Christopher A. Wilkens

29 papers A* 7Journal 15Unranked 6
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2022 J jnl
Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets.
Manag. Sci.
Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Nicolás E. Stier Moses, Eric Sodomka, Christopher A. Wilkens
2020 — conf
The Ad Types Problem.
WINE
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julián Mestre, Okke Schrijvers, Christopher A. Wilkens
2019 J jnl
Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems.
CoRR
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens
2019 J jnl
Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems.
J. ACM
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens
2019 J jnl
The Ad Types Problem.
CoRR
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julián Mestre, Okke Schrijvers, Christopher A. Wilkens
2018 A* conf
Matching Auctions for Search and Native Ads.
EC
Ruggiero Cavallo, Maxim Sviridenko, Christopher A. Wilkens
2017 J jnl
GSP - The Cinderella of Mechanism Design.
CoRR
Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh
2017 A* conf
GSP: The Cinderella of Mechanism Design.
WWW
Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh
2017 A* conf
Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads.
WWW
Ruggiero Cavallo, Prabhakar Krishnamurthy, Maxim Sviridenko, Christopher A. Wilkens
2017 J jnl
Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads.
CoRR
Ruggiero Cavallo, Prabhakar Krishnamurthy, Maxim Sviridenko, Christopher A. Wilkens
2016 — conf
Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue.
WINE
Christos Tzamos, Christopher A. Wilkens
2016 — conf
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions.
WINE
Rad Niazadeh, Christopher A. Wilkens
2016 J jnl
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions.
CoRR
Rad Niazadeh, Christopher A. Wilkens
2016 J jnl
Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers.
CoRR
Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh
2015 J jnl
Single-Call Mechanisms.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
Christopher A. Wilkens, Balasubramanian Sivan
2014 J jnl
GSP with General Independent Click-Through-Rates.
CoRR
Ruggiero Cavallo, Christopher A. Wilkens
2014 — conf
GSP with General Independent Click-through-Rates.
WINE
Ruggiero Cavallo, Christopher A. Wilkens
2014 J jnl
The Value of Knowing Your Enemy.
CoRR
Christos Tzamos, Christopher A. Wilkens
2013 J jnl
A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions
CoRR
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
2013 A* conf
A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions.
EC
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
2013 — —
Economics and Computation: Ad Auctions and Other Stories.
Christopher A. Wilkens
2012 J jnl
Coopetitive Ad Auctions
CoRR
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
2012 A* conf
Single-call mechanisms.
EC
Christopher A. Wilkens, Balasubramanian Sivan
2012 J jnl
eBay's Market Intermediation Problem
CoRR
Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
2011 A* conf
Economies with non-convex production and complexity equilibria.
EC
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christopher A. Wilkens
2011 A* conf
Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems.
EC
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens
2010 — conf
Market Communication in Production Economies.
WINE
Christopher A. Wilkens
2010 J jnl
Single-Call Mechanisms
CoRR
Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens
2009 — conf
The Complexity of Models of International Trade.
WINE
Christopher A. Wilkens