Erel Segal-Halevi

144 papers A* 20A 13B 4C 1Journal 102Unranked 3

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	J	`jnl`	An approximation notion between P and FPTAS. CoRR Samuel Bismuth, Erel Segal-Halevi
2026	J	`jnl`	Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequences of Permutations. CoRR Terrence Adams, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	Computing approximate roots of monotone functions. J. Complex. Alexandros Hollender, Chester Lawrence, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences. J. Econ. Theory Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2025	J	`jnl`	Dividing a Graphical Cake. SIAM J. Discret. Math. Xiaohui Bei, Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2025	J	`jnl`	Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggregation Games. CoRR Patrick Becker, Alexander Fries, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	Fair Allocation with Money: What is Your Objective? CoRR Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	Fair division of the replacement-units without an appraiser in urban renewal processes. CoRR Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	Fairly Wired: Towards Leximin-Optimal Division of Electricity. CoRR Eden Hartman, Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	A*	`conf`	Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing. AAAI Jugal Garg, Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	A*	`conf`	It's Not All Black and White: Degree of Truthfulness for Risk-Avoiding Agents. EC Eden Hartman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Biaoshuai Tao
2025	J	`jnl`	It's Not All Black and White: Degree of Truthfulness for Risk-Avoiding Agents. CoRR Eden Hartman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Biaoshuai Tao
2025	A*	`conf`	Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization. AAAI Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	The Min Max Average Cycle Weight Problem. CoRR Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	A	`conf`	Weighted Envy Freeness With Bounded Subsidies. AAMAS Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	What Are People's Actual Utility Functions in Budget Aggregation? CoRR Ayelet Amster, Lioz Akirav, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2025	J	`jnl`	Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy. CoRR Noga Klein Elmalem, Haris Aziz, Rica Gonen, Xin Huang, Kei Kimura, Indrajit Saha, Erel Segal-Halevi, Zhaohong Sun, Mashbat Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo
2024	B	`conf`	Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-degenerate Valuations. SAGT Samuel Bismuth, Ivan Bliznets, Erel Segal-Halevi
2024	J	`jnl`	Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing. CoRR Jugal Garg, Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
2024	A	`conf`	On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. ECAI Zsuzsanna Jankó, Attila Joó, Erel Segal-Halevi, Sheung Man Yuen
2024	A*	`conf`	Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. EC Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2024	J	`jnl`	Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2024	B	`conf`	Partitioning Problems with Splittings and Interval Targets. ISAAC Samuel Bismuth, Vladislav Makarov, Erel Segal-Halevi, Dana Shapira
2024	J	`jnl`	Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization. CoRR Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-Halevi
2024	J	`jnl`	Weighted Envy Freeness With Limited Subsidies. CoRR Noga Klein Elmalem, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2024	J	`jnl`	Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2024	B	`conf`	k-Times Bin Packing and its Application to Fair Electricity Distribution. SAGT Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Alex Ravsky, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	A*	`conf`	A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. EC Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. CoRR Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	A*	`conf`	Balanced Donor Coordination. EC Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	J	`jnl`	Balanced Donor Coordination. CoRR Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	J	`jnl`	Computing approximate roots of monotone functions. CoRR Chester Lawrence, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods. Eur. J. Oper. Res. Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	J	`jnl`	Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. Am. Math. Mon. Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	J	`jnl`	Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads. CoRR Israel Jacobovich, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	A	`conf`	Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. AAMAS Hila Shoshan, Noam Hazon, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	Fairness for multi-self agents. Games Econ. Behav. Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	Keep your distance: Land division with separation. Comput. Geom. Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	A	`conf`	Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. ECAI Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. CoRR Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. CoRR Zsuzsanna Jankó, Attila Joó, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	On Maximum Bipartite Matching with Separation. CoRR Pasin Manurangsi, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	J	`jnl`	On maximum bipartite matching with separation. Inf. Process. Lett. Pasin Manurangsi, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2023	A*	`conf`	Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract). IJCAI Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
2023	J	`jnl`	k-times bin packing and its application to fair electricity distribution. CoRR Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. Oper. Res. Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. CoRR Hila Shoshan, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon
2022	J	`jnl`	Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division. Inf. Sci. Elad Aigner-Horev, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution. CoRR Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Vadim E. Levit, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Fair cake-cutting in practice. Games Econ. Behav. Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Fractionally Balanced Hypergraphs and Rainbow KKM Theorems. Comb. Ron Aharoni, Eli Berger, Joseph Briggs, Erel Segal-Halevi, Shira Zerbib
2022	J	`jnl`	Generalized Rental Harmony. Am. Math. Mon. Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	—	`conf`	How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels. Allerton Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar
2022	J	`jnl`	Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation. Artif. Intell. Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2022	J	`jnl`	Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting. Soc. Choice Welf. Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? Soc. Choice Welf. Roy Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	A	`conf`	Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. AAMAS Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. CoRR Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Partitioning Problems with Splitting and Interval Targets. CoRR Samuel Bismuth, Vladislav Makarov, Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	J	`jnl`	Redividing the cake. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Erel Segal-Halevi
