Jae Hyun Kim

28 papers B 1C 2Misc 1Journal 17Unranked 7
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2024 J jnl
Briefings Bioinform.
Yujin Kim, Minwoo Jeong, In Gyeong Koh, Chanhee Kim, Hyeji Lee, Jae Hyun Kim, Ronald Yurko, Il Bin Kim, Jeongbin Park, Donna M. Werling, Stephan J. Sanders, Joon-Yong An
2024 J jnl
Ecol. Informatics
Eun Sub Kim, Dong Kun Lee, Jiyoung Choi, Jae Hyun Kim, Youngwon Mo, Yoonho Jeon, Ji Yeon Kim
2023 conf
AIM
Eun Kyu Kim, Bo Min Kang, Hyo Geon Lee, Hyeong Min Yoon, Jae Hyun Kim, Jae Woo Jung, Jun Young Yoon
2023 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.
Jae Hyun Kim, Sang Won Jung, Yoon Sik Kwon, Sangmin Lee, Jun Young Yoon
2022 C conf
ICCE
Seongwook Yoon, Heejeong Lim, Jae Hyun Kim, Hong-Seok Lee, Yun-Tae Kim, Sanghoon Sull
2022 J jnl
npj Digit. Medicine
Ha Young Jang, Jihyeon Song, Jae Hyun Kim, Howard Lee, In-Wha Kim, Bongki Moon, Jung Mi Oh
2022 conf
AIM
Sang Won Jung, Jae Hyun Kim, Jun Young Yoon
2022 J jnl
Adv. Eng. Softw.
Hoseong Jeong, Jae Hyun Kim, Seung-Ho Choi, Seokin Lee, Inwook Heo, Kang Su Kim
2021 J jnl
Appl. Clin. Inform.
Yingcheng Sun, Alex M. Butler, Ibrahim Diallo, Jae Hyun Kim, Casey N. Ta, James R. Rogers, Hao Liu, Chunhua Weng
2021 J jnl
J. Biomed. Informatics
Yingcheng Sun, Alex M. Butler, Latoya A. Stewart, Hao Liu, Chi Yuan, Christopher T. Southard, Jae Hyun Kim, Chunhua Weng
2021 J jnl
J. Am. Medical Informatics Assoc.
Chi Yuan, Patrick B. Ryan, Casey N. Ta, Jae Hyun Kim, Ziran Li, Chunhua Weng
2021 conf
MIE
Yilu Fang, Jae Hyun Kim, Betina Ross S. Idnay, Rebeca Aragon Garcia, Carmen E. Castillo, Yingcheng Sun, Hao Liu, Cong Liu, Chi Yuan, Chunhua Weng
2021 J jnl
J. Am. Medical Informatics Assoc.
Yingcheng Sun, Alex M. Butler, Fengyang Lin, Hao Liu, Latoya A. Stewart, Jae Hyun Kim, Betina Ross S. Idnay, Qingyin Ge, Xinyi Wei, Cong Liu, Chi Yuan, Chunhua Weng
2021 J jnl
Int. J. Medical Informatics
Jae Hyun Kim, Alex M. Butler, Casey N. Ta, Yingcheng Sun, Mathew S. Maurer, Chunhua Weng
2021 J jnl
J. Am. Medical Informatics Assoc.
Jae Hyun Kim, Casey N. Ta, Cong Liu, Cynthia Sung, Alex M. Butler, Latoya A. Stewart, Lyudmila Ena, James R. Rogers, Junghwan Lee, Anna Ostropolets, Patrick B. Ryan, Hao Liu, Shing M. Lee, Mitchell S. V. Elkind, Chunhua Weng
2020 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Biomed. Eng.
Brandon Oubre, Jean-Francois Daneault, Katherine Boyer, Jae Hyun Kim, Mahmood Jasim, Paolo Bonato, Sunghoon Ivan Lee
2020 J jnl
BMC Bioinform.
Ohgew Kweon, Seong-Jae Kim, Jae Hyun Kim, Seong Won Nho, Dongryeoul Bae, Jungwhan Chon, Mark Hart, Dong-Heon Baek, Young-Chang Kim, Wenjun Wang, Sung-Kwan Kim, John B. Sutherland, Carl Cerniglia
2019 conf
ICAIIC
Sang Hoon Lee, Kwang-Yul Kim, Jae Hyun Kim, Yoan Shin
2019 J jnl
Sensors
Hye Jin Kim, Heeju Ahn, David S. Lee, Dongsung Park, Jae Hyun Kim, Jinsik Kim, Dae Sung Yoon, Kyo Seon Hwang
2012 B conf
ICIP
Hyungjun Lim, Dong Yoon Kim, Joonsung Choi, Seung-Ho Park, Se Hyeok Park, Jae Hyun Kim, HyunWook Park
2012 C conf
PCS
Hyungjun Lim, Dong Yoon Kim, Hyun Wook Park, Jun Ho Cho, Se Hyeok Park, Jae Hyun Kim
2010 conf
CCNC
Hyun Jin Lee, Sin-Hun Kang, Jae Hyun Kim
2010 conf
CCNC
Kyu-Hwan Lee, Hyun Jin Lee, Jae Hyun Kim
2008 J jnl
Comput. Aided Des.
Jae Hyun Kim, Jung Whan Park, Tae Jo Ko
2004 Misc conf
International Conference on Computational Science
Jin Ho Chang, Jae Hyun Kim, Byung Man Kwak
2002 J jnl
J. Chem. Inf. Comput. Sci.
Yeong Suk Kim, Jae Hyun Kim, Jung Sup Kim, Kyoung Tai No
1999 J jnl
Wirel. Pers. Commun.
Jae Hyun Kim, Jong-Kyu Lee
1994 conf
ICASSP (5)
Jae Hyun Kim, Goo Man Park
redb/extractors/js_extractors/js_features.py
← Index redb/extractors/js_extractors/js_features.py python
import inspect
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any

from redb.extractors.enum import Tag
from redb.extractors.js_extractor import JSExtractor
from redb.extractors.js_extractors.js_patterns import FEATURE_PATTERNS
from redb.models.dataclasses import JSFeatures


_LONG_STRING_THRESHOLD = 256

# Comments still need a separate scan because the obfuscation metrics consume
# the matched text (to sum its length for comment_ratio), not just its count.
_COMMENT_RE = FEATURE_PATTERNS["comment"]


class JSFeaturesExtractor(JSExtractor):

    def __init__(
        self, filepath, log, exporters=None, index_prefix=None,
        known_benign=False, known_malicious=False, source=None, context=None,
    ):
        super().__init__(
            filepath, log, exporters, index_prefix,
            known_benign, known_malicious, source, context=context,
        )
        self.js_features = None
        self.log.debug(inspect.currentframe().f_code.co_name)

    def tag(self):
        return Tag.JS_FEATURES.value

    @staticmethod
    def _count(scan, name):
        entry = scan.get(name)
        return entry["count"] if entry else 0

    # Score tiers — see docs/js_analysis.md for the rationale behind each
    # threshold. Strong signals are ones that are unambiguous evidence of
    # obfuscation on their own (high encoding density, single-line packers,
    # 1-2 char identifiers). Weak signals are commonly seen in legitimate
    # code (eval, fromCharCode, mid-band entropy) and only count toward the
    # verdict when corroborated.
    _SCORE_STRONG_HEX_DENSITY = 0.05    # >5% of source is \xHH / \uHHHH escapes
    _SCORE_STRONG_MAX_LINE = 5000       # single line ≥5K chars (packer output)
    _SCORE_STRONG_MIN_ID = 2.0          # avg identifier length <2 chars
    _SCORE_STRONG_HIGH_ENTROPY = 5.0    # entropy >5.0 — encoded payload range
    _SCORE_STRONG_NON_ASCII = 0.30      # >30% non-ASCII codepoints in source
    _SCORE_STRONG_UNIQUE_LINES = 0.10   # <10% unique lines (with line_count >100)
    _MIN_LINES_FOR_REPETITION = 100     # below this, repetition isn't meaningful
    # Threshold is paired with the strong-signal gate in the verdict — a high
    # score alone is no longer enough, so the threshold serves as a noise
    # floor, not the false-positive prevention. The gate stops the original
    # "60/100 from weak ticks in clean code" failure mode regardless of where
    # this number sits; 40 keeps the score meaningful without re-banning
    # genuine obfuscation that lacks AST-derived signals (e.g. when
    # pyjsparser isn't installed and avg_identifier_length isn't available).
    _OBFUSCATED_THRESHOLD = 40

    def _score_obfuscation(self, metrics, scan):
        """Return `(score, strong_count, weak_count)` for the obfuscation
        heuristic. The verdict requires `score >= _OBFUSCATED_THRESHOLD` AND
        `strong_count >= 1` (or a js-x-ray hit, handled in the caller); a pile
        of weak signals alone is not enough.
        """
        score = 0
        strong = 0
        weak = 0

        src_len = len(self.js_source) if self.js_source else 1
        line_count = metrics.get('line_count', 1) or 1

        # --- Encoding density (strong / weak split by 1% vs 5%). The old
        # heuristic awarded the same +15 to a sample with 6 hex escapes in
        # 142 KB and to one that was 30% \xHH soup; this fixes that.
        hex_density = (metrics.get('hex_string_count', 0) * 4) / src_len
        unicode_density = (metrics.get('unicode_escape_count', 0) * 6) / src_len
        encoding_density = hex_density + unicode_density
        if encoding_density > self._SCORE_STRONG_HEX_DENSITY:
            score += 20
            strong += 1
        elif encoding_density > 0.01:
            score += 8
            weak += 1

        # --- Identifier length (strong: <2, weak: <3). Obfuscators rename
        # everything to `_0xNNNN` or single chars; legitimate code averages 6+.
        avg_id_len = metrics.get('avg_identifier_length', 10) or 10
        if 0 < avg_id_len < self._SCORE_STRONG_MIN_ID:
            score += 15
            strong += 1
        elif 0 < avg_id_len < 3.0:
            score += 6
            weak += 1

        # --- Single-line packers (strong: >10K, weak: >5K).
        max_line = metrics.get('max_line_length', 0)
        if max_line > 10000:
            score += 15
            strong += 1
        elif max_line > self._SCORE_STRONG_MAX_LINE:
            score += 8
            weak += 1

        # --- Text entropy (strong: >5.0). The old 4.5–5.0 weak band caught
        # jQuery/lodash and is dropped entirely.
        text_entropy = metrics.get('text_entropy', 0)
        if text_entropy > self._SCORE_STRONG_HIGH_ENTROPY:
            score += 15
            strong += 1

        # --- eval (weak; capped at +12). One eval is normal in templating,
        # AngularJS, and polyfills — it can no longer drive 30% of the verdict.
        eval_count = metrics.get('eval_count', 0)
        if eval_count > 0:
            score += min(eval_count * 4, 12)
            weak += 1

        # --- fromCharCode (weak). Common in legacy escapers but worth a tick.
        if metrics.get('fromcharcode_count', 0) > 0:
            score += 6
            weak += 1

        # --- String concatenation density (weak). >20 chains per 100 lines.
        concat_density = self._count(scan, "string_concat") / (line_count / 100)
        if concat_density > 20:
            score += 8
            weak += 1

        # --- Comment-stripped + few-line + large file (weak). Minifier tell.
        comment_ratio = metrics.get('comment_ratio', 0)
        if comment_ratio < 0.01 and line_count < 5 and src_len > 1000:
            score += 5
            weak += 1

        # --- Non-ASCII codepoint density (strong: >30%, weak: >10%). Real-world
        # JS averages <5% non-ASCII (mostly emoji or i18n string literals);
        # ≥30% almost always means a Unicode-codepoint payload (e.g. WSH
        # droppers that build a long string of non-ASCII chars and decode
        # them at runtime). Heavy localization files might cross 30% but
        # typically only score on this signal alone, which can't reach the
        # threshold by itself — the strong-signal gate prevents that
        # false-positive class while still surfacing the case where it
        # corroborates other signals.
        non_ascii_density = metrics.get('non_ascii_density', 0)
        if non_ascii_density > self._SCORE_STRONG_NON_ASCII:
            score += 20
            strong += 1
        elif non_ascii_density > 0.10:
            score += 8
            weak += 1

        # --- Line-uniqueness ratio (strong: <10%, weak: <30%, with
        # line_count >100). Hand-written or even minified code has near-1
        # line uniqueness; <10% means thousands of duplicate lines, which
        # is junk-padding / dead-code-injection used to bloat samples and
        # bury the actual payload. The line-count floor avoids
        # false-positives on tiny files that happen to repeat a few lines.
        unique_line_ratio = metrics.get('unique_line_ratio', 1.0)
        if line_count > self._MIN_LINES_FOR_REPETITION:
            if unique_line_ratio < self._SCORE_STRONG_UNIQUE_LINES:
                score += 15
                strong += 1
            elif unique_line_ratio < 0.30:
                score += 6
                weak += 1

        return min(score, 100), strong, weak

    def _detect_obfuscation_techniques(self, scan, src_len, metrics):
        """Tag the obfuscation techniques present in the source. Densities are
        computed against `src_len` so a handful of escapes in a large file
        does not get the same `hex_encoding` tag as a packed payload.

        Tags mirror the score's signals so the displayed reasoning matches
        the verdict. Three structural tags (`short_identifiers`,
        `packed_single_line`, `high_entropy`) cover the archetypes — minified
        single-line packers, renamed-identifier obfuscators, encoded-payload
        bodies — that the per-API tags below would otherwise miss entirely.
        """
        techniques = []
        if not self.js_source:
            return techniques

        if "eval" in scan:
            techniques.append("eval_usage")
        if "Function constructor" in scan:
            techniques.append("function_constructor")

        # hex_encoding / unicode_encoding by density — match the score's bar
        # so the displayed tags reflect what the score actually credited.
        hex_count = self._count(scan, "hex_escape")
        if hex_count > 5 and (hex_count * 4) / max(src_len, 1) > 0.001:
            techniques.append("hex_encoding")
        unicode_count = self._count(scan, "unicode_escape")
        if unicode_count > 5 and (unicode_count * 6) / max(src_len, 1) > 0.001:
            techniques.append("unicode_encoding")

        # charcode_encoding now requires a real cluster of calls, not one.
        if self._count(scan, "String.fromCharCode") > 3:
            techniques.append("charcode_encoding")
        if self._count(scan, "string_concat") > 10:
            techniques.append("string_concatenation")
        if "atob" in scan:
            techniques.append("base64_decoding")
        if "unescape" in scan:
            techniques.append("unescape_usage")
        if "array_function_call" in scan:
            techniques.append("array_function_calls")

        # Structural tags — surface the score's strong/weak signals so a
        # `is_likely_obfuscated: true` verdict never lands with an empty
        # techniques array (which is what happens on minified packer bodies
        # that don't match any per-API tag above).
        avg_id = metrics.get('avg_identifier_length', 0) or 0
        # Use the weak-tier bar (<3) so both strong (<2) and weak cases
        # surface — `0` means AST was unavailable from both pyjsparser and
        # js-x-ray, so we can't claim anything either way.
        if 0 < avg_id < 3.0:
            techniques.append("short_identifiers")

        # Use the weak-tier bar (>5000) so single-line packers surface even
        # below the strong 10K threshold — both cases credit the score, both
        # deserve a label.
        if metrics.get('max_line_length', 0) > 5000:
            techniques.append("packed_single_line")

