any non-image recognized type ───────
        # Catches edge cases where Magika assigns a benign label (e.g.,
        # "xml", "txt") but the entropy is impossibly high for that format.
        if magika_type not in IMAGE_MAGIKA_TYPES and entropy > ENTROPY_EXTREME:
            return True

        return False

    # ─── Extraction pipeline ────────────────────────────────────────────

    def extract(self):
        if not self._is_valid_apk():
            self.log.error(f"Invalid APK for {self.hash.sha256}")
            return None

        try:
            from magika import Magika
            magika = Magika()
        except Exception as e:
            self.log.error(f"Failed to initialize Magika for {self.hash.sha256}: {e}")
            magika = None

        self.resources = []
        self.suspicious_files = []
        scanned = 0

        zf = self._get_zip_file()
        if not zf:
            return None

        with zf:
            for info in zf.infolist():
                if info.is_dir():
                    continue
                if not (info.filename.startswith("res/") or
                        info.filename.startswith("assets/")):
                    continue

                if scanned >= MAX_RESOURCE_FILES:
                    self.log.warning(
                        f"Resource scan limit reached ({MAX_RESOURCE_FILES}), "
                        f"stopping resource enumeration"
                    )
                    break
                scanned += 1

                try:
                    data = zf.read(info.filename)
                except Exception as e:
                    self.log.warning(
                        f"Error reading resource {info.filename}: {e}"
                    )
                    continue

                try:
                    file_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
                    file_entropy = round(self.calculate_entropy(data), 3)

                    # Read first bytes for Android-specific format detection
                    header = data[:16] if len(data) >= 16 else data

                    if magika:
                        try:
                            filetype = magika.identify_bytes(data).output.label
                        except Exception:
                            filetype = "unknown"
                    else:
                        filetype = "unknown"

                    # Identify Android-specific formats once, reuse for
                    # both stored type and suspicion classification
                    android_type = self._identify_android_format(header)
                    stored_type = android_type if android_type else filetype

                    suspicious = self._is_suspicious_resource(
                        path=info.filename,
                        magika_type=filetype,
                        entropy=file_entropy,
                        android_type=android_type,
                    )

                    resource = APKResource(
                        path=info.filename,
                        size=info.file_size,
                        sha256=file_sha256,
                        filetype_magika=stored_type,
                        entropy=file_entropy,
                    )

                    if suspicious:
                        resource.is_suspicious = True
                        self.suspicious_files.append(resource)

                    self.resources.append(resource)
                except Exception as e:
                    self.log.warning(
                        f"Error processing resource {info.filename}: {e}"
                    )
                    continue

        if not self.resources:
            return None

        return {
            "total_resource_count": len(self.resources),
            "total_resource_size": sum(r.size for r in self.resources),
            "suspicious_file_count": len(self.suspicious_files),
            "resources": self.resources,
            "suspicious_files": self.suspicious_files,
        }

    # ─── Export ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    def prepare_export_data(self, exporter_type: str) -> Any:
        if exporter_type == "ClickHouseExporter":
            if not self.resources:
                return None

            current_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
            data = []
            for res in self.resources:
                data.append([
                    self.sha256,
                    res.path,
                    res.size,
                    res.sha256,
                    res.filetype_magika,
                    res.entropy,
                    int(res.is_suspicious),
                    current_time,
                ])

            column_names = [
                'sha256', 'resource_path', 'resource_size',
                'resource_sha256', 'resource_magika', 'resource_entropy',
                'is_suspicious', 'analysis_date',
            ]

            column_type_names = [
                'FixedString(64)', 'String', 'UInt64',
                'FixedString(64)', 'LowCardinality(String)', 'Float32',
                'UInt8', "DateTime64(3, 'UTC')",
            ]

            return (data, column_names, column_type_names)

    def get_clickhouse_table(self) -> str:
        return "redb_apk_resources"