2022	A*	`conf`	Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. AAAI Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	A	`conf`	A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. AAMAS Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	C	`conf`	Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets. EUMAS Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	J	`jnl`	Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	J	`jnl`	Fair multi-cake cutting. Discret. Appl. Math. Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	A*	`conf`	Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. IJCAI Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	J	`jnl`	Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. CoRR Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	J	`jnl`	How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. Am. Math. Mon. Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	A*	`conf`	Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation. IJCAI Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	J	`jnl`	Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation. CoRR Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	A*	`conf`	Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation. AAAI Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2021	A*	`conf`	On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	J	`jnl`	On Monotonicity of Number-Partitioning Algorithms. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	J	`jnl`	Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. CoRR Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	J	`jnl`	Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2021	J	`jnl`	Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. CoRR Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2020	J	`jnl`	Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Erel Segal-Halevi
2020	J	`jnl`	Computing Fair Utilitarian Allocations of Indivisible Goods. CoRR Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi
2020	J	`jnl`	Envy-Free Division of Land. Math. Oper. Res. Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2020	J	`jnl`	Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Haris Aziz
2020	A	`conf`	Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data. AAMAS Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2020	J	`jnl`	How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2020	J	`jnl`	Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation. CoRR Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2020	J	`jnl`	Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, David Sarne
2020	J	`jnl`	On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
2020	A*	`conf`	Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. AAAI Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	Bipartite Envy-Free Matching. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods. Artif. Intell. Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2019	A*	`conf`	Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. EC Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	Fair Division with Bounded Sharing. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. CoRR Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	Fair cake-cutting among families. Soc. Choice Welf. Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
2019	A	`conf`	Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent. AAMAS Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, Tomer Sharbaf, David Sarne
2019	J	`jnl`	Quasilinear Rental Harmony. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. CoRR Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation. CoRR Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi
2019	J	`jnl`	The Maximin Share Dominance Relation. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	J	`jnl`	Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed? CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	A	`conf`	Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes. AAMAS Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	J	`jnl`	Counting Blanks in Polygonal Arrangements. SIAM J. Discret. Math. Arseniy V. Akopyan, Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	A*	`conf`	Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. IJCAI Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2018	A*	`conf`	Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods. IJCAI Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2018	A	`conf`	Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information. AAMAS Shani Alkoby, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi, Tomer Sharbaf
2018	J	`jnl`	Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. CoRR Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	A	`conf`	Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven. AAMAS Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	J	`jnl`	Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms. Soc. Choice Welf. Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	A*	`conf`	MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. AAAI Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2018	J	`jnl`	Making an Appraiser Work for You. CoRR Shani Alkobi, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi, Tomer Sharbaf
2018	A*	`conf`	Redividing the Cake. IJCAI Erel Segal-Halevi
2018	J	`jnl`	Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting. Math. Soc. Sci. Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs R. Sziklai
2017	J	`jnl`	Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2017	J	`jnl`	Cutting a Cake with both Good and Bad Parts. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2017	A*	`conf`	Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. IJCAI Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim
2017	J	`jnl`	Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim
2017	J	`jnl`	How to Charge Lightning. CoRR Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar
2017	J	`jnl`	MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2017	J	`jnl`	On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
2017	J	`jnl`	On Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice. CoRR Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
2017	J	`jnl`	Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Connected Cake-cutting. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs R. Sziklai
2017	J	`jnl`	Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim
2016	J	`jnl`	A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2016	J	`jnl`	Cutting a Cake without Harming the Toppings. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2016	J	`jnl`	Demand-Flow of Agents with Gross-Substitute Valuations. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2016	J	`jnl`	Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations. Oper. Res. Lett. Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2016	J	`jnl`	Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2016	J	`jnl`	How to Re-Divide a Cake Fairly. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi
2016	J	`jnl`	NegoChat-A: a chat-based negotiation agent with bounded rationality. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Avi Rosenfeld, Inon Zuckerman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Osnat Drein, Sarit Kraus
2016	B	`conf`	SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism. SAGT Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2016	J	`jnl`	SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2016	J	`jnl`	Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Algorithms for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. ACM Trans. Algorithms Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2015	A*	`conf`	Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. AAAI Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2015	J	`jnl`	Fair Cake-Cutting among Groups. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
2015	J	`jnl`	Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2015	—	`ch.`	First Steps in Chat-Based Negotiating Agents. Next Frontier in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation Inon Zuckerman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Avi Rosenfeld, Sarit Kraus
2015	J	`jnl`	Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting. CoRR Balázs R. Sziklai, Erel Segal-Halevi
2015	A	`conf`	Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. AAMAS Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2015	J	`jnl`	Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. CoRR Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
2014	A	`conf`	NegoChat: a chat-based negotiation agent. AAMAS Avi Rosenfeld, Inon Zuckerman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Osnat Drein, Sarit Kraus
2013	—	`conf`	PLIS: a Probabilistic Lexical Inference System. ACL (Conference System Demonstrations) Eyal Shnarch, Erel Segal-Halevi, Jacob Goldberger, Ido Dagan
2012	—	`conf`	Using Textual Entailment with Variables for KBP Slot Filling Task. TAC Ofer Bronstein, Erel Segal-Halevi