Daniel Schoepflin

24 papers A* 7A 2B 2Journal 13
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
Algorithmic Collusion at Test Time: A Meta-game Design and Evaluation.
CoRR
Yuhong Luo, Daniel Schoepflin, Xintong Wang
2025 B conf
A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.
SAGT
Chun Lau, David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin
2025 J jnl
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.
Oper. Res.
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2025 A* conf
Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice.
SODA
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025 J jnl
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.
Oper. Res.
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025 A* conf
Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization.
STOC
Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
2025 A* conf
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms.
AAAI
Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
2025 J jnl
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms.
CoRR
Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
2025 J jnl
Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness.
CoRR
David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin, Kangning Wang
2024 J jnl
Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice.
CoRR
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2024 J jnl
Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization.
CoRR
Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
2022 A* conf
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.
EC
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022 J jnl
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.
CoRR
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022 A conf
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods.
AAMAS
Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
2022 J jnl
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods.
CoRR
Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
2022 A* conf
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.
SODA
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2022 A conf
Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond.
ITCS
Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 A* conf
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.
AAAI
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 J jnl
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.
CoRR
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2021 A* conf
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.
IJCAI
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 J jnl
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.
CoRR
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 B conf
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.
SAGT
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021 J jnl
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.
CoRR
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin
2020 J jnl
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.
CoRR
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin