James Westall

43 papers A 3B 2C 3Misc 4Journal 10Unranked 21
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2021 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.
Adil Alsuhaim, Anjan Rayamajhi, James Westall, Jim Martin
2019 J jnl
Comput. Networks
Gongbing Hong, James Martin, James Westall
2015 conf
EduHPC@SC
Robert Geist, Joshua A. Levine, James Westall
2015 J jnl
Comput. Networks
Gongbing Hong, James Martin, James Westall
2014 conf
CSWS@SIGCOMM
James Martin, Gongbing Hong, James Westall
2012 B conf
MASCOTS
Gongbing Hong, James Martin, Scott Moser, James Westall
2011 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
Christopher Corsi, Robert Geist, James Westall
2011 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.
James Westall, James J. Martin
2011 A conf
SIGCSE
Andrew T. Duchowski, Robert Geist, Robert J. Schalkoff, James Westall
2010 conf
ISVC (1)
Robert Geist, Christopher Corsi, Jerry Tessendorf, James Westall
2010 conf
PERFORM
Robert Geist, Zachary H. Jones, James Westall
2010 B conf
ITiCSE
James Z. Wang, Timothy A. Davis, James Westall, Pradip K. Srimani
2009 conf
CASCON
Robert Geist, Zachary H. Jones, James Westall
2007 J jnl
Simul.
Jim Martin, James Westall
2007 C conf
BROADNETS
James J. Martin, James Westall
2007 conf
NPH
Robert Geist, Jay E. Steele, James Westall
2007 A conf
SIGCSE
Timothy A. Davis, Robert Geist, Sarah Matzko, James Westall
2005 J jnl
IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications
Karl Rasche, Robert Geist, James Westall
2005 conf
Int. CMG Conference
Robert Geist, Jay E. Steele, James Westall
2005 Misc conf
WSC
Robert Geist, Jacob Hicks, Mark Smotherman, James Westall
2005 conf
Int. CMG Conference
James Westall, Robert Geist, James J. Martin
2005 J jnl
Comput. Graph. Forum
Karl Rasche, Robert Geist, James Westall
2005 C conf
IPCCC
James Martin, V. Rajasekaran, James Westall
2004 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
S. Wang, Timothy A. Davis, Robert Geist, James Westall, John L. Kundert-Gibbs
2004 conf
Rendering Techniques
Robert Geist, Karl Rasche, James Westall, Robert J. Schalkoff
2004 A conf
SIGCSE
Timothy A. Davis, Robert Geist, Sarah Matzko, James Westall
2003 C conf
Modelling and Simulation
Karl Rasche, Robert Geist, James Westall
2002 Misc conf
Visualization and Data Analysis
Robert Geist, Karl Rasche, James Westall
2001 J jnl
Perform. Evaluation
Robert Geist, James Westall
2001 conf
Int. CMG Conference
Robert Geist, Vishnu R. Sekhar, James Westall
2000 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
James Westall
2000 conf
Int. CMG Conference
Robert Geist, James Westall, Kartik Paramasivam
2000 Misc conf
WSC
Robert Geist, James Westall
1999 conf
Int. CMG Conference
James Westall, Robert Geist, Kevin F. Spicer
1998 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
Satyendra Bahadur, Viswanathan Kalyanakrishnan, James Westall
1998 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
Robert Geist, James Westall
1998 conf
Int. CMG Conference
Robert Geist, James Westall, Dante M. Treglia
1997 Misc conf
WSC
James Westall, Robert Geist
1997 J jnl
Int. J. Pattern Recognit. Artif. Intell.
James Westall, Manthri S. Narasimha
1995 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
Thomas J. Murray, A. Wayne Madison, James Westall
1995 conf
Parallel and Distributed Computing and Systems
James Westall, Robert E. Fennell, C. J. Wypasek
1994 conf
Int. CMG Conference
Robert Geist, James Westall
1993 J jnl
Pattern Recognit.
James Westall, Manthri S. Narasimha
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*