Itai Arieli - RankMe

65 papers A* 20B 2Journal 42Unranked 1

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2025	A*	`conf`	Anonymous Network Formation. EC Itai Arieli, Leonie Baumann, Wade Hann-Caruthers
2025	A*	`conf`	Constructive Blackwell's Theorem. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
2025	J	`jnl`	Granular DeGroot dynamics - A model for robust naive learning in social networks. J. Econ. Theory Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz
2025	J	`jnl`	Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz, Yevgeny Tsodikovich
2025	B	`conf`	Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design. TARK Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
2025	J	`jnl`	Robust price discrimination. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
2024	J	`jnl`	A population's feasible posterior beliefs. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2024	J	`jnl`	Persuading while Learning. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman, Xianwen Shi
2024	J	`jnl`	Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Srinivas Arigapudi
2024	J	`jnl`	Reputation-based persuasion platforms. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
2024	J	`jnl`	Robust Price Discrimination. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
2023	A*	`conf`	Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. EC Ronen Gradwohl, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky
2023	J	`jnl`	Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. CoRR Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
2023	A*	`conf`	Mediated Cheap Talk Design. AAAI Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
2023	J	`jnl`	Persuasion as Transportation. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
2023	J	`jnl`	Reputation-based Persuasion Platforms. CoRR Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
2023	B	`conf`	Resilient Information Aggregation. TARK Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
2023	A*	`conf`	The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz
2023	J	`jnl`	The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz
2023	J	`jnl`	The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk. CoRR Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
2023	A*	`conf`	Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
2023	J	`jnl`	Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
2022	A*	`conf`	A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2022	J	`jnl`	A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2022	J	`jnl`	Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
2022	A*	`conf`	Granular DeGroot Dynamics - a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. EC Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz
2022	A*	`conf`	Herd Design. EC Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
2022	J	`jnl`	Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs). CoRR Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
2022	J	`jnl`	Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. Oper. Res. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
2022	A*	`conf`	Persuasion as Transportation. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
2021	J	`jnl`	A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning. Math. Oper. Res. Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank
2021	J	`jnl`	Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). SIGecom Exch. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
2021	A*	`conf`	On Social Networks that Support Learning. EC Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
2021	J	`jnl`	Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. CoRR Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz
2021	A*	`conf`	Sequential Naive Learning. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
2021	J	`jnl`	Sequential Naive Learning. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
2021	J	`jnl`	Virtually additive learning. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
2020	A*	`conf`	Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
2020	J	`jnl`	Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
2020	J	`jnl`	Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
2020	J	`jnl`	Multi-issue social learning. Math. Soc. Sci. Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
2020	J	`jnl`	On social networks that support learning. CoRR Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
2020	A*	`conf`	Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita
2019	A*	`conf`	Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
2019	J	`jnl`	Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2019	A*	`conf`	Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
2019	A*	`conf`	The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. EC Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
2019	J	`jnl`	The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. CoRR Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
2018	A*	`conf`	The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. EC Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
2018	J	`jnl`	The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. CoRR Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
2017	A*	`conf`	Forecast Aggregation. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
2017	J	`jnl`	Inferring beliefs from actions. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank
2017	J	`jnl`	Payoff externalities and social learning. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli
2017	J	`jnl`	Sequential commitment games. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz
2017	A*	`conf`	Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. EC Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2017	J	`jnl`	Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2017	—	`conf`	The Crowdfunding Game. WINE Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
2017	J	`jnl`	The Crowdfunding Game. CoRR Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
2016	J	`jnl`	Random extensive form games. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2015	J	`jnl`	Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. Itai Arieli, Yehuda John Levy
2015	J	`jnl`	Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. CoRR Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2015	J	`jnl`	The logic of backward induction. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Robert J. Aumann
2015	J	`jnl`	Transfer Implementation in Congestion Games. Dyn. Games Appl. Itai Arieli
2012	J	`jnl`	Average testing and Pareto efficiency. J. Econ. Theory Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
2011	J	`jnl`	Infinite sequential games with perfect but incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory Itai Arieli, Yehuda Levy