Françoise Forges

21 papers Journal 19Unranked 1
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2022 J jnl
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case.
Games Econ. Behav.
Stéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges
2022 J jnl
Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm.
Int. J. Game Theory
Françoise Forges, József Sákovics
2021 J jnl
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval.
Int. J. Game Theory
Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault
2020 J jnl
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval.
CoRR
Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault
2017 J jnl
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue.
Games Econ. Behav.
Ehud Kalai, Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Françoise Forges, David C. Parkes, Jennifer Byrd
2016 J jnl
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games.
Int. J. Game Theory
Françoise Forges, Ulrich Horst, Antoine Salomon
2015 J jnl
Bayesian repeated games and reputation.
J. Econ. Theory
Antoine Salomon, Françoise Forges
2014 J jnl
Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406].
J. Econ. Theory
Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli
2013 J jnl
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment.
Games Econ. Behav.
Françoise Forges
2013 J jnl
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: some Open Problems.
IGTR
Françoise Forges, Roberto Serrano
2011 J jnl
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values.
Games Econ. Behav.
Omer Biran, Françoise Forges
2009 J jnl
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets.
J. Econ. Theory
Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli
2009 — ch.
Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games.
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
Françoise Forges
2008 J jnl
Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity.
Math. Oper. Res.
Bernhard von Stengel, Françoise Forges
2008 J jnl
Long persuasion games.
J. Econ. Theory
Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler
2008 J jnl
Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types.
IGTR
Frédéric Koessler, Françoise Forges
2006 J jnl
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Françoise Forges
2004 J jnl
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
Math. Soc. Sci.
Françoise Forges
2001 J jnl
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core.
J. Econ. Theory
Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli
1994 — conf
Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission.
Essays in Game Theory
Françoise Forges
1988 J jnl
Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
Math. Oper. Res.
Françoise Forges