        # Mirror the strong-tier entropy bar (>5.0) — the score's only
        # entropy band, since the old 4.5–4.8 weak band was dropped.
        if metrics.get('text_entropy', 0) > 5.0:
            techniques.append("high_entropy")

        # Non-ASCII codepoint payload — Unicode-character buffers that
        # decode at runtime (WSH dropper pattern). Tag at the weak bar
        # (>0.1) so any meaningful presence shows up in the techniques
        # list, even when it's not strong enough on its own.
        if metrics.get('non_ascii_density', 0) > 0.10:
            techniques.append("non_ascii_payload")

        # Repetitive padding — junk-filled bulk that buries the payload
        # under thousands of duplicate lines. Tag at the weak bar (<0.30
        # unique lines) provided the file has enough lines to make the
        # ratio meaningful.
        if (metrics.get('line_count', 0) > self._MIN_LINES_FOR_REPETITION
                and metrics.get('unique_line_ratio', 1.0) < 0.30):
            techniques.append("repetitive_padding")

        return techniques

    def _compute_ast_metrics(self, scan):
        """Compute AST-based metrics: function count, nesting depth, identifiers.

        Falls back to counts from the shared scan dict (function_decl / var_decl
        entries) when pyjsparser is unavailable.
        """
        ast = self._parse_ast()
        if not ast:
            return {
                'total_function_count': self._count(scan, "function_decl"),
                'total_variable_count': self._count(scan, "var_decl"),
                'max_nesting_depth': 0,
                'avg_identifier_length': 0.0,
            }

        counters = {'functions': 0, 'variables': 0}
        identifiers = []
        max_depth = [0]

        def walk(node, depth=0):
            if not isinstance(node, dict):
                return
            node_type = node.get('type', '')
            if node_type in ('FunctionDeclaration', 'FunctionExpression', 'ArrowFunctionExpression'):
                counters['functions'] += 1
            if node_type == 'VariableDeclaration':
                counters['variables'] += len(node.get('declarations', []))
            if node_type == 'Identifier':
                name = node.get('name', '')
                if name:
                    identifiers.append(name)

            # Track nesting depth for blocks/functions
            new_depth = depth
            if node_type in ('BlockStatement', 'FunctionDeclaration', 'FunctionExpression'):
                new_depth = depth + 1
                if new_depth > max_depth[0]:
                    max_depth[0] = new_depth

            for key, value in node.items():
                if key == 'type':
                    continue
                if isinstance(value, dict):
                    walk(value, new_depth)
                elif isinstance(value, list):
                    for item in value:
                        if isinstance(item, dict):
                            walk(item, new_depth)

        try:
            walk(ast)
        except RecursionError:
            self.log.warning(f"AST too deep for {self.hash.sha256}")

        avg_id = 0.0
        if identifiers:
            avg_id = round(sum(len(i) for i in identifiers) / len(identifiers), 2)

        return {
            'total_function_count': counters['functions'],
            'total_variable_count': counters['variables'],
            'max_nesting_depth': max_depth[0],
            'avg_identifier_length': avg_id,
        }

    def extract(self):
        src = self.js_source
        if not src:
            self.log.error(f"Empty JS source for {self.hash.sha256}")
            return None

        lines = self.lines
        line_count = len(lines)
        char_count = len(src)
        # text_entropy is over decoded characters (distinct from BasicProperties.file_entropy
        # over raw bytes); needed for non-ASCII sources where byte entropy is depressed by
        # encoding artefacts (e.g. UTF-16 nulls).
        text_entropy = self._calculate_text_entropy(src)

        line_lengths = [len(l) for l in lines] if lines else [0]
        max_line_length = max(line_lengths)
        avg_line_length = round(sum(line_lengths) / len(line_lengths), 2) if line_lengths else 0.0

        # Minification heuristic: few lines but large file, or very long average lines
        is_minified = (line_count < 5 and char_count > 500) or avg_line_length > 500

        # The shared per-sample scan dict (built once on the JSContext); every
        # count below reads from it, including _detect_obfuscation_techniques()
        # and _score_obfuscation().
        scan = self._context.scan
        # js-x-ray output is also cached on the context — same subprocess runs
        # at most once per sample regardless of how many extractors consult it.
        xray = self._context.xray

        eval_count = self._count(scan, "eval")
        function_constructor_count = self._count(scan, "Function constructor")
        settimeout_setinterval_count = self._count(scan, "settimeout_setinterval")
        document_write_count = self._count(scan, "document.write")
        innerhtml_count = self._count(scan, "innerHTML assignment")
        unescape_count = self._count(scan, "unescape")
        fromcharcode_count = self._count(scan, "String.fromCharCode")
        atob_count = self._count(scan, "atob")
        decodeuri_count = self._count(scan, "decodeURI")

        hex_string_count = self._count(scan, "hex_escape")
        unicode_escape_count = self._count(scan, "unicode_escape")
        long_string_count = self._count(scan, "long_string")
        base64_string_count = self._count(scan, "base64_string")

        # Comment ratio still needs the matched text (to sum its length), so
        # the comment regex is the one pattern we run separately.
        comments = _COMMENT_RE.findall(src)
        comment_chars = sum(len(c) for c in comments)
        comment_ratio = round(comment_chars / char_count, 4) if char_count else 0.0

        # Non-ASCII codepoint density and line-uniqueness ratio — both target
        # patterns the per-API/per-encoding signals miss: Unicode-codepoint
        # payloads (WSH droppers building runtime strings out of >0x7f chars)
        # and junk-padded bulk (thousands of duplicate lines hiding the actual
        # logic). Computed here so they ride alongside the existing metrics.
        non_ascii_count = sum(1 for c in src if ord(c) > 127)
        non_ascii_density = non_ascii_count / char_count if char_count else 0.0
        unique_lines = len({l for l in lines if l.strip()})
        unique_line_ratio = unique_lines / line_count if line_count else 1.0

        ast_metrics = self._compute_ast_metrics(scan)

        # pyjsparser is ES5.1-only — anything with destructuring, classes,
        # optional chaining, etc. fails parse and the AST path returns 0.0
        # for avg_identifier_length, which is exactly the strong signal the
        # heuristic needs to catch obfuscator.io's `_0xNNNN` renaming. js-x-ray
        # parses ES2015+ internally and reports the same statistic, so we use
        # it as the fallback when our own AST is missing.
        avg_id_length = ast_metrics['avg_identifier_length']
        if avg_id_length == 0.0 and xray.avg_identifier_length is not None:
            avg_id_length = xray.avg_identifier_length
            ast_metrics['avg_identifier_length'] = avg_id_length

        metrics = {
            'text_entropy': text_entropy,
            'eval_count': eval_count,
            'hex_string_count': hex_string_count,
            'unicode_escape_count': unicode_escape_count,
            'fromcharcode_count': fromcharcode_count,
            'line_count': line_count,
            'max_line_length': max_line_length,
            'comment_ratio': comment_ratio,
            'avg_identifier_length': avg_id_length,
            'non_ascii_density': non_ascii_density,
            'unique_line_ratio': unique_line_ratio,
        }

        obfuscation_techniques = self._detect_obfuscation_techniques(
            scan, char_count, metrics
        )
        obfuscation_score, strong_signals, _weak = self._score_obfuscation(metrics, scan)

