Ariel Schvartzman

30 papers A* 7A 3Misc 1Journal 16Unranked 2
YearRankTypeTitle / Venue / Authors
2026 A* conf
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World.
WWW
Gagan Aggarwal, Andrés Perlroth, Ariel Schvartzman, Mingfei Zhao
2024 J jnl
Auto-Bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey.
SIGecom Exch.
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng, Zhe Feng, Gagan Goel, Christopher Liaw, Haihao Lu, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Andrés Perlroth, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng, Di Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Mingfei Zhao, Wennan Zhu, Song Zuo
2024 J jnl
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey.
CoRR
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng, Zhe Feng, Gagan Goel, Christopher Liaw, Haihao Lu, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Andrés Perlroth, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng, Di Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Mingfei Zhao, Wennan Zhu, Song Zuo
2024 — conf
On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three.
ADT
David Miksaník, Ariel Schvartzman, Jan Soukup
2024 J jnl
On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three.
CoRR
David Miksaník, Ariel Schvartzman, Jan Soukup
2024 J jnl
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World.
CoRR
Gagan Aggarwal, Andrés Perlroth, Ariel Schvartzman, Mingfei Zhao
2024 — conf
Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities.
ADT
David M. Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue
2024 J jnl
Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities.
CoRR
David M. Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue
2023 A* conf
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling.
EC
Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li, Ariel Schvartzman
2022 J jnl
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling.
CoRR
Sepehr Assadi, Ariel Schvartzman
2022 A* conf
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms.
NeurIPS
Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022 J jnl
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms.
CoRR
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020 A conf
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence.
ITCS
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
2020 — —
Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design
Ariel Schvartzman
2020 A* conf
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents.
EC
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020 J jnl
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents.
CoRR
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019 J jnl
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence.
CoRR
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
2019 J jnl
Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.
CoRR
Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019 A* conf
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.
FOCS
Pravesh Kothari, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019 A* conf
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values.
EC
Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018 J jnl
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values.
CoRR
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018 J jnl
The fewest clues problem.
Theor. Comput. Sci.
Erik D. Demaine, Fermi Ma, Ariel Schvartzman, Erik Waingarten, Scott Aaronson
2018 A* conf
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design.
SODA
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017 J jnl
Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Two-Player Approximate Correlated Equilibria.
Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex.
Young Kun-Ko, Ariel Schvartzman
2017 A conf
Coding in Undirected Graphs Is Either Very Helpful or Not Helpful at All.
ITCS
Mark Braverman, Sumegha Garg, Ariel Schvartzman
2017 A conf
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules.
ITCS
Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017 J jnl
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design.
CoRR
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016 J jnl
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules.
CoRR
Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016 J jnl
Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all.
CoRR
Mark Braverman, Sumegha Garg, Ariel Schvartzman
2016 Misc conf
The Fewest Clues Problem.
FUN
Erik D. Demaine, Fermi Ma, Ariel Schvartzman, Erik Waingarten, Scott Aaronson