Artem Tsikiridis

22 papers A* 3B 3Journal 10Unranked 5
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 A* conf
Breaking Barriers, Finding Boundaries: Not Obviously Manipulable Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design.
AAAI
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis, Carmine Ventre
2026 A* conf
Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets.
SODA
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions.
CoRR
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 B conf
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.
SAGT
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.
CoRR
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Pandora's box problem with time constraints.
Artif. Intell.
Georgios Amanatidis, Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
Smoothness Meets Autobidding: Tight Price of Anarchy Bounds for Simultaneous First-Price Auctions.
CoRR
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2025 J jnl
The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms.
CoRR
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis, Carmine Ventre
2024 — conf
Pandora's Box Problem Over Time.
WINE
Georgios Amanatidis, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Artem Tsikiridis
2024 J jnl
Pandora's Box Problem Over Time.
CoRR
Georgios Amanatidis, Federico Fusco, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Artem Tsikiridis
2024 A* conf
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model.
EC
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2024 J jnl
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model.
CoRR
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2023 — —
Design and analysis of auction mechanisms: algorithms and incentives
Artem Tsikiridis
2023 — conf
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents.
WINE
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2023 J jnl
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents.
CoRR
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
2022 B conf
On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets.
SAGT
Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Artem Tsikiridis
2021 — conf
Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction.
WINE
Evangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis
2019 — conf
On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions.
WINE
Evangelos Markakis, Artem Tsikiridis
2019 J jnl
Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction.
Theory Comput. Syst.
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis, Artem Tsikiridis
2018 — conf
Integrating clinical data from hospital databases.
SWH@ISWC
Kostis Karozos, Iosif Spartalis, Artem Tsikiridis, Despoina Trivela, Vasilis Vassalos
2017 B conf
Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction.
SAGT
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis, Artem Tsikiridis