Iman Vakilinia

44 papers B 3C 1Journal 15Unranked 24
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 conf
ISDFS
Iman Vakilinia
2026 conf
ISDFS
Zoé Elliott, Iman Vakilinia
2026 J jnl
CoRR
Taiwo Onitiju, Iman Vakilinia
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Iman Vakilinia
2025 J jnl
Nat. Comput.
William David Paredes, Hemani Kaushal, Zornitza Genova Prodanoff, Iman Vakilinia
2024 conf
UEMCON
Nevzat U. Demirseren, Iman Vakilinia
2024 conf
ISDFS
Lakshmi Priya Krishnan, Iman Vakilinia, Sandeep Reddivari, Sanjay Ahuja
2024 conf
VTC Fall
Sai V. Mullapudi, Iman Vakilinia, Zornitza Genova Prodanoff, Wenqiang Jin
2024 J jnl
ACM Trans. Sens. Networks
Zejun Xu, Wenqiang Jin, Changwei Yao, Xinyi Liu, Shuang Ma, Yu Liu, Zheng Qin, Iman Vakilinia, Daibo Liu
2024 conf
ISDFS
Lakshmi Priya Krishnan, Iman Vakilinia, Sandeep Reddivari, Sanjay Ahuja
2023 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng.
Iman Vakilinia, Weihong Wang, Jiajun Xin
2023 J jnl
Sensors
William David Paredes, Hemani Kaushal, Iman Vakilinia, Zornitza Genova Prodanoff
2023 J jnl
Inf.
Lakshmi Priya Krishnan, Iman Vakilinia, Sandeep Reddivari, Sanjay Ahuja
2022 J jnl
CoRR
Iman Vakilinia, Weihong Wang, Jiajun Xin
2022 conf
CSCI
Swapnoneel Roy, O. Patrick Kreidl, Karthikeyan Umapathy, Zornitza Genova Prodanoff, Iman Vakilinia
2022 conf
UEMCON
Iman Vakilinia
2022 J jnl
CoRR
Iman Vakilinia
2022 J jnl
Games
Iman Vakilinia, Peyman Faizian, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili
2021 conf
GameSec
Iman Vakilinia, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Ming Li
2021 J jnl
CoRR
Iman Vakilinia, Peyman Faizian, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili
2021 conf
INFOCOM Workshops
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Iman Vakilinia
2020 conf
CCWC
Bryson Lingenfelter, Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2020 conf
CCWC
Shahriar Badsha, Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2020 C conf
ISNCC
Iman Vakilinia, Mohammad Jafari, Deepak K. Tosh, Shahin Vakilinia
2020 J jnl
Comput. Secur.
Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2019 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.
Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2019
Iman Vakilinia
2019 J jnl
IET Inf. Secur.
Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2019 B conf
CNSM
Iman Vakilinia, Shahin Vakilinia, Shahriar Badsha, Engin Arslan, Shamik Sengupta
2019 conf
CCWC
Shahriar Badsha, Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2018 conf
UEMCON
Farhan Sadique, Sui Cheung, Iman Vakilinia, Shahriar Badsha, Shamik Sengupta
2018 conf
UEMCON
Iman Vakilinia, Shahriar Badsha, Shamik Sengupta
2018 conf
MILCOM
Iman Vakilinia, Sui Cheung, Shamik Sengupta
2017 conf
MILCOM
Iman Vakilinia, Deepak K. Tosh, Shamik Sengupta
2017 conf
MILCOM
Iman Vakilinia, Shamik Sengupta
2017 conf
SPECTS
Iman Vakilinia, Deepak K. Tosh, Shamik Sengupta
2017 conf
GECCO (Companion)
Iman Vakilinia, Sushil J. Louis, Shamik Sengupta
2017 B conf
PIMRC
Shahin Vakilinia, Iman Vakilinia, Mohamed Cheriet
2017 conf
SPECTS
Iman Vakilinia, Deepak K. Tosh, Shamik Sengupta
2017 conf
GameSec
Deepak K. Tosh, Iman Vakilinia, Sachin Shetty, Shamik Sengupta, Charles A. Kamhoua, Laurent Njilla, Kevin A. Kwiat
2016 B conf
GLOBECOM
Iman Vakilinia, Jiajun Xin, Ming Li, Linke Guo
2013 J jnl
Int. J. Bus. Data Commun. Netw.
Shahin Vakilinia, Mohammad Hosein Alvandi, Mohammad Reza Khalili Shoja, Iman Vakilinia
2013 conf
WMNC
Shahin Vakilinia, Mohammad Hosein Alvandi, Mohammad Reza Khalili Shoja, Iman Vakilinia
2013 conf
WMNC
Shahin Vakilinia, Iman Vakilinia
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



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*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*