Cenk Toker

50 papers B 3Journal 10Unranked 37
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2022 conf
SIU
Atakan Yilmaz, Cenk Toker
2022 conf
SIU
Gündüz Özkul, Cenk Toker
2021 J jnl
Phys. Commun.
Ömer Özdil, Cenk Toker
2020 conf
SIU
Aysun Aslan, Gülce Bal, Cenk Toker
2020 conf
BlackSeaCom
Aysun Aslan, Gulce Bal, Cenk Toker
2020 conf
BlackSeaCom
Uygar Demir, Cenk Toker, Özgür Ekici
2020 conf
SIU
Uygar Demir, Cenk Toker, Özgür Ekici
2019 conf
SIU
Cansu Sunu, Cenk Toker
2019 conf
BlackSeaCom
Uygar Demir, Merve Çigdem Ipek, Cenk Toker, Özgür Ekici
2019 conf
SIU
Uygar Demir, Baris Yuksekkaya, Cenk Toker
2019 J jnl
Phys. Commun.
Baris Yuksekkaya, Cenk Toker
2019 conf
SIU
Cenk Toker, Cansu Sunu, Sevket Gögüsdere
2018 J jnl
IEEE Wirel. Commun. Lett.
Baris Yuksekkaya, Cenk Toker
2017 J jnl
IEEE Commun. Lett.
Gurhan Bulu, Talha Ahmad, Ramy H. Gohary, Cenk Toker, Halim Yanikomeroglu
2017 conf
SIU
Mehmet Kabasakal, Cenk Toker
2017 J jnl
Turkish J. Electr. Eng. Comput. Sci.
Baris Yüksekkaya, Cenk Toker
2017 conf
SIU
Busra Yilmaz, Cenk Toker
2016 conf
SIU
Omer Haliloglu, Cenk Toker, Gurhan Bulu, Baris Yuksekkaya, Halim Yanikomeroglu
2016 conf
TSP
Omer Ozdil, Cenk Toker
2016 conf
SIU
Baris Yuksekkaya, Hazer Inaltekin, Cenk Toker
2016 conf
SIU
Baris Yuksekkaya, Uygar Demir, Hazer Inaltekin, Cenk Toker
2016 conf
SIU
Uygar Demir, Cenk Toker, Omer Haliloglu, Hazer Inaltekin
2015 conf
VTC Fall
Alparslan Fisne, Cenk Toker
2015 conf
SIU
Alparslan Fisne, Cenk Toker
2015 conf
SIU
Cenk Toker
2015 conf
SPAWC
Baris Yuksekkaya, Hazer Inaltekin, Cenk Toker, Halim Yanikomeroglu
2015 conf
SIU
Uygar Demir, Cenk Toker, Hazer Inaltekin
2015 conf
SIU
Baris Yuksekkaya, Hazer Inaltekin, Cenk Toker, Halim Yanikomeroglu
2014 B conf
PIMRC
Omer Haliloglu, Cenk Toker, Gurhan Bulu, Halim Yanikomeroglu
2014 conf
SIU
Alparslan Fisne, Cenk Toker
2014 conf
SIU
Cenk Toker, Feza Arikan, Orhan Arikan
2014 conf
SIU
Uygar Demir, Cenk Toker, Hazer Inaltekin
2014 conf
SIU
Feza Arikan, Cenk Toker, Umut Sezen, M. Necat Deviren, Onur Cilibas, Orhan Arikan
2013 B conf
PIMRC
Gurhan Bulu, Talha Ahmad, Ramy H. Gohary, Halim Yanikomeroglu, Cenk Toker
2013 conf
VTC Fall
Baris Yuksekkaya, Hazer Inaltekin, Cenk Toker
2013 conf
VTC Spring
Omer Haliloglu, Cenk Toker, Gurhan Bulu, Halim Yanikomeroglu
2012 conf
SIU
Mehmet Kabasakal, Cenk Toker
2012 conf
SIU
Yunus Engin Gökdag, Feza Arikan, Cenk Toker, Orhan Arikan
2012 J jnl
IET Signal Process.
Yogachandran Rahulamathavan, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Cenk Toker, Alex B. Gershman
2010 conf
VTC Fall
Baris Yuksekkaya, Cenk Toker
2009 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Signal Process.
Cenk Toker, Gökhan Altin
2007 conf
EUSIPCO
Cenk Toker, Gökhan Altin
2007 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Signal Process.
Cenk Toker, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Jonathon A. Chambers
2005 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Consumer Electron.
Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Cenk Toker
2005 conf
ICASSP (4)
Cenk Toker, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Jonathon A. Chambers
2005 conf
EUSIPCO
Cenk Toker, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Jonathon A. Chambers
2004 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun.
Cenk Toker, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Jonathon A. Chambers
2004 conf
EUSIPCO
Cenk Toker, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Jonathon A. Chambers
2003 B conf
ITW
Cenk Toker, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Jonathon A. Chambers
2001 conf
VTC Fall
Cenk Toker, Yalçin Tanik
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*