Caihong Yuan

28 papers C 1Journal 22Unranked 5
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 J jnl
Sci. Comput. Program.
Xiaoke Zhu, Yufeng Shi, Xiaopan Chen, Caihong Yuan, Fumin Qi, Xiao-Yuan Jing
2026 J jnl
Vis. Comput.
Xiaoke Zhu, Boyuan Li, Xiaopan Chen, Fumin Qi, Caihong Yuan, Xiao-Yuan Jing
2025 J jnl
Digit. Signal Process.
Caihong Yuan, Bo Jiang, Xiaopan Chen, Xiaoke Zhu, Wenjuan Liang
2025 J jnl
Int. J. Pattern Recognit. Artif. Intell.
Xiaopan Chen, Zhiwei Dong, Xiaoke Zhu, Fan Zhang, Caihong Yuan
2025 J jnl
Complex Intell. Syst.
Caihong Yuan, Zhijie Guan, Yuanchen Xu, Xiaopan Chen, Xiaoke Zhu, Wenjuan Liang
2024 C conf
ISPA
Caihong Yuan, Yuanchen Xu, Zhijie Guan, Xiaopan Chen, Xiaoke Zhu, Wenjuan Liang
2023 conf
iThings/GreenCom/CPSCom/SmartData/Cybermatics
Chenshuang Su, Mingdong Zou, Yujie Zhou, Xiaoke Zhu, Wenjuan Liang, Caihong Yuan
2023 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Xiaoke Zhu, Minghao Zheng, Xiaopan Chen, Xinyu Zhang, Caihong Yuan, Fan Zhang
2023 conf
ICAICE
Mingdong Zou, Chenshuang Su, Yujie Zhou, Caihong Yuan
2023 conf
ICCSE (1)
Yujie Zhou, Caihong Yuan, Chenshuang Su, Mingdong Zou, Xiaoke Zhu, Wenjuan Liang
2022 J jnl
Signal Process. Image Commun.
Xiaopan Chen, Changlong Li, Xiaoke Zhu, Liang Zheng, Ya Chen, Shanshan Zheng, Caihong Yuan
2021 conf
ICANN (5)
Yihao Luo, Min Xu, Caihong Yuan, Xiang Cao, Liangqi Zhang, Yan Xu, Tianjiang Wang, Qi Feng
2020 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Jingjuan Guo, Caihong Yuan, Zhiqiang Zhao, Ping Feng, Yihao Luo, Tianjiang Wang
2020 J jnl
CoRR
Yihao Luo, Min Xu, Caihong Yuan, Xiang Cao, Yan Xu, Tianjiang Wang, Qi Feng
2019 conf
ICIG (1)
Yihao Luo, Quanzheng Yi, Tianjiang Wang, Ling Lin, Yan Xu, Jing Zhou, Caihong Yuan, Jingjuan Guo, Ping Feng, Qi Feng
2019 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Caihong Yuan, Jingjuan Guo, Ping Feng, Zhiqiang Zhao, Chunyan Xu, Tianjiang Wang, Gwang-Min Choe, Kui Duan
2019 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Chun-Hwa Choe, Gwang-Min Choe, Tianjiang Wang, Sokmin Han, Caihong Yuan
2019 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Gwang-Min Choe, Chun-Hwa Choe, Tianjiang Wang, Hyo-Son So, Cholman Nam, Caihong Yuan
2019 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Jingjuan Guo, Caihong Yuan, Zhiqiang Zhao, Ping Feng, Tianjiang Wang, Kui Duan
2019 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Caihong Yuan, Jingjuan Guo, Ping Feng, Zhiqiang Zhao, Yihao Luo, Chunyan Xu, Tianjiang Wang, Kui Duan
2018 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Ping Feng, Chunyan Xu, Zhiqiang Zhao, Fang Liu, Jingjuan Guo, Caihong Yuan, Tianjiang Wang, Kui Duan
2018 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Zhiqiang Zhao, Ping Feng, Jingjuan Guo, Caihong Yuan, Tianjiang Wang, Fang Liu, Zhijian Zhao, Zongmin Cui, Bin Wu
2018 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Jingjuan Guo, Caihong Yuan, Zhiqiang Zhao, Ping Feng, Tianjiang Wang, Fang Liu
2018 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Caihong Yuan, Chunyan Xu, Tianjiang Wang, Fang Liu, Zhiqiang Zhao, Ping Feng, Jingjuan Guo
2017 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Zhiqiang Zhao, Ping Feng, Tianjiang Wang, Fang Liu, Caihong Yuan, Jingjuan Guo, Zhijian Zhao, Zongmin Cui
2017 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Zhiqiang Zhao, Tianjiang Wang, Fang Liu, Gwang-Min Choe, Caihong Yuan, Zongmin Cui
2017 J jnl
Neurocomputing
Ping Feng, Chunyan Xu, Zhiqiang Zhao, Fang Liu, Caihong Yuan, Tianjiang Wang, Kui Duan
2016 J jnl
Multim. Tools Appl.
Gwang-Min Choe, Caihong Yuan, Tianjiang Wang, Qi Feng, Gyong-Il Hyon, Chun-Hwa Choe, Jonghwan Ri, Gumhyok Ji
docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md
← Index docs/CODE_ANALYSIS_APPROACH.md markdown
# Code Analysis Approach

This document explains the code analysis methodologies used in the REDB malware analysis framework.

## Disassembly Normalization

The framework implements a sophisticated three-level normalization strategy for disassembled code that provides different levels of abstraction for similarity detection and feature extraction.

