Caleb Donovick

17 papers A* 2A 2B 2Journal 8Unranked 3
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.
Caleb Donovick, Jackson Melchert, Ross Daly, Lenny Truong, Priyanka Raina, Pat Hanrahan, Clark W. Barrett
2024 B conf
FMCAD
Ross Daly, Caleb Donovick, Caleb Terrill, Jackson Melchert, Priyanka Raina, Clark W. Barrett, Pat Hanrahan
2024 J jnl
CoRR
Ross Daly, Caleb Donovick, Caleb Terrill, Jackson Melchert, Priyanka Raina, Clark W. Barrett, Pat Hanrahan
2023 J jnl
ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.
Kalhan Koul, Jackson Melchert, Kavya Sreedhar, Leonard Truong, Gedeon Nyengele, Keyi Zhang, Qiaoyi Liu, Jeff Setter, Po-Han Chen, Yuchen Mei, Maxwell Strange, Ross Daly, Caleb Donovick, Alex Carsello, Taeyoung Kong, Kathleen Feng, Dillon Huff, Ankita Nayak, Rajsekhar Setaluri, James Thomas, Nikhil Bhagdikar, David Durst, Zachary A. Myers, Nestan Tsiskaridze, Stephen Richardson, Rick Bahr, Kayvon Fatahalian, Pat Hanrahan, Clark W. Barrett, Mark Horowitz, Christopher Torng, Fredrik Kjolstad, Priyanka Raina
2023 conf
ASPLOS (3)
Jackson Melchert, Kathleen Feng, Caleb Donovick, Ross Daly, Ritvik Sharma, Clark W. Barrett, Mark A. Horowitz, Pat Hanrahan, Priyanka Raina
2023 J jnl
CoRR
Caleb Donovick, Ross Daly, Jackson Melchert, Lenny Truong, Priyanka Raina, Pat Hanrahan, Clark W. Barrett
2022 B conf
FMCAD
Ross Daly, Caleb Donovick, Jackson Melchert, Rajsekhar Setaluri, Nestan Tsiskaridze, Priyanka Raina, Clark W. Barrett, Pat Hanrahan
2021 J jnl
CoRR
Jackson Melchert, Kathleen Feng, Caleb Donovick, Ross Daly, Clark W. Barrett, Mark Horowitz, Pat Hanrahan, Priyanka Raina
2021 A conf
SAT
Makai Mann, Amalee Wilson, Yoni Zohar, Lindsey Stuntz, Ahmed Irfan, Kristopher Brown, Caleb Donovick, Allison Guman, Cesare Tinelli, Clark W. Barrett
2020 A* conf
DAC
Rick Bahr, Clark W. Barrett, Nikhil Bhagdikar, Alex Carsello, Ross Daly, Caleb Donovick, David Durst, Kayvon Fatahalian, Kathleen Feng, Pat Hanrahan, Teguh Hofstee, Mark Horowitz, Dillon Huff, Fredrik Kjolstad, Taeyoung Kong, Qiaoyi Liu, Makai Mann, Jackson Melchert, Ankita Nayak, Aina Niemetz, Gedeon Nyengele, Priyanka Raina, Stephen Richardson, Rajsekhar Setaluri, Jeff Setter, Kavya Sreedhar, Maxwell Strange, James Thomas, Christopher Torng, Leonard Truong, Nestan Tsiskaridze, Keyi Zhang
2020 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.
Khaled N. Khasawneh, Meltem Ozsoy, Caleb Donovick, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh, Dmitry Ponomarev
2020 J jnl
CoRR
Lenny Truong, Steven Herbst, Rajsekhar Setaluri, Makai Mann, Ross G. Daly, Keyi Zhang, Caleb Donovick, Daniel Stanley, Mark Horowitz, Clark W. Barrett, Pat Hanrahan
2020 conf
CAV (1)
Lenny Truong, Steven Herbst, Rajsekhar Setaluri, Makai Mann, Ross G. Daly, Keyi Zhang, Caleb Donovick, Daniel Stanley, Mark Horowitz, Clark W. Barrett, Pat Hanrahan
2019 conf
ReConFig
Caleb Donovick, Makai Mann, Clark W. Barrett, Pat Hanrahan
2016 J jnl
IEEE Trans. Computers
Meltem Ozsoy, Khaled N. Khasawneh, Caleb Donovick, Iakov Gorelik, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh, Dmitry Ponomarev
2015 A conf
RAID
Khaled N. Khasawneh, Meltem Ozsoy, Caleb Donovick, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh, Dmitry V. Ponomarev
2015 A* conf
HPCA
Meltem Ozsoy, Caleb Donovick, Iakov Gorelik, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh, Dmitry V. Ponomarev
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*