Iryna Susha

25 papers Journal 12Unranked 10
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2025 J jnl
Inf. Polity
Iryna Susha, Sofie de Wilde de Ligny, Fredo Schotanus, Mirko Tobias Schäfer
2025 conf
EGOV-CeDEM-ePart-*
Sofie de Wilde de Ligny, Iryna Susha, Koen Frenken
2024 conf
ePart
Dwayne Ansah, Iryna Susha
2024 ed.
EGOV-CeDEM-ePart-*
Jolien Ubacht, Joep Crompvoets, Csaba Csáki, Lieselot Danneels, Marijn Janssen, Marius Rohde Johannessen, Thomas J. Lampoltshammer, Habin Lee, Ida Lindgren, Sara Hofmann, Peter Parycek, Gabriela Viale Pereira, Gerhard Schwabe, Iryna Susha, Efthimios Tambouris, Anneke Zuiderwijk
2023 J jnl
Inf. Organ.
Iryna Susha, Boriana Rukanova, Anneke Zuiderwijk, J. Ramón Gil-García, Mila Gascó-Hernández
2023 J jnl
Gov. Inf. Q.
Iryna Susha, Tijs A. van den Broek, Anne Fleur van Veenstra, Johan Linåker
2023 ed.
ePart
Noella Edelmann, Lieselot Danneels, Anna-Sophie Novak, Panos Panagiotopoulos, Iryna Susha
2023 ed.
EGOV-CeDEM-ePart-*
Jolien Ubacht, Csaba Csáki, Lieselot Danneels, Noella Edelmann, Marijn Janssen, Evangelos Kalampokis, Ida Lingren, Anna-Sophie Novak, Panos Panagiotopoulos, Peter Parycek, Gabriela Viale Pereira, Iryna Susha, Gerhard Schwabe, Shefali Virkar, Efthimios Tambouris, Anneke Zuiderwijk
2022 conf
EGOV
Iryna Susha, Jakob Schiele, Koen Frenken
2021 J jnl
Telematics Informatics
Anneke Zuiderwijk, Ali Pirannejad, Iryna Susha
2020 J jnl
Inf. Polity
Iryna Susha
2020 conf
EGOV
Iryna Susha, Maartje Flipsen, Wirawan Agahari, Mark de Reuver
2019 conf
HICSS
Iryna Susha, J. Ramón Gil-García
2019 J jnl
Gov. Inf. Q.
Iryna Susha, Åke Grönlund, Rob Van Tulder
2019 conf
DG.O
Iryna Susha, Boriana D. Rukanova, J. Ramón Gil-García, Yao-Hua Tan, Mila Gascó
2018 J jnl
Int. J. Electron. Gov. Res.
Iryna Susha, Theresa A. Pardo, Marijn Janssen, Natalia Adler, Stefaan Verhulst, Todd Harbour
2018 J jnl
ISPRS Int. J. Geo Inf.
Marc van den Homberg, Iryna Susha
2017 conf
HICSS
Iryna Susha, Marijn Janssen, Stefaan Verhulst
2017 conf
DG.O
Iryna Susha, Marijn Janssen, Stefaan Verhulst, Theresa Pardo
2016 J jnl
J. Organ. Comput. Electron. Commer.
Anneke Zuiderwijk, Marijn Janssen, Iryna Susha
2016 conf
EGOV
Iryna Susha, Paul Johannesson, Gustaf Juell-Skielse
2015 J jnl
Inf. Polity
Iryna Susha, Åke Grönlund, Marijn Janssen
2014 J jnl
Gov. Inf. Q.
Iryna Susha, Åke Grönlund
2012 conf
ePart
Åke Grönlund, Iryna Susha
2012 J jnl
Gov. Inf. Q.
Iryna Susha, Åke Grönlund
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*