### Overall Normalization Strategy

The framework implements a **hierarchical abstraction approach** where each instruction is normalized at three different levels simultaneously:

1. **Level 0 (fully_normalized)**: Maximum abstraction - reduces operands to broad categories
2. **Level 1 (api_normalized)**: Medium abstraction - preserves semantic meaning while normalizing details  
3. **Level 2 (category_normalized)**: Minimum abstraction - maintains architectural specificity

This multi-level approach allows analysts to perform similarity analysis at different granularities depending on their specific detection goals.

### Implementation Architecture

The normalization process follows this workflow:

1. **Token Parsing**: Each instruction is parsed from Binary Ninja's instruction tokens to extract the mnemonic and operands
2. **Multi-Level Processing**: Each operand is processed through all three normalization functions
3. **Instruction Reconstruction**: Normalized instructions are rebuilt with the mnemonic plus normalized operands
4. **Control Flow Tagging**: Control flow instructions get a `<TARGET>` suffix for easier pattern matching

### Level 0: Fully Normalized (Maximum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Creates the most abstract representation for broad pattern detection across different malware families.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: All registers normalized to semantic categories via `normalize_register()`:
  - General purpose registers (EAX, EBX, R8, etc.) → `GPR`
  - Stack/Base pointers (ESP, EBP, RSP) → `PTR` 
  - SIMD registers (XMM0, XMM1) → `XMM`
  - FPU registers (ST0, ST1) → `FPU`
- **Memory Operations**: All memory references → `MEM`
- **Constants**: All immediate values → `CONST`  
- **Data References**: All symbols/data references → `DATA_REF`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR MEM
call CreateFileW     → CALL DATA_REF <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR CONST
```

### Level 1: API Normalized (Medium Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Preserves semantic distinctions while normalizing architectural details. Focuses on behavioral patterns and API usage.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Categorized by functional role:
  - Data registers → `GPR_DATA`
  - Index registers (ESI, EDI) → `GPR_INDEX`  
  - Stack registers (ESP, EBP) → `GPR_STACK`
  - SIMD registers → `XMM_REG`
- **Memory Operations**: Classified by access pattern:
  - Stack access → `MEM_STACK`
  - String operations → `MEM_STRING` 
  - General access → `MEM_GENERAL`
- **Constants**: Categorized by range:
  - Small constants (-16 to 16) → `CONST_{value}`
  - Large constants → `CONST_LARGE`
- **API Calls**: Resolved to specific API names:
  - `CreateFileW` → `API_CreateFileW`
  - Other symbols → `DATA_SYM`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV GPR_DATA MEM_STACK
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_CreateFileW <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD GPR_DATA CONST_LARGE
```

### Level 2: Category Normalized (Minimum Abstraction)

**Purpose**: Maintains architectural specificity while normalizing specific values. Best for detecting variants with similar implementation details.

**Transformations**:
- **Registers**: Architecture-specific categories:
  - 64-bit registers → `REG_64`, with special cases for `REG_64_SP`, `REG_64_BP`
  - 32-bit registers → `REG_32`
  - 16/8-bit registers → `REG_16_8`
- **Memory Operations**: Detailed addressing mode classification:
  - Complex addressing → `MEM_SCALED_INDEX`
  - Base + offset → `MEM_BASE_OFFSET`
  - Direct addressing → `MEM_DIRECT`
- **Constants**: Type-specific classification:
  - Hexadecimal → `CONST_HEX`
  - Decimal → `CONST_DEC`
- **API Calls**: Categorized by functional group:
  - File operations → `API_FILE_OP`
  - Memory operations → `API_MEMORY_OP`
  - Network operations → `API_NETWORK_OP`

**Example**:
```
mov eax, [ebp+8]     → MOV REG_32 MEM_BASE_OFFSET
call CreateFileW     → CALL API_FILE_OP <TARGET>
add ecx, 0x10        → ADD REG_32 CONST_HEX
```

### Key Features and Benefits

#### 1. Multi-Granularity Similarity Detection
- **Level 0**: Detects broad behavioral patterns across malware families
- **Level 1**: Identifies API usage patterns and semantic similarities
- **Level 2**: Finds variants with similar implementation approaches

#### 2. Robust Pattern Matching
- Control flow instructions tagged with `<TARGET>` for easier CFG analysis
- Handles edge cases with fallback mechanisms
- Consistent uppercase normalization prevents case sensitivity issues

#### 3. API-Aware Analysis
The framework includes sophisticated API recognition through the `ApiCategory` enum and resolution methods:
- **File Operations**: CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, etc.
- **Memory Operations**: VirtualAlloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualProtect, etc.  
- **Registry Operations**: RegOpenKey, RegSetValue, etc.
- **Network Operations**: WSASocket, send, recv, etc.
- **Process Operations**: CreateProcess, OpenProcess, etc.

#### 4. Scalable Feature Extraction
Each level produces different hash values for the same function:
- `fully_normalized_disassembly_hash`
- `api_normalized_disassembly_hash`  
- `category_normalized_disassembly_hash`

This enables efficient similarity searches at different abstraction levels in the ClickHouse database.

### Practical Applications for Malware Analysis

#### Threat Hunting Scenarios:

1. **Family Detection** (Level 0): Find samples using similar algorithmic approaches regardless of specific implementation
2. **Variant Analysis** (Level 1): Identify samples with similar API usage patterns and behavioral semantics
3. **Code Reuse Detection** (Level 2): Discover samples sharing specific implementation techniques or code fragments

#### Similarity Metrics Integration:
- Each normalization level can be used with different fuzzy hashing algorithms (ssdeep, TLSH, etc.)
- Level 0 works well with structural similarity metrics
- Level 1 optimal for behavioral similarity analysis  
- Level 2 suitable for implementation-specific pattern matching

This three-tiered approach provides malware analysts with flexible tools for detecting similarities across the threat landscape while maintaining the precision needed for detailed variant analysis.



---

*More code analysis approaches will be documented in additional sections as they are implemented.*