Haixiao Gao

19 papers B 1C 2Journal 15Unranked 1
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.
Xiqi Cheng, Rui Meng, Xiaodong Xu, Haixiao Gao, Ping Zhang, Dusit Niyato
2026 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw.
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Xiaodong Xu, Xiqi Cheng, Shujun Han, Ping Zhang
2026 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng.
Zechuan Fang, Mengying Sun, Sen Wang, Xiaodong Xu, Haixiao Gao, Jinghong Huang, Shujun Han, Ping Zhang
2026 J jnl
Expert Syst. Appl.
Haixiao Gao, Yimin Zheng, Chong Li, Linyou Xiao, Tian-Tian Zhang, Yanhua Chen, Zhi-Ri Tang
2026 J jnl
Eng. Appl. Artif. Intell.
Haixiao Gao, Chong Li, Yimin Zheng, Zhi-Ri Tang, Guanghua Yang, Rammohan Mallipeddi
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Rui Meng, Song Gao, Dayu Fan, Haixiao Gao, Yining Wang, Xiaodong Xu, Bizhu Wang, Suyu Lv, Zhidi Zhang, Mengying Sun, Shujun Han, Chen Dong, Xiaofeng Tao, Ping Zhang
2025 J jnl
J. Netw. Comput. Appl.
Rui Meng, Song Gao, Dayu Fan, Haixiao Gao, Yining Wang, Xiaodong Xu, Bizhu Wang, Suyu Lv, Zhidi Zhang, Mengying Sun, Shujun Han, Chen Dong, Xiaofeng Tao, Ping Zhang
2025 conf
INFOCOM WKSHPS
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Yuantao Zhang, Haiming Wang, Xiaodong Xu
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Ruichen Zhang, Yanhan Wang, Xiaodong Xu, Nan Ma, Dusit Niyato, Ping Zhang
2025 J jnl
IEEE Internet Things J.
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Xiaodong Xu, Bingxuan Xu, Shujun Han, Bizhu Wang, Sheng Jiang, Chen Dong, Ping Zhang
2025 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun.
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Xiaodong Xu, Shujun Han, Bizhu Wang, Jingxuan Zhang, Ping Zhang
2025 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng.
Yuankang Chen, Mengying Sun, Xiaodong Xu, Shujun Han, Haixiao Gao, Xiqi Cheng, Peng Cui, Ping Zhang
2025 C conf
CloudCom
Zhidi Zhang, Rui Meng, Song Gao, Haixiao Gao, Xiaodong Xu
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Rui Meng, Dayu Fan, Haixiao Gao, Yifan Yuan, Bizhu Wang, Xiaodong Xu, Mengying Sun, Chen Dong, Xiaofeng Tao, Ping Zhang, Dusit Niyato
2025 J jnl
CoRR
Ping Zhang, Xiaodong Xu, Mengying Sun, Haixiao Gao, Nan Ma, Xiaoyun Wang, Ruichen Zhang, Jiacheng Wang, Dusit Niyato
2024 J jnl
CoRR
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Xiaodong Xu, Bingxuan Xu, Shujun Han, Bizhu Wang, Sheng Jiang, Chen Dong, Ping Zhang
2024 B conf
WCNC
Haixiao Gao, Mengying Sun, Xiaodong Xu, Shujun Han
2021 J jnl
J. Medical Imaging Health Informatics
Shasha Xie, Wei Dong, Yeting Liu, Haixiao Gao
2012 C conf
Healthcom
Chen Hao, Dingcheng Xiang, Weiyi Qin, Minwei Zhou, Yan Tian, Jian Liu, Mingyu Wang, Ji-Jiang Yang, Qing Wang, Haifeng Yang, Xianjun Sun, Haixiao Gao, Geng Li, Qiang Gao
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*