Camilo C. Dorea

32 papers B 13C 4Misc 2Journal 9Unranked 4
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2023 C conf
FIE
Maristela Holanda, Lucas R. F. De Miranda, Fernanda Macedo, João Lucas Yamin, Camilo C. Dorea, Christiana Chamon, Dilma Da Silva
2023 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Image Process.
André L. Souto, Ricardo L. de Queiroz, Camilo C. Dorea
2022 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Image Process.
Diogo C. Garcia, Camilo C. Dorea, Renan U. B. Ferreira, Davi Rabbouni Freitas, Ricardo L. de Queiroz, Rogério Higa, Ismael Seidel, Vanessa Testoni
2021 B conf
ICIP
Ismael Seidel, Davi Rabbouni Freitas, Camilo C. Dorea, Diogo C. Garcia, Renan U. B. Ferreira, Rogério Higa, Ricardo L. de Queiroz, Vanessa Testoni
2021 J jnl
CoRR
Ricardo L. de Queiroz, Camilo C. Dorea, Davi Rabbouni Freitas, Maja Krivokuca, Gustavo L. Sandri
2020 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2020 C conf
FIE
Maristela Holanda, George von Borries, Dilma Da Silva, Camilo C. Dorea, Roberta B. Oliveira, Edison Ishikawa
2019 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2018 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2017 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol.
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2017 C conf
MMSP
Vladan Velisavljevic, Camilo C. Dorea, Jacob Chakareski, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2017 B conf
ICIP
Eduardo Peixoto, Bruno Macchiavello, Edson Mintsu Hung, Camilo C. Dorea, Gene Cheung
2016 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2014 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2014 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Multim.
Bruno Macchiavello, Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Gene Cheung, Wai-Tian Tan
2014 Misc conf
ICASSP
Bruno Macchiavello, Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Gene Cheung, Ivan V. Bajic
2013 Misc conf
ICASSP
Diogo C. Garcia, Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2013 J jnl
CoRR
Bruno Macchiavello, Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Gene Cheung, Wai-Tian Tan
2013 J jnl
Multidimens. Syst. Signal Process.
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2013 B conf
ICIP
Bruno Macchiavello, Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Gene Cheung, Wai-Tian Tan
2012 conf
Visual Information Processing and Communication
Bruno Macchiavello, Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Gene Cheung, Wai-Tian Tan
2012 B conf
ICIP
Bruno Macchiavello, Camilo C. Dorea, Edson M. Hung, Gene Cheung, Wai-Tian Tan
2012 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol.
Diogo C. Garcia, Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2011 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2011 conf
EUSIPCO
Edson M. Hung, Camilo C. Dorea, Diogo C. Garcia, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2010 B conf
ICIP
Diogo C. Garcia, Camilo C. Dorea, Ricardo L. de Queiroz
2009 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol.
Camilo C. Dorea, Montse Pardàs, Ferran Marqués
2008 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Òscar Divorra Escoda, Peng Yin, Cristina Gomila
2007 C conf
CBMI
Camilo C. Dorea, Montse Pardàs, Ferran Marqués
2007 conf
ICASSP (1)
Camilo C. Dorea, Montse Pardàs, Ferran Marqués
2006 B conf
ICIP
Camilo C. Dorea, Montse Pardàs, Ferran Marqués
2005 conf
ICIP (2)
Camilo C. Dorea, Montse Pardàs, Ferran Marqués
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*