Ionut Emil Iacob

31 papers A 5C 1Journal 10Unranked 15
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2024 A conf
ECAI
Kazeem Bankole, Felix G. Hamza-Lup, Ionut Emil Iacob
2023 A conf
ECAI
Daniel Bekker, Ionut Emil Iacob
2021 A conf
ECAI
Felix G. Hamza-Lup, Ionut Emil Iacob, James Orgeron
2020 conf
ACM Southeast Regional Conference
Felix G. Hamza-Lup, Aditya Suri, Ionut Emil Iacob, Ioana R. Goldbach, Lateef Rasheed, Paul Nicolae Borza
2020 J jnl
CoRR
Felix G. Hamza-Lup, Aditya Suri, Ionut Emil Iacob, Ioana R. Goldbach, Lateef Rasheed, Paul Nicolae Borza
2020 J jnl
Int. J. Mach. Learn. Cybern.
Duleep Rathgamage Don, Ionut Emil Iacob
2019 conf
Web3D
Felix G. Hamza-Lup, Ionut Emil Iacob, Sushmita Khan
2019 J jnl
CoRR
Felix G. Hamza-Lup, Ionut Emil Iacob, Sushmita Khan
2018 J jnl
Ars Comb.
Ionut Emil Iacob, T. Bruce McLean, Hua Wang
2018 J jnl
CoRR
Duleep Rathgamage Don, Ionut Emil Iacob
2017 A conf
ECAI
Ionut Emil Iacob, Hameed Jimoh, Abdullah Al Mamun
2015 A conf
ECAI
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Apostolou
2015 conf
DSDIS
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Apostolou
2007 J jnl
Bull. IEEE Tech. Comm. Digit. Libr.
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob, Kevin Kiernan, Dorothy C. Porter
2006 conf
JCDL
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob, Kevin Kiernan, Dorothy C. Porter
2006 conf
XIME-P
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2006 conf
ICDE Workshops
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar, Michael I. Dekhtyar
2006 J jnl
Int. J. Digit. Libr.
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob, Jerzy W. Jaromczyk, Kevin Kiernan, Neil Moore, Dorothy C. Porter
2006 conf
JCDL
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2005 J jnl
Data Knowl. Eng.
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob
2005 conf
SIGMOD Conference
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2005 J jnl
Bull. IEEE Tech. Comm. Digit. Libr.
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob, Jerzy W. Jaromczyk, Kevin Kiernan, Neil Moore, Dorothy C. Porter
2005 conf
JCDL
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob, Jerzy W. Jaromczyk, Kevin Kiernan, Neil Moore, Dorothy C. Porter
2005 J jnl
Bull. IEEE Tech. Comm. Digit. Libr.
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2005 conf
JCDL
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2005 C conf
DEXA
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob, Srikanth Methuku
2005 conf
WebDB
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2005 conf
JCDL
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2004 conf
WebDB
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar, Michael I. Dekhtyar
2004 conf
WIDM
Ionut Emil Iacob, Alex Dekhtyar
2003 conf
ER (Workshops)
Alex Dekhtyar, Ionut Emil Iacob
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*