Eric Neyman

20 papers A* 7Journal 12
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2025 J jnl
Robust forecast aggregation via additional queries.
CoRR
Rafael M. Frongillo, Mary Monroe, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner
2024 — —
Algorithmic Bayesian Epistemology
Eric Neyman
2024 J jnl
Algorithmic Bayesian Epistemology.
CoRR
Eric Neyman
2024 J jnl
Towards a Law of Iterated Expectations for Heuristic Estimators.
CoRR
Paul F. Christiano, Jacob Hilton, Andrea Lincoln, Eric Neyman, Mark Xu
2023 A* conf
Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals.
EC
Rafael M. Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner
2023 J jnl
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation.
Oper. Res.
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2023 A* conf
No-Regret Learning with Unbounded Losses: The Case of Logarithmic Pooling.
NeurIPS
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2022 A* conf
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals.
EC
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2022 J jnl
Formalizing the presumption of independence.
CoRR
Paul F. Christiano, Eric Neyman, Mark Xu
2022 J jnl
No-Regret Learning with Unbounded Losses: The Case of Logarithmic Pooling.
CoRR
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2022 A* conf
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free.
AAAI
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2021 J jnl
Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals.
CoRR
Rafael M. Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner
2021 J jnl
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals.
CoRR
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2021 A* conf
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision.
EC
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021 A* conf
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation.
EC
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2021 J jnl
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation.
CoRR
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2021 J jnl
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free.
CoRR
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
2020 J jnl
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision.
CoRR
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019 A* conf
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.
FOCS
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018 J jnl
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.
CoRR
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg