David C. Parkes

371 papers A* 106A 35B 11C 3Misc 1Journal 159Unranked 50

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	J	`jnl`	Dynamic Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing. CoRR Nicholas Lopez, Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossío, José Roberto Tello-Ayala, David C. Parkes
2026	J	`jnl`	Inner Speech as Behavior Guides: Steerable Imitation of Diverse Behaviors for Human-AI coordination. CoRR Rakshit S. Trivedi, Kartik Sharma, David C. Parkes
2026	J	`jnl`	LLM Active Alignment: A Nash Equilibrium Perspective. CoRR Tonghan Wang, Yuqi Pan, Xinyi Yang, Yanchen Jiang, Milind Tambe, David C. Parkes
2026	A*	`conf`	Understanding Strategic Platform Entry and Seller Exploration: A Stackelberg Model. WWW Garrett Seo, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes
2026	J	`jnl`	Understanding Strategic Platform Entry and Seller Exploration: A Stackelberg Model. CoRR Garrett Seo, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	Accelerated Preference Elicitation with LLM-Based Proxies. CoRR David Huang, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Edwin Lock, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	BundleFlow: Deep Menus for Combinatorial Auctions by Diffusion-Based Optimization. CoRR Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	Differentiable Economics: Strategic Behavior, Mechanisms, and Machine Learning. Commun. ACM Martin Bichler, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment. CoRR Ermis Soumalias, Yanchen Jiang, Kehang Zhu, Michael J. Curry, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	Learning from Synthetic Labs: Language Models as Auction Participants. CoRR Anand Shah, Kehang Zhu, Yanchen Jiang, Jeffrey G. Wang, Arif Kerem Dayi, John J. Horton, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Games. CoRR Gerson Personnat, Tao Lin, Safwan Hossain, David C. Parkes
2025	J	`jnl`	Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI. CoRR Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton, Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier, Akbir Khan, Euan McLean, Chandler Smith, Wolfram Barfuss, Jakob N. Foerster, Tomas Gavenciak, The Anh Han, Edward Hughes, Vojtech Kovarík, Jan Kulveit, Joel Z. Leibo, Caspar Oesterheld, Christian Schröder de Witt, Nisarg Shah, Michael P. Wellman, Paolo Bova, Theodor Cimpeanu, Carson Ezell, Quentin Feuillade-Montixi, Matija Franklin, Esben Kran, Igor Krawczuk, Max Lamparth, Niklas Lauffer, Alexander Meinke, Sumeet Motwani, Anka Reuel, Vincent Conitzer, Michael Dennis, Iason Gabriel, Adam Gleave, Gillian K. Hadfield, Nika Haghtalab, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, Sébastien Krier, Kate Larson, Joel Lehman, David C. Parkes, Georgios Piliouras, Iyad Rahwan
2025	A	`conf`	On Diffusion Models for Multi-Agent Partial Observability: Shared Attractors, Error Bounds, and Composite Flow. AAMAS Tonghan Wang, Heng Dong, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe
2025	J	`jnl`	Pricing with Tips in Three-Sided Delivery Platforms. CoRR Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
2024	A*	`conf`	Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces. ICLR Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David C. Parkes, Nir Rosenfeld
2024	J	`jnl`	Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang, Manzil Zaheer, Aranyak Mehta, David C. Parkes
2024	A*	`conf`	Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization. EC Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
2024	J	`jnl`	Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization. CoRR Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
2024	J	`jnl`	Easy as ABCs: Unifying Boltzmann Q-Learning and Counterfactual Regret Minimization. CoRR Luca D'Amico-Wong, Hugh Zhang, Marc Lanctot, David C. Parkes
2024	A*	`conf`	GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning. EC Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
2024	J	`jnl`	GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning. CoRR Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
2024	A*	`conf`	Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers. ICLR Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Romuald Elie, Guy Lever, Andrea Tacchetti
2024	A*	`conf`	Generative Social Choice. EC Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich
2024	J	`jnl`	Multi-Sender Persuasion - A Computational Perspective. CoRR Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
2024	A*	`conf`	Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective. ICML Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
2024	J	`jnl`	Nontruthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification. Math. Oper. Res. Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2024	J	`jnl`	On Diffusion Models for Multi-Agent Partial Observability: Shared Attractors, Error Bounds, and Composite Flow. CoRR Tonghan Wang, Heng Dong, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe
2024	J	`jnl`	Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. J. ACM Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath
2024	J	`jnl`	Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality. CoRR Michael J. Curry, Zhou Fan, David C. Parkes
2024	A*	`conf`	Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. EC Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
2024	A*	`conf`	Position: Social Environment Design Should be Further Developed for AI-based Policy-Making. ICML Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, Yiling Chen
2024	J	`jnl`	Predictive Churn with the Set of Good Models. CoRR Jamelle Watson-Daniels, Flávio du Pin Calmon, Alexander D'Amour, Carol Xuan Long, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun
2024	J	`jnl`	Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning. CoRR Dima Ivanov, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Tonghan Wang, David C. Parkes
2024	J	`jnl`	Social Environment Design. CoRR Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, Yiling Chen
2024	A*	`conf`	Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract). AAAI Luca D'Amico-Wong, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Chain-of-Thought Reasoning is a Policy Improvement Operator. CoRR Hugh Zhang, David C. Parkes
2023	A*	`conf`	Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. STOC Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, David C. Parkes
2023	A*	`conf`	Data Market Design through Deep Learning. NeurIPS Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Data Market Design through Deep Learning. CoRR Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
2023	—	`conf`	Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data. ICAIF He Sun, Zhun Deng, Hui Chen, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces. CoRR Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David C. Parkes, Nir Rosenfeld
2023	A*	`conf`	Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks. NeurIPS Tonghan Wang, Paul Duetting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks. CoRR Tonghan Wang, Paul Dütting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Eliciting Information from participants with Competing Incentives and Dependent Beliefs. CoRR Manuel Wuthrich, Mark York, David C. Parkes
2023	—	`conf`	Empowering First-Year Computer Science Ph.D. Students to Create a Culture that Values Community and Mental Health. SIGCSE (1) Yaniv Yacoby, John Girash, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers. CoRR Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Romuald Elie, Guy Lever, Andrea Tacchetti
2023	J	`jnl`	Generative Social Choice. CoRR Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich
2023	A*	`conf`	Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. ICML Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes
2023	A*	`conf`	Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study. WWW Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes
2023	J	`jnl`	Platform Equilibrium: Analayzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. CoRR Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes
2023	A*	`conf`	Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification. AAAI Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun
2023	A	`conf`	Reinforcement Learning with Stepwise Fairness Constraints. AISTATS Zhun Deng, He Sun, Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, David C. Parkes
2023	B	`conf`	Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap V3. AFT Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Daniel J. Moroz, Michael Neuder, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence. CoRR Peter Stone, Rodney Brooks, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ryan Calo, Oren Etzioni, Greg Hager, Julia Hirschberg, Shivaram Kalyanakrishnan, Ece Kamar, Sarit Kraus, Kevin Leyton-Brown, David C. Parkes, William H. Press, AnnaLee Saxenian, Julie Shah, Milind Tambe, Astro Teller
2022	J	`jnl`	Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. CoRR Matheus V. X. Ferreira, David C. Parkes
2022	A*	`conf`	CrowdPlay: Crowdsourcing Human Demonstrations for Offline Learning. ICLR Matthias Gerstgrasser, Rakshit S. Trivedi, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design. CoRR Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Ben Altschuler, He Sun, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes
2022	—	`conf`	Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design✱. ICAIF Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Ben Altschuler, He Sun, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Empowering First-Year Computer Science Ph.D. Students to Create a Culture that Values Community and Mental Health. CoRR Yaniv Yacoby, John Girash, David C. Parkes
2022	A*	`conf`	Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms. NeurIPS Mira Finkelstein, Nitsan Levy Schlot, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Sarah Keren
2022	J	`jnl`	Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms. CoRR Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Nitsan Levy Schlot, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren
2022	J	`jnl`	Learning Stackelberg Equilibria and Applications to Economic Design Games. CoRR Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Darshan Chakrabarti, Matthias Gerstgrasser, Vincent Li, David C. Parkes
2022	A*	`conf`	Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms. NeurIPS Gianluca Brero, Eric Mibuari, Nicolas Lepore, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms. CoRR Gianluca Brero, Nicolas Lepore, Eric Mibuari, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Opinion Dynamics Optimization by Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion via Non-Convex Local Search. ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data Rediet Abebe, T.-H. Hubert Chan, Jon M. Kleinberg, Zhibin Liang, David C. Parkes, Mauro Sozio, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis
2022	J	`jnl`	Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. CoRR Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification. CoRR Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun
2022	A*	`conf`	Reinforcement Learning Explainability via Model Transforms (Student Abstract). AAAI Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren
2022	J	`jnl`	Reinforcement Learning with Stepwise Fairness Constraints. CoRR Zhun Deng, He Sun, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, David C. Parkes
2022	J	`jnl`	Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. Oper. Res. Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes
2022	—	`ch.`	Too Many cooks: Bayesian inference for coordinating Multi-agent Collaboration. Human-Like Machine Intelligence Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, David C. Parkes, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Max Kleiman-Weiner
2022	J	`jnl`	Using Reinforcement Learning to Study Platform Economies under Market Shocks. CoRR Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes
2021	J	`jnl`	Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching. CoRR Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers, David C. Parkes
2021	—	`conf`	Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market (Invited Talk). Tokenomics Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern
2021	J	`jnl`	Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market. CoRR Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern
2021	B	`conf`	Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. AFT Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern
2021	—	`conf`	Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment. WINE Mark York, Munther A. Dahleh, David C. Parkes
2021	J	`jnl`	Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment. CoRR Mark York, Munther A. Dahleh, David C. Parkes
2021	A*	`conf`	Learning Representations by Humans, for Humans. ICML Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jack Cao, David C. Parkes
2021	A	`conf`	Learning Robust Helpful Behaviors in Two-Player Cooperative Atari Environments. AAMAS Paul Tylkin, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes
2021	J	`jnl`	Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders. CoRR Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes
2021	J	`jnl`	Optimal auctions through deep learning. Commun. ACM Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath
2021	J	`jnl`	Playing with symmetry with neural networks. Nat. Mach. Intell. David C. Parkes
2021	A*	`conf`	Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms. AAAI Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo
2021	J	`jnl`	Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3. CoRR Michael Neuder, Rithvik Rao, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes
2021	J	`jnl`	The AI Economist: Optimal Economic Policy Design via Two-level Deep Reinforcement Learning. CoRR Stephan Zheng, Alexander Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, David C. Parkes, Richard Socher
2021	J	`jnl`	Too Many Cooks: Bayesian Inference for Coordinating Multi-Agent Collaboration. Top. Cogn. Sci. Sarah A. Wu, Rose E. Wang, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner
2021	—	`conf`	Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. WINE Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka
2020	A*	`conf`	A Kernel of Truth: Determining Rumor Veracity on Twitter by Diffusion Pattern Alone. WWW Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	A Kernel of Truth: Determining Rumor Veracity on Twitter by Diffusion Pattern Alone. CoRR Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	Artificial Intelligence & Cooperation. CoRR Elisa Bertino, Finale Doshi-Velez, Maria L. Gini, Daniel Lopresti, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data. CoRR He Sun, Zhun Deng, Hui Chen, David C. Parkes
2020	B	`conf`	Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake. AFT Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake. CoRR Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems. CoRR Daniel J. Moroz, Daniel J. Aronoff, Neha Narula, David C. Parkes
2020	A*	`conf`	From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization. NeurIPS Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization. CoRR Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	How do fairness definitions fare? Testing public attitudes towards three algorithmic definitions of fairness in loan allocations. Artif. Intell. Nripsuta Ani Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu
2020	J	`jnl`	Incentivizing Deep Fixes in Software Economies. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. Malvika Rao, David F. Bacon, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer
2020	A*	`conf`	Information Shaping for Enhanced Goal Recognition of Partially-Informed Agents. AAAI Sarah Keren, Haifeng Xu, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes, Barbara J. Grosz
2020	J	`jnl`	Modernizing Data Control: Making Personal Digital Data Mutually Beneficial for Citizens and Industry. CoRR Sujata Banerjee, Yiling Chen, Kobbi Nissim, David C. Parkes, Katie A. Siek, Lauren Wilcox
2020	J	`jnl`	Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion via Non-Convex Local Search. CoRR Rediet Abebe, T.-H. Hubert Chan, Jon M. Kleinberg, Zhibin Liang, David C. Parkes, Mauro Sozio, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis
2020	J	`jnl`	Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah
2020	A	`conf`	Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present-Bias. AAMAS Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, Elena Wu-Yan
2020	A*	`conf`	Reasoning About Plan Robustness Versus Plan Cost for Partially Informed Agents. KR Sarah Keren, Sara Bernardini, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	Reinforcement Learning of Simple Indirect Mechanisms. CoRR Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo
2020	J	`jnl`	Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms. SIGecom Exch. Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes
2020	J	`jnl`	The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies. CoRR Stephan Zheng, Alexander Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, Nikhil Naik, Melvin Gruesbeck, David C. Parkes, Richard Socher
2020	A*	`conf`	The Effectiveness of Peer Prediction in Long-Term Forecasting. AAAI Debmalya Mandal, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes
2020	A*	`conf`	The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation. ICML Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
2020	A	`conf`	The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests. AAMAS Hau Chan, David C. Parkes, Karim R. Lakhani
2020	J	`jnl`	The Rise of AI-Driven Simulators: Building a New Crystal Ball. CoRR Ian T. Foster, David C. Parkes, Stephan Zheng
2020	J	`jnl`	The capacity constrained facility location problem. Games Econ. Behav. Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes
2020	A	`conf`	Too Many Cooks: Coordinating Multi-agent Collaboration Through Inverse Planning. AAMAS Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner
2020	B	`conf`	Too many cooks: Coordinating multi-agent collaboration through inverse planning. CogSci Sarah A. Wu, Rose E. Wang, James A. Evans, Josh Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner
2020	J	`jnl`	Too many cooks: Coordinating multi-agent collaboration through inverse planning. CoRR Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner
2020	J	`jnl`	Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. CoRR Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka
2019	J	`jnl`	Algorithmic and Economic Perspectives on Fairness. CoRR David C. Parkes, Rakesh V. Vohra, et al.
2019	J	`jnl`	Artificial Intelligence for Social Good. CoRR Gregory D. Hager, Ann W. Drobnis, Fei Fang, Rayid Ghani, Amy Greenwald, Terah Lyons, David C. Parkes, Jason Schultz, Suchi Saria, Stephen F. Smith, Milind Tambe
2019	A*	`conf`	Bayesian Fairness. AAAI Christos Dimitrakakis, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic
2019	A	`conf`	Contingent Payment Mechanisms for Resource Utilization. AAMAS Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, James Y. Zou
2019	J	`jnl`	Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions. Math. Oper. Res. Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2019	A*	`conf`	Fairness without Harm: Decoupled Classifiers with Preference Guarantees. ICML Berk Ustun, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes
2019	A*	`conf`	Finding Friend and Foe in Multi-Agent Games. NeurIPS Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, Josh Tenenbaum
2019	J	`jnl`	Finding Friend and Foe in Multi-Agent Games. CoRR Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, Joshua B. Tenenbaum
2019	C	`conf`	How Do Fairness Definitions Fare?: Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness. AIES Nripsuta Ani Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu
2019	J	`jnl`	Learning Representations by Humans, for Humans. CoRR Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jack Cao, David C. Parkes
2019	A*	`conf`	Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes. ICML Goran Radanovic, Rati Devidze, David C. Parkes, Adish Singla
2019	J	`jnl`	Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes. CoRR Goran Radanovic, Rati Devidze, David C. Parkes, Adish Singla
2019	J	`jnl`	Machine behaviour. Nat. Iyad Rahwan, Manuel Cebrián, Nick Obradovich, Josh C. Bongard, Jean-François Bonnefon, Cynthia Breazeal, Jacob W. Crandall, Nicholas A. Christakis, Iain D. Couzin, Matthew O. Jackson, Nicholas R. Jennings, Ece Kamar, Isabel M. Kloumann, Hugo Larochelle, David Lazer, Richard McElreath, Alan Mislove, David C. Parkes, Alex 'Sandy' Pentland, Margaret E. Roberts, Azim Shariff, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Michael P. Wellman
2019	A*	`conf`	Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning. ICML Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath
2019	J	`jnl`	Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias. CoRR Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, Elena Wu-Yan
2019	A*	`conf`	Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences. IJCAI Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes
2019	J	`jnl`	Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences. CoRR Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes
2019	J	`jnl`	Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol. CoRR Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes
2019	A*	`conf`	Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. EC Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes
2019	—	`conf`	The Capacity Constrained Facility Location Problem. WINE Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes
2019	J	`jnl`	The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation. CoRR Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu
2019	J	`jnl`	Weighted Tensor Completion for Time-Series Causal Inference. CoRR Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes
2018	A*	`conf`	Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design. IJCAI Noah Golowich, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes
2018	A	`conf`	Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with Budgets. AAMAS Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes
2018	J	`jnl`	How Do Fairness Definitions Fare? Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness. CoRR Nripsuta Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu
2018	J	`jnl`	Mechanism Design without Money for Common Goods. CoRR Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes
2018	A*	`conf`	Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion. KDD Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis
2018	J	`jnl`	Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion. CoRR Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis
2018	A*	`conf`	Optimizing Cluster-based Randomized Experiments under Monotonicity. KDD Jean Pouget-Abadie, Vahab S. Mirrokni, David C. Parkes, Edoardo M. Airoldi
2018	A	`conf`	Playing the Wrong Game: Bounding Externalities in Diverse Populations of Agents. AAMAS Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2018	A*	`conf`	Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities. EC Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2018	J	`jnl`	Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities. CoRR Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2018	J	`jnl`	Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. CoRR Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes
2018	J	`jnl`	Technical perspective: Moving spectrum. Commun. ACM David C. Parkes
2017	J	`jnl`	Calibrated Fairness in Bandits. CoRR Yang Liu, Goran Radanovic, Christos Dimitrakakis, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes
2017	A	`conf`	Fair Division via Social Comparison. AAMAS Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes
2017	A	`conf`	Generalizing Demand Response Through Reward Bidding. AAMAS Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes, Valentin Robu
2017	J	`jnl`	Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. Games Econ. Behav. Ehud Kalai, Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Françoise Forges, David C. Parkes, Jennifer Byrd
2017	—	`conf`	Multi-View Decision Processes: The Helper-AI Problem. NIPS Christos Dimitrakakis, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic, Paul Tylkin
2017	A	`conf`	On AI, Markets and Machine Learning. AAMAS David C. Parkes
2017	J	`jnl`	Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning. CoRR Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes
2017	A*	`conf`	Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users. EC Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah
2017	J	`jnl`	Subjective fairness: Fairness is in the eye of the beholder. CoRR Christos Dimitrakakis, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic
2017	—	`conf`	Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots - Extended Version. AAMAS Workshops (Visionary Papers) David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia
2017	A	`conf`	Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots. AAMAS David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia
2017	A*	`conf`	Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots. IJCAI David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia
2016	A	`conf`	A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mechanisms. UAI Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes
2016	A*	`conf`	Automated Mechanism Design without Money via Machine Learning. IJCAI Harikrishna Narasimhan, Shivani Agarwal, David C. Parkes
2016	J	`jnl`	Contingent Payment Mechanisms to Maximize Resource Utilization. CoRR Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, James Y. Zou
2016	A*	`conf`	Correlated Voting. IJCAI Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes
2016	J	`jnl`	Fair Division via Social Comparison. CoRR Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes
2016	A*	`conf`	Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response. IJCAI Hongyao Ma, Valentin Robu, Na Li, David C. Parkes
2016	A*	`conf`	Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction. EC Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes
2016	J	`jnl`	Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction. CoRR Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes
2016	—	`conf`	Long-term Causal Effects via Behavioral Game Theory. NIPS Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes
2016	A*	`conf`	Measuring Performance of Peer Prediction Mechanisms Using Replicator Dynamics. IJCAI Victor Shnayder, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes
2016	J	`jnl`	Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Tasks. CoRR Debmalya Mandal, Matthew Leifer, David C. Parkes, Galen Pickard, Victor Shnayder
2016	A	`conf`	Personalized Hitting Time for Informative Trust Mechanisms Despite Sybils. AAMAS Brandon K. Liu, David C. Parkes, Sven Seuken
2016	B	`conf`	Practical Peer Prediction for Peer Assessment. HCOMP Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes
2016	A*	`conf`	Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities. IJCAI Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2016	A*	`conf`	Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. EC Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2016	J	`jnl`	Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. CoRR Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2016	—	`conf`	When are Marginal Congestion Tolls Optimal? ATT@IJCAI Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2015	J	`jnl`	Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah
2015	A*	`conf`	Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty. AAAI Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2015	J	`jnl`	Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs. Games Econ. Behav. Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes
2015	A*	`conf`	Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design. EC Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes, Elery Pfeffer, James Y. Zou
2015	—	`conf`	Learnability of Influence in Networks. NIPS Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Yaron Singer
2015	A	`conf`	On Sex, Evolution, and the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm. AAMAS Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2015	J	`jnl`	On Sex, Evolution, and the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm. CoRR Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2015	J	`jnl`	Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
2015	J	`jnl`	Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases. SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev. Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2015	J	`jnl`	Statistical inference of long-term causal effects in multiagent systems under the Neyman-Rubin model. CoRR Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes
2015	A	`conf`	Strategic Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls. CSCW James Y. Zou, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2014	—	`conf`	A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice. NIPS Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2014	J	`jnl`	A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice. CoRR Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2014	A	`conf`	Approximating the shapley value via multi-issue decompositions. AAMAS Hossein Azari Soufiani, David Maxwell Chickering, Denis Xavier Charles, David C. Parkes
2014	A*	`conf`	Computing Parametric Ranking Models via Rank-Breaking. ICML Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2014	J	`jnl`	Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty. CoRR Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2014	J	`jnl`	Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums. Games Econ. Behav. Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes
2014	J	`jnl`	Enabling Spectrum Sharing in Secondary Market Auctions. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. Ian A. Kash, Rohan Murty, David C. Parkes
2014	A*	`conf`	Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. EC Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2014	J	`jnl`	Long-term causal effects of economic mechanisms on agent incentives. CoRR Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes
2014	J	`jnl`	Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Risk Averse Agents. CoRR Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes
2014	B	`ed.`	Proceedings of the Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2014, November 2-4, 2014, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA HCOMP Jeffrey P. Bigham, David C. Parkes
2014	J	`jnl`	Special Issue on Pricing and Incentives in Networks and Systems: Guest Editors' Introduction. ACM Trans. Internet Techn. Costas Courcoubetis, Roch Guérin, Patrick Loiseau, David C. Parkes, Jean C. Walrand, Adam Wierman
2014	A	`conf`	Sybil-proof accounting mechanisms with transitive trust. AAMAS Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
2014	J	`jnl`	Truthful Prioritization Schemes for Spectrum Sharing. CoRR Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia, Jeremy Hoon
2014	B	`conf`	Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing. MobiHoc Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia, Jeremy Hoon
2013	J	`jnl`	A game-theoretic analysis of the ESP game. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes
2013	J	`jnl`	An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Valentin Robu, Enrico H. Gerding, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nick R. Jennings
2013	A*	`conf`	Automated Workflow Synthesis. AAAI Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, David C. Parkes
2013	J	`jnl`	Capturing Cognitive Aspects of Human Judgment. CoRR Andrew Mao, Hossein Azari Soufiani, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes
2013	J	`jnl`	Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games. Artif. Intell. Yoram Bachrach, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
2013	—	`conf`	Contrastive Learning Using Spectral Methods. NIPS James Y. Zou, Daniel J. Hsu, David C. Parkes, Ryan Prescott Adams
2013	B	`conf`	Dwelling on the Negative: Incentivizing Effort in Peer Prediction. HCOMP Jens Witkowski, Yoram Bachrach, Peter B. Key, David C. Parkes
2013	A*	`conf`	Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences. AAAI David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia
2013	A*	`conf`	Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. IJCAI Valentin Robu, David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito, Nicholas R. Jennings
2013	J	`jnl`	Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions. CoRR Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2013	—	`conf`	Generalized Method-of-Moments for Rank Aggregation. NIPS Hossein Azari Soufiani, William Z. Chen, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2013	—	`conf`	Generalized Random Utility Models with Multiple Types. NIPS Hossein Azari Soufiani, Hansheng Diao, Zhenyu Lai, David C. Parkes
2013	J	`jnl`	Non-Cooperative Location Privacy. IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, David C. Parkes
2013	A	`conf`	Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models. UAI Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2013	J	`jnl`	Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models. CoRR Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2013	J	`jnl`	SIGecom news. SIGecom Exch. David C. Parkes
2013	J	`jnl`	Truth, justice, and cake cutting. Games Econ. Behav. Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia
2012	A*	`conf`	A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Comparison between Schulze's Rule and Ranked Pairs. AAAI David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2012	A*	`conf`	A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations. AAAI Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes
2012	A*	`conf`	Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities. EC David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah
2012	A*	`conf`	Human computation tasks with global constraints. CHI Haoqi Zhang, Edith Law, Rob Miller, Krzysztof Gajos, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz
2012	J	`jnl`	Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation CoRR Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
2012	A*	`conf`	Market user interface design. EC Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan
2012	J	`jnl`	Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions CoRR Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes
2012	A*	`conf`	Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions. EC John K. Lai, David C. Parkes
2012	J	`jnl`	Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. CoRR Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh
2012	J	`jnl`	Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers CoRR Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
2012	A*	`conf`	Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers. EC Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
2012	A*	`conf`	Peer prediction without a common prior. EC Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes
2012	A	`conf`	Predicting your own effort. AAMAS David F. Bacon, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen, Malvika Rao, Ian A. Kash, Manu Sridharan
2012	J	`jnl`	Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions CoRR Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
2012	J	`jnl`	Random Utility Theory for Social Choice CoRR Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2012	—	`conf`	Random Utility Theory for Social Choice. NIPS Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia
2012	J	`jnl`	SIGecom news. SIGecom Exch. David C. Parkes
2012	A	`conf`	Task routing for prediction tasks. AAMAS Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes
2012	—	`conf`	Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing. INFOCOM Workshops Victor Shnayder, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia
2012	—	`conf`	TurkServer: Enabling Synchronous and Longitudinal Online Experiments. HCOMP@AAAI Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Haoqi Zhang
2011	A*	`conf`	A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives. EC Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes
2011	—	`conf`	An Online Mechanism for Multi-speed Electric Vehicle Charging. AMMA Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, Enrico H. Gerding, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
2011	J	`jnl`	Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents CoRR Jonathan Bredin, Quang Duong, David C. Parkes
2011	B	`conf`	Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions. SAGT Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes
2011	J	`jnl`	Complex financial products: Commun. ACM David C. Parkes
2011	A	`conf`	Incentive design for adaptive agents. AAMAS Yiling Chen, Jerry Kung, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Haoqi Zhang
2011	A*	`conf`	Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. AAAI Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
2011	J	`jnl`	Journals for certification, conferences for rapid dissemination. Commun. ACM Joseph Y. Halpern, David C. Parkes
2011	—	`conf`	Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract). AMMA Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan
2011	A*	`conf`	On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions. AAAI Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang, David C. Parkes
2011	A	`conf`	Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging. AAMAS Enrico H. Gerding, Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
2011	A*	`conf`	Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting. AAAI Yuga J. Cohler, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia
2011	J	`jnl`	Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design CoRR Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2011	A*	`conf`	Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design. EC Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes
2011	J	`jnl`	Viewpoint: Journals for Certification, Conferences for Rapid Dissemination CoRR Joseph Y. Halpern, David C. Parkes
2010	A*	`conf`	Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. AAAI Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes
2010	A*	`conf`	Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. AAAI William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes
2010	—	`conf`	Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering. FoSER Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Kurt C. Wallnau
2010	J	`jnl`	Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms. AI Mag. David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Florin Constantin, Satinder Singh
2010	A	`conf`	Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option. ECAI Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes
2010	A*	`conf`	Hidden Market Design. AAAI Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes
2010	A	`conf`	Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. AAMAS Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
2010	—	`conf`	Impersonation Strategies in Auctions. WINE Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes
2010	A*	`ed.`	Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, June 7-11, 2010 EC David C. Parkes, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Moshe Tennenholtz
2010	—	`conf`	Security Games in Online Advertising: Can Ads Help Secure the Web? WEIS Nevena Vratonjic, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Maxim Raya, David C. Parkes
2010	—	`conf`	Software economies. FoSER David F. Bacon, Eric Bokelberg, Yiling Chen, Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao, Manu Sridharan
2010	J	`jnl`	Specifying and monitoring economic environments using rights and obligations. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
2010	J	`jnl`	Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions. Comput. Oper. Res. Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang
2010	A*	`conf`	Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money. AAAI James Y. Zou, Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes
2010	—	`conf`	Toward automatic task design: a progress report. HCOMP@KDD Eric Huang, Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, Yiling Chen
2010	A*	`conf`	Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting. AAAI Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia
2009	A*	`conf`	A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent. IJCAI Haoqi Zhang, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes
2009	—	`conf`	A market-based approach to software evolution. OOPSLA Companion David F. Bacon, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao
2009	A*	`conf`	An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity. INFOCOM Jacomo Corbo, Shaili Jain, Michael Mitzenmacher, David C. Parkes
2009	J	`jnl`	An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem. Artif. Intell. Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
2009	J	`jnl`	Computational challenges in e-commerce. Commun. ACM Joan Feigenbaum, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock
2009	—	`conf`	Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions. Financial Cryptography David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Thorpe
2009	—	`conf`	Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges. Financial Cryptography Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes
2009	A*	`conf`	Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. EC Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes
2009	A*	`conf`	Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers. IJCAI Benjamin Lubin, Jeffrey O. Kephart, Rajarshi Das, David C. Parkes
2009	—	`conf`	Fair Package Assignment. AMMA Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
2009	B	`conf`	Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. TCC Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan
2009	J	`jnl`	Minimal Economic Distributed Computing CoRR Saul Youssef, John Brunelle, John Huth, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer, Jim Shank
2009	J	`jnl`	Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions. Games Econ. Behav. Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes
2009	A*	`conf`	On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis. CCS Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, David C. Parkes
2009	A*	`conf`	Policy teaching through reward function learning. EC Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen
2009	A	`conf`	Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions. UAI Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
2009	A*	`conf`	Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. EC Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
2009	J	`jnl`	Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Games Econ. Behav. David C. Parkes, Moshe Tennenholtz
2009	—	`conf`	The role of game theory in human computation systems. KDD Workshop on Human Computation Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes
2009	B	`conf`	When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures. SOFSEM David C. Parkes
2008	—	`ed.`	7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 1 AAMAS (1) Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons
2008	—	`ed.`	7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 2 AAMAS (2) Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons
2008	—	`ed.`	7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 3 AAMAS (3) Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons
2008	—	`conf`	A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose. WINE Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes
2008	J	`jnl`	A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exch. Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
2008	A*	`conf`	An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. AAAI Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock
2008	A*	`conf`	Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier
2008	A*	`conf`	Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning. AAAI Erik G. Schultink, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes
2008	A*	`conf`	Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions. AAAI Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes
2008	A*	`conf`	Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh
2008	J	`jnl`	Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan
2008	—	`conf`	Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. NetEcon Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, Kurt C. Wallnau
2008	J	`jnl`	ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
2008	A	`conf`	Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. UAI Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
2008	J	`jnl`	M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes
2008	A*	`conf`	On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. EC Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
2008	A*	`conf`	Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. AAAI Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes
2008	J	`jnl`	Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe
2008	A*	`conf`	Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation. AAAI Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes
2007	J	`jnl`	AAMAS 2008. Künstliche Intell. David C. Parkes, Lin Padgham
2007	A*	`conf`	An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains. AAAI David C. Parkes, Quang Duong
2007	J	`jnl`	Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. J. Econ. Theory Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes
2007	J	`jnl`	Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents. J. Artif. Intell. Res. Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong
2007	—	`conf`	Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. Financial Cryptography Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes
2007	—	`conf`	On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. AMEC/TADA Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
2007	A	`conf`	Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. AAMAS Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes
2007	A*	`ed.`	Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California, USA, June 11-15, 2007 EC Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, David C. Parkes, Paul Resnick
2007	—	`conf`	The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. WINE Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes
2007	J	`jnl`	The Internet, evolutionary variational inequalities, and the time-dependent Braess paradox. Comput. Manag. Sci. Anna Nagurney, David C. Parkes, Patrizia Daniele
2006	J	`jnl`	A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks. ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes
2006	A	`conf`	Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions. AAMAS Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes
2006	A	`conf`	MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. AAMAS Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes
2006	A	`conf`	Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. UAI Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh
2006	C	`conf`	Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments. ICEC Laura Kang, David C. Parkes
2006	C	`conf`	Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. ICEC David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe
2006	A*	`conf`	The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution. EC Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
2005	J	`jnl`	Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions. Decis. Support Syst. Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri
2005	J	`jnl`	Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. David C. Parkes
2005	—	`conf`	Computational Mechanism Design: An AI Agenda. BNAIC David C. Parkes
2005	Misc	`conf`	Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks. NSDI Geoffrey Mainland, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh
2005	A*	`conf`	ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. EC David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan
2005	J	`jnl`	Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions. Manag. Sci. David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam
2005	A	`conf`	Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. UAI Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes
2005	A*	`conf`	More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives. IJCAI Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
2005	A*	`conf`	Online auctions with re-usable goods. EC Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes
2005	J	`jnl`	Special Issue of Decis. Support Syst. David C. Parkes
2005	A*	`conf`	The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. PODC Jacomo Corbo, David C. Parkes
2005	A	`conf`	Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems. HotOS Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, Brent N. Chun
2004	A*	`conf`	Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. EC Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes
2004	—	`ed.`	Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15, 2003, Revised Selected Papers AMEC Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, William E. Walsh
2004	—	`conf`	An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions. AMEC Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
2004	A*	`conf`	Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. EC Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
2004	—	`conf`	Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design. NIPS David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh, Dimah Yanovsky
2004	A	`conf`	Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. AAMAS David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman
2004	A*	`conf`	GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms. AAAI David C. Parkes, Grant Schoenebeck
2004	A*	`conf`	Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. PODC Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
2004	—	`conf`	Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations. AMEC Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
2004	—	`conf`	Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks. ACM SIGOPS European Workshop Geoffrey Mainland, Laura Kang, Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh
2003	—	`conf`	An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. NIPS David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh
2003	A*	`conf`	Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. EC Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri
2003	—	`conf`	Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. AMEC William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Rajarshi Das
2003	J	`jnl`	Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms. IEEE Intell. Syst. Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes
2003	A*	`conf`	Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. EC Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes
2003	A*	`conf`	Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design. EC Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes
2003	—	`conf`	Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks. IPTPS Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
2003	A*	`conf`	Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations. EC Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
2003	A*	`conf`	Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. EC Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer
2002	—	`ed.`	Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002, Revised Papers AMEC Julian A. Padget, Onn Shehory, David C. Parkes, Norman M. Sadeh, William E. Walsh
2002	J	`jnl`	Conference report: the third ACM conference on electronic commerce. SIGecom Exch. David C. Parkes
2002	—	`conf`	Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC David C. Parkes
2001	A*	`conf`	Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges. IJCAI David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso
2001	—	`conf`	An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. Agents David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
2001	J	`jnl`	Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection. Games Econ. Behav. David C. Parkes, Bernardo A. Huberman
2000	—	`conf`	Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice. AAAI/IAAI David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
2000	—	`conf`	Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment. AAAI/IAAI David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
1999	—	`conf`	Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems. Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop) David C. Parkes
1998	—	`conf`	Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design. AMET David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, Dean P. Foster