Clayton Thomas

28 papers A* 8A 3Journal 14Unranked 2
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 A conf
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms.
ITCS
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2026 J jnl
Existence of Fair Resolute Voting Rules.
CoRR
Manik Dhar, Kunal Mittal, Clayton Thomas
2025 A* conf
Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices.
FOCS
Clayton Thomas
2025 J jnl
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms.
CoRR
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024 A* conf
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier.
FOCS
Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2024 J jnl
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier.
CoRR
Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2024 A* conf
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis.
EC
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas
2024 J jnl
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis.
CoRR
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas
2024 J jnl
Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive.
CoRR
Clayton Thomas
2024 A* conf
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.
EC
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024 J jnl
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.
CoRR
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024 A* conf
Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms.
STOC
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas
2023 — —
Explainable Mechanism Design
Clayton Thomas
2023 A* conf
Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions.
EC
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas
2022 J jnl
On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms.
CoRR
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas
2022 J jnl
Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions.
CoRR
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas
2022 — conf
The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets.
SOSA
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
2021 A* conf
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable.
EC
Clayton Thomas
2021 A* conf
Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness.
STOC
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
2021 A conf
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity.
ITCS
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi, Clayton Thomas, Geng Zhao
2020 J jnl
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof.
CoRR
Clayton Thomas
2020 J jnl
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness.
CoRR
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
2020 A conf
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard.
ITCS
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020 J jnl
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity.
CoRR
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Clayton Thomas, Geng Zhao
2019 J jnl
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard.
CoRR
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019 J jnl
Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain.
CoRR
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
2019 J jnl
The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets.
CoRR
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas
2017 — conf
Maximally recoverable codes: The bounded case.
Allerton
Venkata Gandikota, Elena Grigorescu, Clayton Thomas, Minshen Zhu