Dolors Berga

17 papers B 1Journal 16
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2025 J jnl
Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò
2023 J jnl
Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò
2022 J jnl
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models.
Games Econ. Behav.
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2020 J jnl
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2017 J jnl
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth.
Math. Soc. Sci.
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2014 J jnl
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model.
Int. J. Game Theory
Kentaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga, Shigehiro Serizawa
2013 B conf
Some New Domain Restrictions in Social Choice, and Their Consequences.
MDAI
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2012 J jnl
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2012 J jnl
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results.
Int. J. Game Theory
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2012 J jnl
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
Games Econ. Behav.
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2010 J jnl
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
J. Econ. Theory
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2009 J jnl
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
2007 J jnl
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit.
Math. Soc. Sci.
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
2006 J jnl
On Exiting After Voting.
Int. J. Game Theory
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
2004 J jnl
Stability and voting by committees with exit.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
2002 J jnl
Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes.
Soc. Choice Welf.
Dolors Berga
2000 J jnl
Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good.
J. Econ. Theory
Dolors Berga, Shigehiro Serizawa