        # Verdict: js-x-ray's recognised obfuscator family is authoritative.
        # Otherwise the heuristic must clear the threshold AND have at least
        # one strong signal — three weak ticks alone are no longer enough.
        obfuscator_name = xray.obfuscator
        is_likely_obfuscated = (
            obfuscator_name is not None
            or (obfuscation_score >= self._OBFUSCATED_THRESHOLD and strong_signals >= 1)
        )

        script_type = self._detect_script_type()
        detected_environment = self._detect_environment()

        self.js_features = JSFeatures(
            line_count=line_count,
            char_count=char_count,
            text_entropy=text_entropy,
            max_line_length=max_line_length,
            avg_line_length=avg_line_length,
            is_minified=is_minified,
            is_likely_obfuscated=is_likely_obfuscated,
            obfuscator_name=obfuscator_name,
            obfuscation_score=obfuscation_score,
            obfuscation_techniques=obfuscation_techniques,
            eval_count=eval_count,
            function_constructor_count=function_constructor_count,
            settimeout_setinterval_count=settimeout_setinterval_count,
            document_write_count=document_write_count,
            innerhtml_count=innerhtml_count,
            unescape_count=unescape_count,
            fromcharcode_count=fromcharcode_count,
            atob_count=atob_count,
            decodeuri_count=decodeuri_count,
            total_function_count=ast_metrics['total_function_count'],
            total_variable_count=ast_metrics['total_variable_count'],
            max_nesting_depth=ast_metrics['max_nesting_depth'],
            avg_identifier_length=ast_metrics['avg_identifier_length'],
            hex_string_count=hex_string_count,
            unicode_escape_count=unicode_escape_count,
            long_string_count=long_string_count,
            base64_string_count=base64_string_count,
            comment_ratio=comment_ratio,
            script_type=script_type,
            detected_environment=detected_environment,
        )
        return self.js_features

    def prepare_export_data(self, exporter_type: str) -> Any:
        if exporter_type == "ClickHouseExporter":
            if not self.js_features:
                return None

            f = self.js_features
            current_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
            data = [[
                self.sha256,
                f.line_count,
                f.char_count,
                f.text_entropy,
                f.max_line_length,
                f.avg_line_length,
                int(f.is_minified),
                int(f.is_likely_obfuscated),
                f.obfuscator_name or "",
                f.obfuscation_score,
                f.obfuscation_techniques,
                f.eval_count,
                f.function_constructor_count,
                f.settimeout_setinterval_count,
                f.document_write_count,
                f.innerhtml_count,
                f.unescape_count,
                f.fromcharcode_count,
                f.atob_count,
                f.decodeuri_count,
                f.total_function_count,
                f.total_variable_count,
                f.max_nesting_depth,
                f.avg_identifier_length,
                f.hex_string_count,
                f.unicode_escape_count,
                f.long_string_count,
                f.base64_string_count,
                f.comment_ratio,
                f.script_type,
                f.detected_environment,
                current_time,
            ]]

            column_names = [
                "sha256",
                "line_count", "char_count", "text_entropy",
                "max_line_length", "avg_line_length",
                "is_minified", "is_likely_obfuscated", "obfuscator_name",
                "obfuscation_score", "obfuscation_techniques",
                "eval_count", "function_constructor_count",
                "settimeout_setinterval_count", "document_write_count",
                "innerhtml_count", "unescape_count", "fromcharcode_count",
                "atob_count", "decodeuri_count",
                "total_function_count", "total_variable_count",
                "max_nesting_depth", "avg_identifier_length",
                "hex_string_count", "unicode_escape_count",
                "long_string_count", "base64_string_count",
                "comment_ratio",
                "script_type", "detected_environment",
                "analysis_date",
            ]

            column_type_names = [
                "FixedString(64)",
                "UInt32", "UInt64", "Float64",
                "UInt32", "Float64",
                "UInt8", "UInt8", "LowCardinality(String)",
                "UInt8", "Array(String)",
                "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "UInt32", "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "UInt16", "Float64",
                "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "UInt32", "UInt32",
                "Float64",
                "LowCardinality(String)", "LowCardinality(String)",
                "DateTime64(3, 'UTC')",
            ]

            return (data, column_names, column_type_names)

    def get_clickhouse_table(self) -> str:
        return "redb_js_features"