Daniel Schoepflin

24 papers A* 7A 2B 2Journal 13

Year	Rank	Type	Title / Venue / Authors
2026	J	`jnl`	Algorithmic Collusion at Test Time: A Meta-game Design and Evaluation. CoRR Yuhong Luo, Daniel Schoepflin, Xintong Wang
2025	B	`conf`	A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events. SAGT Chun Lau, David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin
2025	J	`jnl`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. Oper. Res. Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2025	A*	`conf`	Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. SODA Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025	J	`jnl`	Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. Oper. Res. Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2025	A*	`conf`	Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. STOC Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
2025	A*	`conf`	On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. AAAI Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
2025	J	`jnl`	On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. CoRR Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
2025	J	`jnl`	Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness. CoRR David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin, Kangning Wang
2024	J	`jnl`	Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2024	J	`jnl`	Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. CoRR Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
2022	A*	`conf`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	J	`jnl`	Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	A	`conf`	Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. AAMAS Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	J	`jnl`	Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. CoRR Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
2022	A*	`conf`	Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. SODA Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2022	A	`conf`	Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond. ITCS Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	A*	`conf`	Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. AAAI Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	J	`jnl`	Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. CoRR Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
2021	A*	`conf`	PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. IJCAI Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	J	`jnl`	PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. CoRR Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	B	`conf`	Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. SAGT Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin
2021	J	`jnl`	Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. CoRR Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin
2020	J	`jnl`	Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. CoRR Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin